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ABSTRACT         
 
ABSTRACT 
Demand for mobile payment (m-payment) services is transforming the banking 
payment system in unprecedented ways1 and at a growing rate.2 These 
developments raise unique concerns and risks3 which must be managed by the 
adoption of an appropriate regulatory framework if this ‘Fintech’4 innovation is 
to offer a net social and economic benefit.5 
This work will draw on Western and Islamic consumer protection 
literature to analyse how Saudi Arabian law at present protects consumers 
when it comes to m-payments, particularly unauthorised mobile payment 
transactions and consumer data in order to maintain privacy and protect them 
against breaches of their privacy. In so doing, the research seeks to make an 
original contribution to the Saudi Arabian legal system in the presently under-
researched areas of both consumer protection and m-payment services. It will 
be demonstrated that the Saudi Arabian legal provisions are inadequate and fall 
 
1 A.A. Shaikh and H. Karjaluoto, ‘Mobile banking adoption: A literature review’ 
(2015) Telematics and Informatics 32 (1), 129-142. 
2 P.A. Salz, The Netsize Guide 2009: Mobile Society & Me, when worlds combine (Netsize 
2009) 102; S. Romero, 'The unstoppable growth of digital banking: 3 billion users by 2021', 
BBVA, 22 February 2017 <https://www.bbva.com/en/unstoppable-growth-digital-banking-3-
billion-users-2021/> 19th November 2017. 
3 A. Zercan, New Technologies, New Risks?: Innovation and Countering the Financing of 
Terrorism (World Bank 2010) 11. 
4 The Oxford Dictionary defines Fintech as “[c]omputer programs and other technology used to 
support or enable banking and financial services.”  Oxford Dictionary, 'Fintech', 2017 
<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/fintech> accessed 20th May 2017. 
5 G.G. Kaufman et al, Achieving Financial Stability: Challenges To Prudential Regulation 
(World Scientific 2017) 270. 
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short of the requirements of Sharia law in many respects: Consumer protection 
is insufficient and is not appropriately targeted to address the specific, unique 
risks raised by m-payment services.6 At the same time, restrictive legislation 
designed in the context of traditional banking has created a hostile regulatory 
environment which has failed to stimulate innovation and growth within this 
potentially promising sector. 
With a view to proposing a model for reform of Saudi regulation, the 
United Kingdom (‘UK’) legal system will be scrutinised to assess whether 
lessons can be learnt in providing greater protection to customers in a Saudi 
Arabian context while remaining Sharia compliant. The UK is a valuable 
selection as a comparator as it has succeeded in balancing these objectives to a 
significant extent, achieving greater consumer protection than is currently 
available in Saudi Arabia (‘SA’) without compromising the strength and 
freedom of the market. There are also strong parallels between the two 
societies particularly in respect of openness to Fintech innovation.7 It will be 
proposed that the UK law provides a positive example of how this systematic 
defect in the regulation of m-payments can be remedied, in addition to more 
specific illustrations of provisions and policies which can aid in balancing the 
demands of consumer protection and market development. Recommendations 
are made as to how these can be usefully incorporated into a broader reform of 
the Saudi regulatory regime.  
 
6 A.S. Albaqme, 'Consumer Protection under Saudi Arabia Law' (2014) Arab Law Quarterly 
28(2), 158-175. 
7 Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority, 'Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority Launches 
FintechSaudi with the Objective to Make the Kingdom a Pioneer in the Financial Technology 
Sector', 1 May 2018 <http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-US/News/Pages/news30042018.aspx> 
accessed 6 March 2019; Sir Mark Walport, FinTech Futures: The UK as a World Leader in 
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Research Aim and Objectives 
Demand for mobile payment (m-payment) services through hand-held, portable 
devices is transforming the banking payment system in unprecedented ways as 
customers can now use their smartphones to conduct financial transactions and 
access financial information.8 With the advent of the internet, online or e-
banking has been made possible.9 E-banking consists of making available 
traditional and new banking services and products through the internet from an 
electronic device, such as a personal computer ('PC').10 Accordingly, certain 
banking services are delivered through the medium of the internet and not 
traditional bank branches.11 E-banking enables bank customers to log into their 
bank accounts on the webpage of their bank in order to check their bank 
account and manage online payments.   
With the arrival of the smartphone, customers can also access their 
bank account online. M-banking can be defined as using mobile devices to 
conduct banking business.12 As mobile phones are small, it is not very practical 
 
8 Shaikh and Karjaluoto n 1. 
9 UNCTAD, Information Economy Report 2007-2008: Science and Technology for 
Development: The new paradigm of ICT (United Nations 2007) 213. 
10 V.C. Joshi, E-Finance: The Future is Here (2nd ed, Sage 2010) 37. 
11 UNCTAD n 9, 213.  
12 M. Khosrow-Pour, E-Commerce for Organizational Development and Competitive 
Advantage (IGI Global 2013) 227. 
29 
 
to log into the webpage online. M-banking apps have thus been made available 
which are more convenient and quicker to use, and which bank customers can 
download onto their smartphone.13 These m-banking apps enable customers to 
check balances, send money to other accounts and make payments.14  
Increasingly, bank customers have also been offered to use m-payment 
services which can be used for online and proximity payments, as further 
explored in chapter 1, section 1.2.15 It is this latter m-payment innovation with 
which this research is concerned in the specific context of protecting 
consumers against unauthorised m-payment transactions, safeguarding 
consumers' data and their privacy, including against breaches of their privacy.  
The main focus of the thesis is thus on the use of mobiles for effecting payment 
transactions. 
A m-payment consists of funds being transferred in return for a service 
or goods and the mobile phone is employed to initiate and confirm the 
payment.16 The payer can be at the point of sale (‘POS’) or mobile.17 In other 
words, a m-payment is a noncash kind of payment service conducted through a 
mobile.18   
 
13 M. Cerna et al, 'Quality in Mobile Payment Service in India' in A. K. Kar et al (eds), Digital 
Nations – Smart Cities, Innovation, and Sustainability: 16th IFIP WG 6.11 Conference on e-
Business, e-Services, and e-Society, i3E 2017, Delhi, India, November 21-23, 2017, 
Proceedings (Springer 2017) 191. 
14 BBVA, 'Mobile Banking, New Experience in the Post PC Era', Innovation Edge, April 2012, 
1-67, 23. 
15 OECD, ‘Report on Consumer Protection in Online and Mobile Payments’, 17 August 2012, 
1-45, 8; BBVA, 'Mobile Payments, Paying with a mobile device', Innovation Edge, November 
2012, 10. 
16 H. Nahari and R.L. Krutz, Web Commerce Security: Design and Development (Wiley 
Publishing Inc 2011) 1.6. 
17 Ibid. 
18 F.J. Mtenzi et al, Mobile Technologies and Socio-Economic Development in Emerging 
Nations (IGI Global 2018) 50. 
30 
 
The thesis is looking at how the laws in the UK and SA compare in 
terms of providing protection to consumers when they move increasingly to the 
use of their mobiles to effect payment transactions.  In this context, it is 
essential to further distinguish online or electronic (e-) banking and m-banking 
services from m-payment services. 
Online payments, including through e-banking or m-banking apps, can 
be made, for instance, via debit cards, credit cards, through an account based 
systems (such as a bank account), online payment banking whereby a 
consumer is redirected to his/her own bank from a merchant's website or 
mediating services (e.g. PayPal), prepaid payment services or electronic 
currency systems, automated bill payment mechanisms, escrow services or an 
online wallet registered with a payment provider to which money can be 
uploaded with a credit or debit card.19  
In contrast, m-payments are made through smartphones in two main 
ways, namely through contactless, mobile, POS payments or mobile remote 
payments.20 A contactless, mobile, POS payment takes place when the seller 
and buyer are there to execute a contactless payment through radio 
technologies, such as Bluetooth and NFC, as discussed in chapter 1, section 
1.2.21 A mobile remote (i.e. non-location specific) payment is made with the 
smartphone over a telecommunication network, e.g. the internet or the global 
system for mobile communication ('GSM').22 The remote m-payment can be 
 
19 OECD n 15, 7-8. 
20 Ibid, 8-9. 
21 Ibid, 8. 
22 Ibid, 9. 
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conducted through a short message service ('SMS'):23  A mobile payment 
service provider ('MPSP') allows the consumer to create an account.24 The 
account is linked to a pre-paid, credit or debit card or bank account.25  A SMS 
is sent by the consumer which contains the payee's phone number.26 The 
consumer enters a personal identification number ('PIN') for authentication 
purposes.27  The MPSP then submits the payment.28 The remote m-payment 
can also be made through a wireless application protocol ('WAP'): The 
smartphone's browser is used to go to a web merchant where purchases are 
made, just like an online purchase.29  
While traditional banking laws apply to online payments, they appear 
ill-suited for m-payments for a number of reasons, particularly the new risks 
they pose for customers, as detailed in chapter 2, as well as the innovation 
stifling impact they would have on Fintech30 innovation.31 Also, a different 
treatment in law appears essential since unlike credit institutions32, payment 
institutions cannot accept funds in order to deposit them.33   
Furthermore, it may be difficult to apply or adapt and adequately 









30 Oxford Dictionary n 4. 
31 OECD n 15, 16; G. Gimigliano, Bitcoin and Mobile Payments: Constructing a European 
Union Framework (Palgrave Macmillan 2016) 124. 
32 See Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, Part IV. 
33 A.R. Lodder and A.D. Murray, EU Regulation of E-Commerce: A Commentary (Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2017) 158. 
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regulation to address emerging problems within this emerging field.34 
Countries, such as the UK35, Kenya36 and South Korea37, have therefore 
promulgated new statutory regimes for payment services.38 For instance, the 
UK has created two separate authorisation frameworks to permit non-banks, 
namely payment and e-money institutions, to make available m-payment 
services and to address the unique risk and protect customers, as discussed in 
chapter 4, sections 4.3.4 and 4.3.3.  
A payment institution includes those which provide, for instance, 
account information services, provide and maintain payment accounts for 
payers, execute payment transactions or initiate payment services.39 In contrast 
to payment institutions, an electronic money (‘e-money’) institution issues 
“means of payment in the form of electronic money”40, though credit 
institutions can also issue electronic money (‘e-money’).41 E-money is 
monetary value which is issued when funds are received and stored on a 
remote server or an electronic payment device by a money holder who has an 
 
34 Ibid (OECD) 17. 
35 The Payment Services Regulations 2009, the Electronic Money Regulations 2011 and the 
Payment Services Regulations 2017. 
36 The Kenyan National Payment Systems Act 2011. 
37 South Korea’s Electronic Financial Transaction Act No. 11087. 
38 OECD n 15, 17. 
39 Regulation 2, Regulation 4(1)(a), Regulation 6 of the PSR 2017 and see esp. Part 1 of 
Schedule 1 (payment services). 
40 Directive 2000/46/EC on the Taking Up, Pursuit and Prudential Supervision of the Business 
of Electronic Money Institutions, Article 1(3)(a). 
41 Point 15 of Annex of Directive 2013/36/EC; Lodder and Murray n 33, 158; European 
Payment Institutions Federation, 'What is a Payment Institution?', 2019 




e-money account.42 Hence, e-money is monetary value which is stored 
electronically on a device to make payments.43  
 The statutory impetus in the evolving Fintech field is vital to safeguard 
m-payment customers, particularly against unauthorised m-payment 
transactions. Legislative steps must also be taken to protect m-payment 
customers’ data and privacy, including against breaches, as m-payments enable 
companies to obtain a precise picture about consumers, to gather detailed 
information about consumers and to exchange data about their purchases with 
other businesses.44 The making available of m-payment services by companies, 
such as Facebook, with extensive digitalised customer data further highlights 
the need for legislators to debate how best to protect customers' data, their 
privacy and protect them against breaches of their privacy.45 
Also, an up to date legislative framework is essential to promote 
innovation in an area, which is witnessing massive growth; in 2016 the global 
m-payment market was valued an estimated $601 billion and by 2023 it is 
expected to grow to $4,574 billion.46 Hence, legislators must address how m-
payments are regulated in light of the popularisation of m-payments which is 
 
42 OECD n 15, 18; see Electronic Money Regulations 2011 (‘EMR 2011’), Regulation 2(1); 
Electronic Money Directive 2009/110/EC, Article 2(2). 
43 M. Arnone and L. Bandiera, ‘Monetary Policy, Monetary Areas, and Financial Development 
with Electronic Money’, IMF Working Paper WP/04/122, July 2004, 4. 
44 C.J. Hoofnagle et al, 'Mobile Payments: Consumer Benefits & New Privacy Concerns' 
(2012) University of California, 1-19, 2 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2045580> accessed 5 
March 2019. 
45 D.A. Zetsche et al, 'From Fintech to TechFin: The Regulatory Challenges of Data-Driven 
Finance' (2017) European Banking Institute Working Paper Series 3, No.6, 1-36, 14. 
46 K. Sonawane, 'Mobile Payment Market Expected to Reach $ 4,574 Billion by 2023', Allied 
Market Research, February 2018 <https://www.alliedmarketresearch.com/press-
release/mobile-payment-market.html> accessed 5 March 2019. 
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incrementally replacing cash.47 Unlike traditional banking services, consumer 
protection for customers who use Fintech raises unique concerns due to some 
of the associated technological risks and dangers that these services pose in 
relation to the securing of financial assets and safeguarding of confidential, 
private personal online data against cybercriminal activity and failures in 
system functionality, as discussed in chapter 2.48 Without consumer protection 
customers may be exploited by m-payment providers which unfairly hold them 
responsible for their own security breaches and system failings. If customers 
are inadequately protected, they could incur large financial losses and have 
their personal data and privacy breached e.g. through misuse of personal 
transaction data and transaction information.49 Therefore, an appropriate legal 
framework must be adopted for Fintech innovation to be genuinely socially 
beneficial.50 This framework would incorporate laws that allocated liability by 
carefully delineating the circumstances in which customers, m-payment 
providers or third parties are to be held accountable.   
The research aim is thus to analyse how Saudi Arabian law protects m-
payment customers, particularly against unauthorised m-payment transactions 
and protects consumers' data and their privacy, including against untoward 
privacy intrusions and thereby seeks to make an original contribution to the 
Saudi Arabian legal system in the presently under-researched areas of both 
consumer protection and m-payment services. The legislative analysis deals 
 
47 L. Lu, 'Decoding Alipay: mobile payments, a cashless society and regulatory challenges' 
(2018) Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law, 40-43, 40. 
48 Zercan n 3. 
49 P.-L. Chatain et al, Integrity in Mobile Phone Financial Services: Measures for Mitigating 
Risks (World Bank 2008) 40; S.-H. Chun, 'E-Commerce Liability and Security Breaches in 
Mobile Payment for e-Business Sustainability' (2019) Sustainability, 11, 715-733, 718. 
50 Kaufman et al n 5. 
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with m-payment services provided by banks and companies, such as Apple Pay 
or PayPal. For example, PayPal is available in the UK and SA.51 PayPal 
provides a cloud-based remote mobile wallet through a closed loop system 
which makes it possible to use money held in the PayPal account for payments 
through a digital wallet.52 ApplePay is a digital wallet through which m-
payments can be made remotely and which can be used by the majority of bank 
customers with an iPhone in the UK.53 While ApplePay had not been launched 
by the end of 2017 in SA, six banks of the neighbouring UAE announced its 
use in October 2017.54 Procrastination in adopting a law by SA may mean that 
financial benefits for the economy are foregone. As citizen’s property is being 
handled through the discussed technologies, the requisite legal consumer 
safeguards must also be debated by policy and lawmakers. 
The predominant focus of this work is the consumer protection legal 
literature, in order to present the various arguments/rationales formulated to 
advocate for, or caution against, providing consumer protection through legal 
means. In chapter 3, the literature is synthesised in order to establish what is 
known and, by extension, the gaps in existing knowledge which may be 
addressed by this research. The review seeks to identify whether there are any 
 
51 PayPal Holdings Inc is a United States (US) based business which provides global online 
payments: PayPal <https://www.paypal.com/uk/home> accessed July 2015; PayPal, 'We get 
where you're coming from.' 2017 <https://www.paypal.com/en/webapps/mpp/country-
worldwide> accessed 25 November 2017. 
52 C. Scardovi, Restructuring and Innovation in Banking (Springer 2016) 33-34. 
53 R. LeRoy Miller, Business Law Today, Comprehensive Edition, Text & Cases (11th ed,  
Cengage Learning 2017) 552; J. Russell, 'Apple is 'working rapidly' to launch Apple Pay in 
more countries in Asia and Europe', TechCrunch, 26 May 2016 
<https://techcrunch.com/2016/05/26/apple-is-working-rapidly-to-launch-apple-pay-in-more-
countries-in-asia-and-europe/> accessed 10 November 2016; Apple UK, 'Find it all in Wallet.' 
2017 <https://www.apple.com/uk/apple-pay/> accessed 23rd November 2017. 
54 A.R. Cabrai, 'ApplePay launches in UAE and 3 other countries today', Khaleej Times, 24 
October 2017 <https://www.khaleejtimes.com/technology/apple-pay-is-now-in-the-uae> 
accessed 16 November 2017. 
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gaps in the literature which the thesis intends to fill in and respond to in 
subsequent chapters. The review of the consumer protection literature also 
provides direction. It acts as a framework for the analysis of UK and Saudi 
laws in chapters 4 and 5 in order to ascertain the consumer protection approach 
being taken by each jurisdiction respectively in the context of m-payment 
services and helps with the recommendations which are derived from this 
research.  
From this understanding in chapter 3, it emerges that a vulnerable 
customer should still be able to seek compensation from the m-payment 
provider, even in circumstances where s/he is partly to blame. In contrast, a 
reasonably circumspect customer will find it more difficult to pursue his/her m-
payment provider for omissions on his/her behalf. The adoption of a vulnerable 
consumer approach within consumer protection law may promote naivety and 
does not encourage learning. However, it also arguably incentivises m-payment 
providers to adopt stronger security measures and to engage in heightened risk 
management, thereby helping to comply with the Islamic halal doctrine.55 Such 
an approach may help to promote social unity because a wider safety net is 
created for consumers.56 It should arguably always be the case when customers 
have discharged their basic obligations. 
Accordingly, the thesis analyses how the laws in the UK and SA 
compare in terms of protecting consumers against unauthorised m-payment 
 
55 M.K. Hassan and M. Rashid, Management of Islamic Finance: Principle, Practice, and 
Performance (Emerald Publishing Limited 2019) 45. 
56 J.M. Paterson and G. Brody, '"Safety Net” Consumer Protection: Using Prohibitions on 
Unfair and Unconscionable Conduct to Respond to Predatory Business Models' (2015) Journal 
of Consumer Policy 38, 331-355, 340. 
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transactions and consumers data and their privacy, including against breaches 
of their privacy, when they move increasingly to the use of their mobiles to 
effect payment transactions. In addressing the research aim the following five 
objectives will be clearly defined and will be used to help direct the discussion: 
1. What are the key technologies currently used to facilitate m-payment 
services? The answer to this will include showing the considerable 
impact that Fintech57 has had upon the banking and financial sector. 
This question is a valuable starting point as it sheds light on the benefits 
which these technologies offer to consumers, which are to be weighed 
against the harm caused.  
2. What risks do m-payment services pose in comparison to traditional, 
non-technological banking practices?  This question is important as it 
provides the counterpoint to the benefits identified in answering the 
first question above; taken together these are the two sides of the debate 
which must be weighed and balanced by the law. Overall, the objective 
is to foreground what exactly it is that m-payment consumers need to be 
protected against since the law must respond to these practical issues as 
and when disputes arise. In short, legislation should demarcate the 
boundaries of acceptable business conduct for m-payment providers 
which offer m-payment services and the customers who utilise them, 
particularly in relation to unauthorised m-payment transactions and 
safeguarding consumers data and privacy. 
 
57 Oxford Dictionary n 4. 
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3. What does the existing legal consumer protection literature in the West 
and the Sharia reveal about the different consumer protection 
frameworks?  What evidence is there that these frameworks are 
influenced by either the neo-liberal and ‘consumer economic interest’ 
or the social welfare and ‘consumer protection interest approaches?”58 
And, where is Sharia law positioned in relation to these paradigms?  
Central to this objective is an evaluation of the Islamic stance towards 
business dealings, consumers, consumer rights and protection since all 
of these aspects are very influential in shaping the policy stance of the 
legislator. It is explored how the Sharia principle of good faith might be 
one way of to help developing a more pro-consumer set up of 
legislation or legislative provisions when it comes to m-payments. 
Answering these questions provides crucial background to the 
regulatory environments in the UK and SA, in the context of which 
regulation of Fintech can be appraised.  
4. How does UK law frame, provide for and regulate the rights and 
obligations of the m-payment provider and customer, including in 
relation to unauthorised m-payment transactions and the protection of 
consumers' data and their privacy? And, what does this reveal about the 
policy orientation undergirding its legislation of the complex m-
payment ecosystem? 
5. How does Saudi Arabian law currently provide for and regulate the 
rights and obligations of the bank and the customer in payment 
 
58 J.Q. Whitman, 'Consumerism Versus Producerism: A Study in Comparative Law' (2007) 
Yale Law Journal 117, 340-406, 356. 
39 
 
transactions? And does this extend to m-payment services?  The 
question of whether Saudi Arabian law adequately protects m-payment 
customers against the risks of unauthorised m-payment transactions and 
safeguards consumers' data and their privacy in a manner that is 
compliant with Sharia law, and if there are lessons that can be learnt 
from the UK requires critical appraisal.  
 
Research Background and Focus 
Consumer protection policies and laws are designed to mitigate business 
negligence and prevent the exploitation of consumers and enhance consumer 
wellbeing.59 The rapid technological evolvement of Fintech and the globalised 
arena in which it functions has meant that customers are continuously offered a 
wide variety of diverse services, most recently m-payment services.60  
However, it is concerning that these complex technological developments have 
not been accompanied by the necessary financial consumer protection in 
countries, such as SA, as discussed in chapter 5.61 This is a situation that leaves 
consumers exposed to the concomitant risks of regulatory weaknesses, 
including business and system failures, fraud or exploitation, as further 
discussed in chapter 2. In these circumstances, the state is the only authority 
 
59 P. Cartwright, Consumer Protection and the Criminal Law: Law, Theory, and Policy in the 
UK (CUP 2004) 194; J.J. Xiao, Consumer Economic Wellbeing (Springer 2015) 73; F. Kessler, 
'The Protection of the Consumer under Modern Sales Law, Part 1, A Comparative Study' 
(1964-1965) Yale Law Journal 74, 262-285, 262. 
60 Ibid. 
61 I. Lukonga, 'Fintech, Inclusive Growth and Cyber Risks: Focus on the MENAP and CCA 
Regions', IMF Working Paper, WP/18/201, 2018, 19. 
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with any meaningful power to act to protect consumers,62 particularly against 
unauthorised mobile payment transactions, as well as their data and privacy.   
When considering how to draft and implement consumer protection 
laws within a m-payment context, a number of key aspects come into play and 
shall be the subject of in-depth analysis in the thesis; central to this is the 
question of fair allocation of liability between m-payment service providers 
and consumers. This requires delineating the rights and responsibilities of each 
party.  Typically, m-payment risks arise from customer errors, security 
problems and third parties, as discussed in chapter 2. Consumer protection laws 
could incorporate the imposition of legal duties, such as, the tortious law of 
negligence and duty of care, general contract law, including statutes which 
limit unfair exclusion clauses, as well as regulations which promote fairness 
and justice, as identified through the analysis of the UK approach in chapter 4.  
They would demarcate statutory and regulatory obligations relating to 
mandated disclosure and the operation of effective risk management systems 
and oversight, to name but a few.  Equally, the consumer also has rights and 
duties. The right to seek redress for unauthorised transactions and data 
breaches is essential, as identified in chapter 4. Customer duties could include 
keeping the identity authentication information safe, installing security, anti-
virus and updating software, and exercising a level of discernment and 
vigilance when conducting m-payment transactions through public Wi-Fi 
networks, as observed in chapter 2. 
 
62 B. Schuller, 'Social peace via pragmatic civil rights -the Scandinavian model of consumer 
law'. In H.W. Micklitz (eds), The Many Concepts of Social Justice in European Private Law 
(Edward Elgar 2011) 384. 
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However, these considerations of the impact on m-payment providers 
and consumers are not the only forces which shape consumer protection 
policies; perhaps even more significantly, these reflect the policy orientation of 
a region, country or framework, as is explored in chapter 3.  This becomes 
apparent when examining the G20 Financial Consumer Protection and the EU 
Consumer Protection.  The former reflects a neo-liberal and consumer 
economic interest approach initiated in response to the financial crisis of 2008, 
rather than offering comprehensive consumer protection.63  The latter, while 
more of a rights-based approach, neglects to take into account vulnerable 
people and their limited access to legal rights.64  Should the law make special 
dispensation for specific demographics?  If so, what does it mean for 
objectivity and equality in judicial proceedings? These questions demonstrate 
that how ‘the consumer’ is conceptualised in law is integral to the formulation 
of consumer protection legislation for it determines the extent of protection that 
the consumer both requires and can obtain. 
The legal scope for consumer protection appears to be premised on an 
understanding of the consumer as either rational or vulnerable.65  This is a 
highly contested area in the context of m-payment services, and it has been 
examined by academics who have referenced work from the fields of rational 
choice theory66 and behavioural economics and cognitive psychology67, as 
 
63 T. Williams, 'Continuity, not Rupture: The Persistence of Neoliberalism in the 
Internationalization of Consumer Finance Regulation'. In T. Wilson (eds), International 
Responses to Issues of Credit and Over-indebtedness in the Wake of Crisis (Routledge 2013) 3. 
64 H.-W. Micklitz, 'European Consumer Law'. In E. Jones et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
the European Union, Oxford Handbooks Online, 2013, 1-20, 1. 
65 I. Ramsay, 'Regulation and the Constitution of the EU Single Market: The Contribution of 
Consumer Law' (2010) Canadian Business Law Journal 50, 322-346, 343. 
66 E.g. see R.A. Posner, 'Rational choice, behavioural economics, and the law' (1998) Stanford 
Law Review 50, 1551–1575, 1551. 
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discussed in chapter 3.  Some areas under discussion have been: Are m-
payment consumers able to reach adequate analytical economic decisions or do 
they require proactive protection?  What about the role of IT consumer 
literacy? Who bears responsibility for it? Should legislation positively 
incentivise m-payment providers to educate their customers?  In a rapidly 
changing technological field, even skilful users of smart devices can be deemed 
vulnerable to sophisticated cybercriminal activity and techniques.  These are 
just some of the areas that shall require further critical attention in the research. 
Consumer protection and the concept of rights are not clearly 
articulated and defined in Islamic law and literature.68 Sharia law contains a 
wealth of information about how business obligations are to be met and 
business affairs are to be conducted.69 It advocates for high business standards 
that incorporate good faith, honesty, transparency, delivering quality products 
and adhering to contractual business agreements.70 Most assuredly, business 
discharged by these Islamic holy duties forgoes the need for consumer rights.71  
However, this business remit raises some pressing questions regarding certain 
neglected aspects of compliance and enforcement, namely: what about those 
instances where businesses fail to discharge their Islamic holy duties?  Are 
consumers within their rights to bring a legal claim against those businesses 
which do not meet their obligations?  Also, how would they do so?  Should 
 
67 E.g. see R. Incardona and C. Poncibo, 'The Average Consumer, The Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive, and the Cognitive Revolution' (2007) Journal of Consumer Policy Issue 
30(1), 21-38, 21. 
68 M.A. Khan, 'Consumer Protection in Islamic Law (Shariah): An Overview' (undated) 45(31), 
77-100, 77-78 <http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/szic/PDF/English/6-
%20Muhammad%20Akbar%20Khan%20Final%20Draft%20of%20Research%20Paper.pdf> 
accessed 10 February 2019. 





there be state bodies or institutions charged with monitoring compliance with 
Islamic business values?  Legal uncertainties such as these do not wholly take 
into account the role of the consumer and renders questionable the area of 
consumer rights and consumer protection in Islamic countries. 
It is vital that Saudi legislation keeps apace with Fintech innovation.  In 
the current digital age, it must be explored which legal measures are required to 
protect Saudi Arabian m-payment customers against harms arising from 
technological risk. The Quran commands that the state guarantees security.72 
Prophet Mohammed emphasised that “there should be neither harming (dara) 
nor reciprocating harm (dirar).73 The challenges are how to apply these holy 
duties to commercial transactions and keep the Sharia up to date with the latest 
developments in business, since the precise scope of consumer protection 
within Islamic law has not been explored and has received very little attention 
in Muslim countries.74 Some have suggested taking a progressive approach 
towards Quranic verses, but it is thought that this might be met by some 
resistance from the Hanbali School which is the foundation of Sharia principles 
in SA.75 Another option to clarify Islamic law is to promulgate an Islamic 
consumer protection jurisprudence through the concept of qiyas (analogical 
reasoning).76 Quranic business, religious and ethical principles, particularly the 
good faith principle, haram and halal and the profit and loss sharing principle, 
 
72 O.R. Al-Jayyousi, Islam and Sustainable Development: New Worldviews (Routledge 2016) 
129. 
73 40 Hadith Nawawi 32. 
74 D. Morris and M. Al Dabbagh, 'The development of consumer protection in Saudi Arabia' 
(2003) International Journal of Consumer Studies 28(1), 2-13, 2. 
75 J.-P. Platteau, Islam Instrumentalized, Religion and Politics in Historical Perspective (CUP 
2017) 93. 
76 H.M. Ramadan, Understanding Islamic Law: From Classical to Contemporary (AltaMira 
Press 2006) 18. 
44 
 
could be used as a base to develop welfare-oriented consumer protection 
policies and laws.  At present, there is a lack of Islamic consumer protection 
jurisprudence and government bodies do not ensure that consumer rights are 
upheld.77  The topic of consumer protection therefore requires urgent attention 
by Islamic scholars.  
The research aim is to analyse how Saudi Arabian law protects m-
payment customers from the specific consumer welfare problems raised by m-
payments: Unauthorised payments and data and privacy protection. There is a 
dearth of research related to consumer protection in SA,78 and even less that is 
focused on m-payment services. This research analyses the Saudi legal system, 
using Western and Islamic consumer protection literature. Additionally, the 
UK legal system is scrutinised to assess whether lessons can be learnt in 
providing greater protection to customers in a Saudi Arabian context while 
remaining Sharia compliant. In so doing, the research seeks to make an original 
contribution to the Saudi Arabian legal system in the presently under-
researched areas of both consumer protection and m-payment services. The 
overall aim is to supply recommendations that will result in greater consumer 
protection rights for Saudi Arabian people. 
 
 
77 A. Alqarni, 'Saudi Consumers' Experience toward the Role of the Government Agencies as 
Service Providers in Ensuring their Consumer Rights' (2016) International Journal of Business 
and Social Sciences 7(9), 72-76, 72. 




The research examines Sharia-compliant consumer protection of Saudi Arabian 
customers who use m-payment services; it seeks to answer the following 
question: 
• How does Saudi Arabian law protect customers who use m-payment 
services in SA, particularly against unauthorised m-payment 
transactions and protects consumers' data in order to maintain privacy, 
including against breaches of their privacy? 
In attempting to answer this research question the following sub-questions will 
also need to be examined: 
• What are the primary technologies which facilitate m-payment 
services? How do they benefit m-payment customers? 
This is essential to understanding the features of this innovation which any 
policy intervention should seek to preserve as far as possible.  
• What are the main sources of risk involved in m-payment services? 
What problems can arise to disadvantage m-payment customers? 
These questions help to provide essential context for the consideration of 
policy issues through which risks and benefits must be balanced and 
managed.  
• What are the paradigms of the Western and Islamic legal consumer 
protection literature?  In what ways are the legal consumer protection 




The answer to these questions provides essential context for the analysis of 
consumer protection in relation to m-payments services and is also critical in 
informing the recommendations at the end of the work.  
• What legal framework has the UK adopted in respect of m-payment 
services? Which policy orientation underpins its laws? 
This provides a point of comparison for Saudi Arabian legislation, from which 
inspiration for recommendations can also be drawn.  
• What legal framework has SA adopted in respect of m-payment 
services? To what extent does its laws safeguard m-payment customers 
against unauthorised m-payment transactions and protects consumers' 
data in order to maintain privacy, including against breaches of their 
privacy, in a Sharia compliant manner? 
This analysis forms the basis of a critical assessment later in the work.  
• Can SA draw any lessons from the UK model of consumer protection 
legislation? 
Answering this question is critical to the work as this draws together the 
doctrinal and theoretical analysis of UK and Saudi Arabian law to propose 
recommendations for improvement.  
 
Scope of the Research 
The thesis has narrowed its focus to the issues of consumer protection in the 
context of unauthorised payment transactions and protection against 
data/privacy breaches. The reason is that those are two areas which are likely to 
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be of primary concern to consumers making m-payment transactions in light of 
technological and operational risks involved as well as the potential for vast 
amounts of data to be collected in m-payment transactions. The technologies 
underlying m-payments heighten security risks, as discussed in Chapter 2, and 
consumer confidence and trust in m-payments and the evolving digital 
ecosystem would be undermined if consumers had to unfairly shoulder losses 
for unauthorised payment transactions.79 The benefits for consumers, discussed 
in Chapter 1, as well as the wider economic benefits for society from this 
innovation, may be lost,80 without financial consumers being protected against 
the new risks. In other words, security concerns constitute a significant barrier 
which is likely to adversely affect the take-up of m-payments and undermine 
the growth of the growing Fintech sector.81 M-payment innovation can only be 
promoted if trust is built and this necessitates that potential security issues are 
addressed in such a way that consumers retain confidence.82 Consumer 
protection in the context of unauthorised transaction is likely to lower 
consumer risk and promote consumer confidence.83  
Moreover, the collection of payment data (i.e. personal data, namely the 
payer's and payee's names and bank details, as well as non-personal data, such 
 
79 International Financial Consumer Protection Organisation, 'Online and mobile payments, An 
overview of supervisory practices to mitigate security risks', January 2018, 1-79, 9 
<http://www.finconet.org/FinCoNet_SC3_Report_Online_Mobile_Payments_Supervisory_Pra
ctices_Security_Risks.pdf> accessed 6 July 2019. 
80 The Wall Street Journal, 'How Mobile Money Drives Economic Growth', 2017 
<http://www.wsj.com/ad/article/mlf-how-mobile-money-drives-economic-growth> accessed 
16 December 2017. 
81 International Financial Consumer Protection Organisation n 79, 21. 
82 Ibid, 29.  
83 Ibid, 65. 
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as the time, date, amount and parties involved in the transactions84) plays an 
increasingly important role in the evolving payment sector85 and data-driven 
economy.86 It can be utilised to enhance services or “valuecreate commercial 
products.”87 This data can be sold to other organisations, analysed in order to 
gain insights and then applied.88 For instance, Google Pay uses transaction data 
for advertising purposes.89 However, these “data-related opportunities” may 
not be realised if consumers fear that their data is unsafe or is used 
inappropriately.90 Also, data security and privacy concerns must be addressed 
in order to avoid that consumers are harmed.91 Consumer protection through 
data privacy law is thus essential to balance protection with growth 
objectives.92  
It is for these reasons that the focus of this research is on unauthorised 
m-payments and data/privacy breaches and not on other areas, such as 
cryptocurrencies, which also facilitate m-payments.93 Also, as this thesis 
focuses on two specific consumer protection issues - unauthorised m-payments 
and data/privacy breaches, it does not deal with broader issues, such as risk 
management theory and risk management models or regulatory frameworks for 
m-payments in general. This is despite the fact that these are also areas which 
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impact consumer protection. The work also does not address whether 
competition law can be evoked when companies, such as Facebook, abuse their 
position and require users to agree to untoward privacy terms and conditions.94 
Also, the many other issues which face electronic consumers of financial 
services, such as choice of law, are beyond the scope of this work;95 
nevertheless, literature exploring approaches to these issues may be valuable 
for illustrative purposes for the study of consumer protection.  
The research is primarily a law-focused work informed by the 
technological context for which a legal answer is sought. The focus of the 
thesis is on customer protection, that is to say, m-payment provider conduct 
vis-à-vis customers. 
Furthermore, the Saudi Arabian and UK legal systems are analysed. 
Other jurisdictions are only mentioned to highlight the importance for the 
Saudi legislator to take legislative action, including by taking into account new 
legislative impetus all over the world. Also, due to the UK’s membership of the 
European Union (‘EU’) at the time of writing this research, it has transposed a 
number of EU laws. Recourse is therefore made to EU legislation when 
appropriate.  Finally, as the research specifically deals with developing Sharia-
compliant legal recommendations, Islamic verses are cited and arguments by 
Islamic scholars are presented.  No other religious texts are referenced in the 
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research. It should be noted that this work analyses the law as at 1 May 2018; 




Since laws are identifiable facts, the thesis adopts the positivist stance.96 A 
positivist ontology views reality as objective and external.97 Thus, a doctrinal 
approach (also known as black letter law approach) was chosen.98 Legal 
doctrine was studied, including its development and application.99 Laws were 
systematically analysed, cases were cited, and accepted legal principles were 
discussed in the research.100 Hence, recourse was made to primary, as well as 
secondary sources.101 Academic arguments by scholars were being put 
forward, examined, interpreted and responded to by the researcher.102 
However, the focus was not only on what the law is, but it was also critically 
analysed.103 Relevant legislation and cases were conceptually analysed to 
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identify the law governing m-payment, particularly in relation to unauthorised 
payment transactions and protection of customers' data and their privacy.104 
Moreover, the research had a small interdisciplinary component in 
order to take into account advances in information communication 
technologies (‘ICT’). Technological developments and risks were described in 
chapters 1 and 2 in order to explain the context against which the legislator 
must develop its legislative framework. However, it is important to emphasise 
that the interdisciplinary part was only included in order to answer the legal 
questions which this research raises.105 Hence, ICT developments and related 
technological risks which affect the law were considered.  
Additionally, the policy considerations, including the wider ethical 
framework spelled out by the Sharia in SA and which may underpin the law 
were explored in chapter 3. These policy considerations were used to analyse 
the statutory frameworks in the UK and SA in chapters 4 and 5.  
Furthermore, the comparative legal research method was chosen to 
identify solutions to a similar problem, namely unauthorised m-payments and 
data protection.106 At present in SA, m-payment customers bear the full cost of 
any loss that follows from an unauthorised transaction. This approach to loss 
allocation presents a significant problem. The protection of customers' data and 
their privacy is also especially problematic under Saudi law, as no 
comprehensive data protection legislation has been enacted, leaving customers’ 
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data unprotected.107 The Sharia which is primarily concerned with promoting 
welfare is thereby contravened.108 Such an approach is not unsurprising, given 
that the fiqh (the philosophy of Islamic law) literature does not deal specifically 
with the content of consumer law, including data and privacy protection.109  
 
In other words, the rich Sharia base which stipulates principles of 
fairness and social justice, as discussed in chapter 3, section 3.6, has been 
insufficiently developed by Islamic scholars to protect consumers. The failure 
to develop a comprehensive Islamic consumer protection discourse results in 
consumers being inadequately protected in the context of unauthorised m-
payments and data/privacy breaches. However, the Sharia could serve as a 
wider ethical framework which could be utilised to think about consumer 
protection in the Kingdom. The comparison with the UK assisted with 
developing recommendations on how the Saudi consumer protection rationale 
can be developed in line with its religious-based legal system. 
The Sharia principle of good faith was identified as a crucial tool to 
promulgate more pro-consumer m-payment primary and secondary legislation, 
especially if it was utilised as a base for a principle of fairness. According to 
Article 1 of the Saudi Arabian constitutional law, the Basic Law of Governance 
of 1992, requires such an approach since it mandates that the Sharia is supreme 
over civil law. 
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Furthermore, the legislative framework in SA which deals with m-
payments is outdated. It focuses on e-banking and omits to address the 
consumer issues which arise from m-payment services. It is therefore only 
suitable for a Web 1.0 version of banking services (i.e. e-banking and m-
payments), but not Web 2.0, let alone Web 3.0 Fintech innovation.110 While 
Regulatory Rules for Prepaid Payment Services were adopted in 2012, they 
curtail m-payment innovation. Trade is thus undermined which is contrary to 
the Sharia.111 The experience of another jurisdiction was therefore drawn 
upon112 in order to gain insight how consumer protection values can co-exist 
and even support, strong competition within the market. It helped with 
identifying legislative responses to developments in the sector and policies 
which improve the rights of consumers without stifling the market. The 
comparison with another jurisdiction made it possible to recommend new 
legislative solutions on how consumer protection provisions can be enhanced, 
and laws can be updated to reflect advances in technology and the maturing of 
the Fintech sector, whilst maintaining or strengthening compliance with Sharia 
principles. 
This was considered to aid SA develop its fintech market and become 
“a pioneer in the financial technology sector”,113 which is an important 
objective and forms part of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority’s (‘SAMA’) 
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Fintech Saudi initiative.114  This initiative aims to promote the use of digital 
transactions and aid with the creation of a fintech hub in SA.115  
It was worthwhile and meaningful to compare the UK approach 
towards consumer protection approach in respect of unauthorised m-payments 
and data/privacy breaches with that of SA for a number of reasons:  The UK 
was chosen for the comparative method since it has statutorily responded to the 
problems of protecting consumers against unauthorised payments and data and 
privacy protection, as discussed in chapter 4. It has a long-standing history of 
protecting consumers against unfair business conduct, ever since the 
publication of the Molony Report in 1959.116 It has consolidated its consumer 
protection legislation through the enactment of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, 
and which also protects m-payment customers against unfair terms and 
conditions. Consumer data has been protected by third-generation legislation - 
the General Data Protection Regulation (‘GDPR’) (Regulation (EU) 2016/679), 
which replaced the Data Protection Act 1998, and which was prior to the 1998 
Act protected by the Data Protection Act 1984, as discussed in Chapter 4, 
section 4.5. The UK has also adopted legislation for payments, namely the 
Payment Services Regulations 2009, as well as second-generation legislation - 
the Payment Services Regulations 2017. It has also created an authorisation 
regime for e-money and e-money institutions by virtue of the Electronic 
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Money Regulations 2011. UK legislators have thus made efforts to keep pace 
with technological progress in the m-banking sector. 
Also, the UK has one of the largest financial centres in the world, 
coming second only after the United States.117 It is a global financial power 
center and has the biggest capital market within Europe118 and according to 
Groenfeldt, the City of London’s success is particularly the result of its ability 
to adapt to changes within the business environment.119  The UK Government's 
aim is for the UK to be a 'World Leader in Financial Technologies'.120 KPMG 
reports that the UK was a 'global leader for fintech investment' in the first six 
months of 2018.121 It attracted more investments than other countries around 
the world.122  Hence, it is one of the fastest growing and developing Fintech 
markets in the world.  
The UK has thus been chosen as a comparator to SA for a number of 
reasons and ultimately because of its carefully developed regime which finely 
balances market interests with those of the consumer. 
It is considered that the comparative method provides worthwhile and 
meaningful insights not only about the law in the UK, but also Saudi law. By 
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comparing the two legal systems, it is possible for the researcher to reflect on 
the underlying thinking which has shaped the different approaches.123 It helps 
to identify commonalities and differences.124  
The findings are used to generate new solutions to the shared problem 
of how to protect m-payment customers, particularly against unauthorised m-
payment transactions and protect consumers' data and maintain their privacy 
and safeguard against breaches of their privacy.125 Essentially, this ensures that 
more knowledge is generated about a unique research area which requires new 
legislative impetus all over the world.126 However, it is acknowledged that SA 
assigns supremacy to the Sharia and thus religious law.127 In contrast, the UK 
adheres to a common law system which follows a system of precedent and 
which excludes religion from the legal arena.128 As a result, the legal tradition 
of each state is very different. This has an impact on the knowledge and insight 
gained from the UK approach which cannot simply be transposed to a Sharia 
legal system.129 In other words, ‘cultural comparative law’ must be undertaken 
i.e. it must be taken into account that the law is influenced and driven by the 
specific culture in each country.130 
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Advocates of functionalism therefore observe that “the legal system of 
every society faces essentially the same problems, and solves these problems 
by quite different means though very often with similar results.” 131 The 
concept of functionalism, especially ‘equivalence functionalism’, denotes that a 
similar problem, such as unauthorised m-payment transactions and data and 
privacy protection, may require different solutions and that it is not necessary 
to look for the best or similar solution.132 Such an approach recognises that an 
issue in one society has a unique background, whereas this background is 
different in another society.133 The functional approach was chosen to underpin 
this thesis for pragmatic reasons, as the focus was on getting results134 by 
identifying a solution to a problem.135 A problem was identified, namely 
providing protection to consumers when they move increasingly to the use of 
their mobiles to effect payment transactions, and for which the research then 
searched for a solution, by making recourse to the Saudi and UK legal regimes. 
The functionalist method also helped informing the research design i.e. 
the different stages of the thesis.136 During the first stage of the research, this 
method highlighted the importance of focusing on those issues which exist in 
both SA and the UK137, namely that consumers who make m-payment 
 
131 K. Zweigert and H. Kotz, An introduction to comparative law (OUP 1998) 34. 
132 B. Wernaart, The Enforceability of the Human Right to Adequate Food: A Comparative 
Study (Wageningen Academic Publishers 2013) 40. 
133 Ibid. 
134 R. Michaels, 'The Functional Method of Comparative Law'. In K. Zimmermann and M. 
Reimann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP 2006) 340; J. Gordley, 'The 
functional method.' In P. G. Monateri (eds), Methods of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar 
2012) 107. 
135 O. Brand, 'Conceptual Comparisons: Towards a Coherent Methodology of Comparative 
Legal Studies' (2007) Brooklyn Journal of International Law 32, 405-466, 409. 
136 F. Bignami and D. Zaring, Comparative Law and Regulation: Understanding the Global 
Regulatory Process (Edward Elgar 2016) 32. 
137 Brand n 135, 409. 
58 
 
transactions are at risk of unauthorised payments due to the heightened 
technological and operational risk and data/privacy breaches in light of the vast 
amounts of data being collected from m-payment transactions. The first two 
chapters, therefore, focused on understanding m-payment technologies and the 
particular risks they pose. During the second stage, it was analysed and 
presented how two very distinct legal systems, namely the UK and SA, respond 
to the issues of unauthorised payments and data/privacy breaches.138 Similar 
structural laws were identified in both jurisdictions i.e. those which deal with 
unauthorised payments and data/privacy breaches and it was investigated what 
functions they play in addressing the two central research issues.139  Such a 
structural comparison made it possible to scrutinise differences and 
similarities.140 While critics of functionalism point out that it is hardly a 
theory,141 it was nonetheless considered helpful to single out dissimilarities and 
resemblances.142 During the last step, the analyses of the UK and Saudi 
responses and solutions were compared and evaluated.143 The core objective 
was thus to identify the 'better law'144 by focusing on comparing, understanding 
and critiquing the different laws which exist in the UK and SA.145 It allowed 
for the law to be determined, particularly the flaws in respect of consumer 
protection. It provided a window of novel solutions and impetus for legal 
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change for very real problems for m-payment customers in SA.146 These new 
solutions are designed to enrich the debate about consumer protection in SA 
and may play a positive role in influencing legal reform which better protect 
Saudi m-payment customers.147  
The functionalist approach revealed that the UK has regularly updated 
and reviewed its laws to ensure that they evolve alongside the changing risks of 
the Fintech sector, in contrast to SA which has failed to modernise its 
legislation in order to accommodate technological advance. In the UK, the 
consumer protection rationale has been firmly embedded in the Payment 
Services Regulations 2009, the Electronic Money Regulations 2011, the 
Payment Services Regulations 2017, the Data Protection Act 1998, the GDPR 
and the Consumer Rights Act 2015 and in various codes of conduct. As a 
result, consumers are well protected against unauthorised m-payments and 
data/privacy breaches. This is in marked contrast to SA which has not ensured 
that the 2012 Regulatory Rules for Prepaid Payment Services adequately 
protect consumers against unauthorised m-payment transactions, but only 
against a much narrower operational risk which causes billing errors. Other 
laws and regulations, such as the e-Banking Rules 2010 and 2013 Banking 
Consumer Protection Principles and Banking Consumers' Guide, also fail to 
adequately address the risk of unauthorised payments. The topic of 
data/privacy breaches is particularly underdeveloped, as no data protection law 
has been enacted. 
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Motivation and Originality 
The legislative analysis deals with m-payment services provided by banks and 
companies, such as Facebook, ApplePay and PayPal. As citizens’ property is 
being handled through these new technologies, the requisite legal consumer 
safeguards must be addressed by policy and lawmakers. In SA where the 
primary source is the Sharia, and as discussed in chapter 3, the main objective 
is to realise welfare and the conceptualisation of welfare includes the 
protection of property.148 As emphasised in chapter 5, the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Authority’s (‘SAMA’) regulatory efforts have focused 
predominantly on a reloadable gift card or stored-value system, but not on 
facilitating wider m-payment innovation. However, it is unlikely that economic 
growth within the FinTech sector is going to come from companies having 
their own reloadable gift card or stored-value system, as discussed in chapter 1. 
Moreover, it is normal for states to enact consumer protection laws and policy 
for important services.149 As a large part of consumers’ daily lives involve 
making payments, these services are arguably ‘services of general economic 
interest’.150 It is for this reason essential to close this legislative lacuna in SA in 
order to protect m-payment customers and the future financial system. 
 
148 A.A. Elias, 'Sharia, Fiqh, and Islamic Law explained', 18 April 2013 
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Without legislative reform, risks which come with these technologies 
may be unfairly distributed. Consumer property may not be adequately 
protected because of the practical technical issues which may arise, and which 
are discussed in chapter 2. 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 describes the m-payment 
innovation which is taking place globally and how this is simultaneously 
transforming the banking sector and the way that customers conduct their 
financial activity.  It provides a brief overview of the predominant technologies 
which can be employed for m-payments; these include Near-Field 
Communications (‘NFC’),151 Bluetooth, mobile apps and digital wallets, cloud 
computing, algorithms, and encryption techniques. The chapter details the 
many financial transactions and financial information-based advantages that 
each of these technologies offers to m-payment customers. In other words, it is 
explained how benefits are created through Fintech innovation. The chapter 
explains how these interactive technologies benefit customers by facilitating 
the creation of a quick, convenient and dynamic payment channel, in any 
location and at any time.   
Chapter 2 discusses how the many freedoms brought about by m-
payment services have not come without risk.  It examines a variety of 
practical issues and risks associated with the m-payment technologies in order 
 




to determine why consumers who use m-payment services need legal 
protection, what they need protection against and as a result of this, how these 
customers might be conceptualised in law.  To this end, the chapter is divided 
into three core areas: (1) Customer errors; (2) technology problems and risks; 
and (3) risks and issues caused by third parties.  The reason why these practical 
issues and risks are discussed is that it is imperative that the law is able to 
ascertain who is at fault when things go wrong, in order to protect m-payment 
customers in a highly complex technological ecosystem, particularly against 
unauthorised m-payment transactions and their data, including against breaches 
of their privacy. 
Chapter 3 explores the Western and Islamic legal consumer protection 
literature. It covers consumer law, international consumer law, consumer 
protection laws and embeds the academic contractual literature on unauthorised 
transactions and the question of loss allocation in the m-payment 
provider/customer context.  The chapter provides an overview of the types of 
laws that could be rallied to protect m-payment customers, such as, the tortious 
law of negligence and duty of care.  It draws on rational choice theory and 
behavioural economics and cognitive psychology literature to assess whether 
the duties and obligations of the m-payment customer should be based on a 
construction of them as circumspect, rational or vulnerable, and what this, in 
turn, might mean for the legal threshold available to them. The chapter 
analyses different policy orientations comprised of the consumer protection 
interest, consumer economic interest, social welfare or neo-liberal approach 
that can be adopted when formulating consumer protection legislation in 
respect of m-payment transactions and m-payment consumers’ data.  A central 
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focus of the chapter is Sharia law and its perspective on consumer rights and 
protection.  The chapter provides a general overview of a number of business, 
religious and ethical principles that can be applied to this area.  It is argued that 
the Sharia requires a social welfare approach and, as Prophet Mohammed was 
a businessman, it is imperative that innovation must also be promoted. It is 
argued that the Islamic principle of good faith, alongside other Islamic 
principles, could be utilised to develop more pro-consumer legislation or 
legislative provisions when it comes to m-payments in SA. 
Chapter 4 analyses the legal framework which the UK has adopted in 
respect of m-payment services and identifies which policy orientation 
underpins these laws.  The chapter argues that the UK has opted for a policy 
that reflects a combination of the social welfare and neo-liberal approaches. 
The UK legal consumer protection measures are comprehensive. As a result, a 
protective safety net has been created for vulnerable customers who make use 
of innovative m-payment technologies. The chapter commences with 
discussing how the UK has facilitated a m-payment third-party collaboration 
environment, including by pursuing a consumerist policy orientation to 
facilitate entry and access by third parties and addressing the risk which arise 
from third-party collaboration. For instance, this has been achieved through the 
adoption of the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) 
Regulations 2003, the Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006, the Electronic Money 
Regulations 2011 and the regulation of e-money institutions and voluntary 
codes of conduct. 
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Subsequently, the legal sources which govern the rights and obligations 
of banks including payment institutions and electronic money institutions and 
customers are discussed, particularly in respect of unauthorised m-payment 
transactions. Recourse is made to contract and tort law and legislation, such as: 
the previous Payment Services Regulations 2009 and the new Payment 
Services Regulations 2017; the FCA’s Banking Conduct of Business 
Sourcebook and the voluntary Standards of Lending Practice 2016. 
 Thereafter, it is explored how contract performance and unfair terms 
are dealt with by the Consumer Rights Act 2015 and are likely to impact 
consumer understanding in respect of unauthorised m-payment transactions. 
Finally, the chapter deals with the question of how English law protects 
consumners' data in order to maintain privacy, as well as how it protects 
against breaches of consumers' privacy. The mainly repealed Data Protection 
Act 1998 and the General Data Protection Regulation; the Money Laundering, 
Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) 
Regulations 2017; and the EU Funds Transfer Regulation 2015 are referred to.   
Like chapter 4, chapter 5 asks what are the different sources of Saudi 
law that deal with unauthorised m-payment transactions and the protection of 
consumers' data in order to maintain their privacy. Chapter 5 firstly scrutinises 
whether SA facilitates a m-payment third-party collaboration environment, 
including by drawing a legal distinction between bank status and m-payment 
providers and highlights the problem with the Banking Control Law 1966 in 




Thereafter, the Saudi sources of law which govern the rights and 
obligations of m-payment providers and their customers, particularly in respect 
of unauthorised m-payment transactions are discussed. The 2012 Regulatory 
Rules for Prepaid Payment Services and the failure to address the thorny issue 
of unauthorised m-payment transactions are highlighted. The e-Banking Rules 
2010 and the Manual of Combating Embezzlement & Financial Fraud & 
Control Guidelines 2008 are analysed in order to identify shortcomings. 
It is then assessed how contract performance and unfair terms are 
addressed by the 2013 Banking Consumer Protection Principles and Banking 
Consumers' Guide. The failure to utilise the principles and guide to seek 
compensation for unauthorised m-payment transactions is emphasised.  
The final section deals with the question of how Saudi law protects 
consumers' data in order to maintain privacy, as well as how it protects against 
breaches of consumers' privacy. It considers: The Credit Information Law 
2008; the Consumer Credit Regulations 2006, and the Anti-Money Laundering 
Law 2003 and related rules and regulations and their application to data and 
privacy protection of m-payment customers' data. 
It is argued that Saudi Arabian laws do not mirror UK laws as they are 
more web 1.0 laws than web 2.0 (as in the UK) and hence outdated. The failure 
to keep pace with innovation has resulted in Saudi m-payment customers being 
inadequately protected against unauthorised m-payment transactions. M-
payment consumers' data and their privacy are also not safeguarded. This is 
particularly apparent from the UK legal analysis in chapter 4 which is drawn 
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upon as a comparator. Hence, Saudi Arabian law is deficient in several aspects 
and customers who use m-payment services are inadequately protected. 
The Conclusion assesses the lessons that SA can learn from the UK in 
providing greater protection to customers while remaining compliant to Sharia 
law. Recommendations and suggestions are made therein for the Saudi 
legislators. The Conclusion also considers how the preceding chapters have 
met the research aim and questions. The core research findings are presented, 
including the view that UK laws are comprehensive and far-reaching, and that 
they protect customers who use m-payment services to a greater degree.
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CHAPTER 1         
 
A PRACTICAL OVERVIEW OF M-PAYMENTS 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to point out how Fintech innovates the banking 
sector. The predominant technologies are identified, as well as how they 
benefit m-payment customers. This is an essential starting point for the thesis 
as a whole, as it identifies the key challenges which need to be addressed and 
the benefits of these technologies which regulation should seek to preserve. On 
the basis of such understanding, we can ensure that the law protects m-payment 
customers adequately. Awareness of the different technologies also makes it 
possible to identify the main advantages for m-payment customers. In other 
words, the chapter depicts the context against which the subsequent legal 
discussions must be viewed. 
However, the chapter is not intended to be an in-depth examination of 
the technologies. Instead, it gives, by way of background, a brief overview of 
the particular technology trends and developments, and the advantages which 
these technologies bring for m-payment customers. For this purpose, the 
dominant and preferred technologies which are being used or considered for m-
payment services are identified. The chapter concludes by summarising the 




ICT have created a significant change from the traditional banking 
model of face-to-face interaction towards an increasingly depersonalised 
system.1 This allows banks to market their services to customers at reduced 
costs and enables customers to conduct their daily banking transactions in a 
much more convenient and flexible manner.2 For example, customers can 
check their bank accounts, statements and bank account activity through an app 
on their mobile device. Hence, the fusion of banking with technology creates a 
new and more self-service oriented m-payment infrastructure.3 This new 
infrastructure was initially driven by the increasing adoption of the World 
Wide Web in the late 1990s and the 2000s, which allowed the retail consumer 
to enact financial transactions from a personal computer through a web 
browser.4 Such innovation gave rise to m-banking services and has allowed 
customers to enact financial transactions on a convenient ‘24/7’ basis,5 free 
from geographical restraint. However, with the rise of mobile smartphones, one 
of the most profound innovations within this development has been m-
payments.  
In addition, customers can now install mobile apps, namely device-
based or cloud-based digital wallets,6 to perform the function of e-wallets 
 
1 Y. Baghdadi, ICT for a Better Life and a Better World: The Impact of Information and 
Communication Technologies and Organizations and Society (Springer 2019) 154. 
2 Ibid. 
3 B. Nicoletti, The Future of FinTech: Integrating Finance and Technology in Financial 
Services (Palgrave Macmillan) 284. 
4 It should be noted, however, that electronic banking on personal computers dates back to the 
pre World Wide Web days of the early 1980s, with systems such as Minitel in France, and 
Prestel’s Homelink service in the UK: R.K. Miryala and M.V. Ramana Reddy, Trends, 
Challenges & Innovations in Management - Volume III (Zenon Academic Publishing 2015) 
112. 
5 R.H. Weber and A. Darbellay, ‘Legal Issues in Mobile Banking’ (2010) Journal of Banking 
Regulation 11, 129-145, 130. 
6 D. Morley and C.S. Parker, Understanding Computers: Today and Tomorrow (15th ed, 
Cengage Learning 2015) 445. 
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carrying e-money. Through cryptographic techniques, mobiles thereby become 
money repositories.7 Customers can also use their mobiles to make certain 
types of payments via apps, i.e., they can make m-payments. This type of 
technology provides customers with direct access to their bank accounts at no 
additional charge.8 A connection can be established by a third-party payment 
provider ('TPP') between the customer's bank and the merchant's bank.9 
Indeed, since the arrival of e-banking in 1999, demand for m-banking 
has grown considerably from an estimated 300 million customers globally in 
2011 to an estimated one billion by 2019.10 Increasingly m-payments are 
becoming popular, with 27% of all card purchases in the UK having been made 
with contactless cards in 2016.11 Over £10 billion had been transferred through 
m-payment apps, such as, Pingit.12  
Demand for m-payments through smartphones is transforming the 
payment system as currently known, also since m-payments with digital money 
 
7 A. Hnaif and M.A. Alia, ‘Mobile Payment Method Based on Public-Key Cryptography’ 
(2015) International Journal of Computer Networks and Communications Security 7(2), 81-92, 
81. 
8 D. Hinds, ‘Micropayments: A technology with a promising but uncertain future’. In N. Mallat 
et al (eds), ‘Mobile Banking Services’ (2004) 47(5) Communications of the ACM, 42–46, 44; 
A. Boden, 'Explaining PSD2 without TLAs is tough!' Starling Bank, 9 October 2015 
<https://www.starlingbank.com/explaining-psd2-without-tlas-tough/> accessed 10th September 
2016. 
9 R. Wandhofer, 'European Payments: A Path Towards the Single Market for Payments'. In B. 
Batiz-Lazo and L. Efthymiou (eds), The Book of Payments: Historical and Contemporary 
Views on the Cashless Society (Palgrave Macmillan 2016) 346. 
10 P.A. Salz, The Netsize Guide 2009: Mobile Society & Me, when worlds combine (London, 
Netsize 2009) 102; D. McMillin, ‘Massive mobile banking growth’, Bankrate, year?  
<http://www.bankrate.com/financing/banking/massive-mobile-banking-growth/> accessed 13 
October 2013; S. Romero, 'The unstoppable growth of digital banking: 3 billion users by 2021', 
BBVA, 22 February 2017 <https://www.bbva.com/en/unstoppable-growth-digital-banking-3-
billion-users-2021/> 19th November 2017. 
11 UK Cards Association, 'UK Card Payments Summary 2017', 2017, 1-4, 1 
<http://www.theukcardsassociation.org.uk/wm_documents/UK%20Card%20Payments%20201
7%20-%20Summary%20FINAL.pdf> accessed 1st September 2017. 
12 D. Worth, ‘Mobile banking services pose major security risks, warns financial watchdog’, 
V3.co.uk, 2013 <http://www.v3.co.uk/v3-uk/news/2291042/mobile-banking-services-pose-
major-security-risks-warns-financial-watchdog> accessed 28 October 2013. 
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is increasingly replacing cash.13 In the future, it may be possible that users will 
be able to conduct all purchases without cash.14 As a result, traditional debit 
and credit cards, as well as cash machines may eventually become replaced.15 
Even cashiers may no longer be required since goods can be scanned and 
purchased while walking through a shop and users can store their travel cards, 
gift vouchers, tickets and even their identity cards (‘IDs’) and driving licences 
on their mobiles phones, thereby opening the door to myriad new 
possibilities.16 Equally, merchants can gather useful data about consumers 
which can be utilised for marketing and advertising purposes.17 This raises 
profound data protection and privacy implications, especially since it enables 
banks, e-money and payment institutions to hold much more precise 
transactional, financial, behavioural and other kind of data which profiles 
customers.18 This data is certainly valuable from a commercial perspective, but 
it is important that an appropriate balance is struck between commercial and 
consumer interests.19  
 
13 V. Marria, 'What A Cashless Society Could Mean For The Future', Forbes, 21 December 
2018 <https://www.forbes.com/sites/vishalmarria/2018/12/21/what-a-cashless-society-could-
mean-for-the-future/#e40fc1332638> accessed 10 February 2019. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 A. Tabakovic, ‘The prepaid mobile wallet: A powerful product for an impatient ecosystem’ 
(2014) Journal of Payments Strategy & Systems 8(3), 254-263, 254. 
17 C.J. Hoofnagle et al, 'Mobile Payments: Consumer Benefits & New Privacy Concerns' 
(2012) University of California, 1-19, 6 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2045580> accessed 5 
March 2019 
6 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2045580> accessed 19 December 2013. 
18 Payment Systems Regulator, 'Discussion paper: Data in the payments industry', June 2018, 
1-65, 6. 
19 Ibid 5-6. 
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Micro-business is also encouraged in places where individuals 
frequently only own a mobile phone and not a computer and often do not have 
a bank account.20 M-payments can thus bridge the poverty gap.  
All of these innovations are made possible through FinTech, which 
provides a fusion of financial services with technology. 21 Different 
technologies fall within the scope of FinTech, and this chapter provides a brief 
overview of the predominant technologies which can be employed for m-
payments.  
 
1.2 The m-payment technologies 
A Wireless Application Protocol (‘WAP’) - i.e. a set of technical protocols - 
can be used for mobile phones to access the internet.22 A WAP gives a similar 
user experience as e-banking, but the problem is that many clicks are 
necessary.23 As mobile phone screens are tiny, this is impractical for banking 
customers.24 Most banks instead offer m-banking and most recently m-payment 
apps as they are more user-friendly and convenient to use.25 These m-payment 
 
20 G. Demombynes and A. Thegeya, ‘Kenya's Mobile Revolution and the Promise of Mobile 
Savings’ (2012) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No.5988, 1-32, 6 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2017401> accessed 5 January 2014. 
21 Nicoletti n 3, 12. 
22 M. Rouse, 'WAP (Wireless Application Protocol)', TechTarget.com, 2017 
<http://searchmobilecomputing.techtarget.com/definition/WAP> accessed 15th November 
2017. 
23 Ibid. 
24 T. Lerner, Mobile payment (Springer 2013) 45; A. Kaikkonen and V. Roto, ‘Navigating in a 
mobile XHTML application’, Proceeding CHI '03 Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on 
Human Factors in Computing Systems 2003, 329-336; S. Singhal, WAP-the Wireless 
Application Protocol: Writing Applications for the Mobile Internet (Addison-Wesley 2001) 11. 
25 See, e.g., Barclays, ‘Barclays Mobile Banking app’, 2013 
<http://www.barclays.co.uk/BarclaysMobileBanking/BarclaysMobileBankingapp/P124260912




apps are also offered by non-banks, e.g. companies such as Facebook.26 These 
apps have several functionalities which pave the way for transaction-based, as 
well as informational services.27  Mobile phones can be turned into a mobile 
brokerage through which transactions and payments, including financial trades, 
can be conducted.28 For example, one can easily find out one’s account balance 
and mobile accounting software ensures that new balances are instantaneously 
displayed.29 M-payments apps permit users to make electronic transfers of 
funds from their accounts. Additionally, m-payment apps can turn phones into 
money repositories by performing the function of e-wallets.30 Phones can be 
swiped or scanned to settle payments in shops and stores, just like debit or 
credit cards, but much faster.31 Hence, customers can now use a convenient, 
fast and easy channel.32 M-payment customers do not have to use cash. They 
do not have to take out their debit or credit card and sign or enter their personal 
identification number (‘PIN’).33 Waiting time is thereby reduced, as a simple 
tap or scan with their mobile phone is sufficient to execute the payment.34 
 
26 M. Muchmore, 'The Best Mobile Payment Apps', PC Mag, 2 April 2018 
<https://www.pcmag.com/roundup/358553/the-best-mobile-payment-apps> accessed 20 April 
2019. 
27 Essvale Corporation Ltd, Business Knowledge in IT in Global Retail Banking, the Complete 
Handbook for IT Professionals (Essvale Corporations Ltd 2011) 16. 
28 Alpari, ‘Mobile trading’, 2013 <http://www.alpari.co.uk/trading-platforms/mobile-trading> 
accessed 29 October 2013. 
29 Essvale Corporation Ltd n 27, 16.  
30 D. Neef, Digital Exhaust: What Everyone Should Know About Big Data, Digitization, and 
Digitally Driven Innovation (Pearson Education 2015) 60. 
31 B. King, Bank 3.0, Why Banking Is No Longer Somewhere You Go, But Something You Do 
(Marshall Cavendish Business 2013) 191. 
32 Ibid. 




The latter function is facilitated, for instance, with the help of Near-
Field Communications (‘NFC’).35 NFC refers to a set of standards that allow 
electronic devices to communicate with computer networks through radio 
communication in close proximity.36 It covers both network protocols (i.e. 
clearly defined procedures, rules and formats for network devices to 
communicate37) and data exchange formats (i.e. conversion of source data by a 
program into an exchange format for further conversion into a target format),38 
and is defined under a range of international standards39 as set by the NFC 
Forum, a consortium established by some of the major mobile technology 
providers.40 The benefits of NFC are that it is more stable, secure and faster 
than, for example, Wifi, Bluetooth, Sound Wave and Infra-red.41 
Bluetooth is a low energy frequency, which establishes a connection 
with the internet through a ‘low energy sensor device’ and is particularly 
utilised by mobile phones; Wireless-Fidelity (‘Wi-Fi’) is a ‘networking 
standard’ particularly employed to quickly transfer big data.42 Sound waves 
 
35 Near Field Communication Forum, 2013 <http://www.nfc-forum.org/home/> accessed 28 
October 2013.  
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid.   
38 A. Hernich, Foundations of Query Answering in Relational Data Exchange (Logos Verlag 
GmbH 2010) iii. 
39 For instance, ISO 15693, ISO 18000, ISO 18092/NFCIP-1, ISO 21481/NFCIP-2, ISO 
14443:  A. Attard, ‘A Novel Card-Present Payment Scheme using NFC Technology’, Royall 
Holloway, University of London, 2010-2011, 1-98, 12 
<http://www.ma.rhul.ac.uk/static/techrep/2012/MA-2012-07.pdf> accessed 27 December 
2013. 
40 NFC Forum, 'Our Members NFC', 2019 <https://nfc-forum.org/about-us/our-members/> 
accessed 5 March 2019. 
41 SPD Bank, ‘NFC and Mobile Bank 2.0’, GSMA (2013), 1-20, 4 
<http://www.gsma.com/mobilecommerce/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/3.-XUE-JIANHUA-
Pudong-Dev-Bank.pdf> accessed 29 October 2013. 
42 P. Smith, ‘Comparisons between Low Power Wireless Technologies, Bluetooth low energy, 





and infra-red are other electromagnetic spectra, which are utilised by 
communication technologies.43 
These technologies have different capabilities of carrying data and use 
different means, i.e., electromagnetic waves are carried through metallic wires, 
radio waves through radio masts or ‘lightwaves through optical cables’.44 NFC 
requires radio-frequency electromagnetic fields through which data can be 
transmitted wirelessly and contactless and allows electronically tagged objects, 
which store information, to be identified and tracked; this then renders them 
into ‘contactless smart cards’ due to the communication dialogue, which has 
been created.45 NFC is therefore an extension of Radio-Frequency 
Identification (‘RFID’), i.e., the NFC protocol and interface are added to the 
RFID infrastructure.46 RFID is normally used to link two devices which are in 
close contact and the NFC protocol ensures that the configuration data is 
integrated within a peer-to-peer (‘P2P’) network47 when the device is in Active 
Mode.48 However, communication can continue even when the device is in 
Passive Mode, using longer range technology, such as Bluetooth, thereby 
 
papers/comparisons_between_low_power_wireless_technologies.pdf> accessed 29 December 
2013. 
43 S. Boydell and R. Braidwood, Preliminary Physics, Cambridge Checkpoints 2012 (CUP 
2011) 70-72. 
44 A. Valdar, Understanding Telecommunications Networks (Institution of Engineering and 
Technology 2006) 16. 
45 A. Rida et al, RFID-Enabled Sensor Design and Applications (Artech House 2010) 18. 
46 S. Ahson and M. Ilyas, RFID Handbook, Applications, Technology, Security, and Privacy 
(CRC Press 2008) 376. 
47 A Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network is an architecture which links tasks amongst the peers and 
these peers gain equal privileges through the nodes which connects all peers with each other: 
L.T. Yang et al, Handbook on Mobile and Ubiquitous Computing: Status and Perspective 
(CRC Press 2012) 40. 
48 The active mode or 'forward active mode' means that the device can be operated through a 
bipolar junction transistor through which the current can flow. The current does not flow 
through the bipolar junction transistor since this is in reverse: M.B Patil, Basic Electronics 
Devices and Circuits (PHI Learning 2013) 197. 
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optimising battery use due to lower energy consumption.49 Hence, only one 
device has to be powered, whereas the other is powered by the transmission of 
radio waves.50 This makes it possible for NFC card readers to accept payments 
through contactless credit cards, so long as both devices are brought into close 
contact.51 
The RFID infrastructure coupled with NFC can be used for three 
different types of operation: Firstly, through NFC, mobile devices can read 
information contained on ‘passive RFID tags’ which are stored publicly and 
respond to information on a ‘Uniform Resource Locator’ (‘URL’) (for 
instance, by allowing information from a web address to be decoded). In 
addition, data can be added to tags, including on other devices. Hence, NFC 
has a ‘writing and reading’ mode.52 Secondly, NFC allows mobile device 
owners to undertake business transactions without any contact through 
payment identification and access control management as it has a ‘card 
emulation’ mode.53 Thirdly, NFC allows for increased interaction with others 
since data is transferred ‘peer-to-peer’,54 for instance via Bluetooth.55 NFC is 
ideal for mobile device owners who can enter their PIN or other identification 
each time they make a payment.56 
 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ahson and Ilyas n 46, 12.  
51 Ibid. 
52 A. Cavoukian, ‘Mobile Near Field Communications (NFC) "Tap 'n Go" Keep it Secure & 
Private, Information and Privacy Commissioner Ontaria’, Canada, 2013, 1-22, 5 
<http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/mobile-nfc.pdf> accessed 29 December 2013. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 E. Haselsteiner and K. Breitfuss, ‘Security in Near Field Communication (NFC), Strengths 
and Weaknesses’, undated, 1-11, 4 
<http://ece.wpi.edu/~dchasaki/papers/Security%20in%20NFC.pdf> accessed 27 December 
2013. 
56 M. Hendry, Near Field Communications Technology and Applications (CUP 2014) 185. 
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Yet NFC is not the only technology which allows greater m-payment 
functionality. Apple recently replaced NFC with iBeacon, a low energy 
Bluetooth which has wireless sensors to detect transmitted data in a particular 
location, such as, customised coupons upon entering a shop, and allows 
payments to be made via mobile phones.57 Equally, PayPal has adopted the 
‘PayPal Beacon’ which is simply connected to a power outlet in a store and 
when those who have downloaded the PayPal app then enter the shop, a 
dialogue, which is facilitated through Bluetooth, is created.58 As a result, 
customers are immediately checked in upon entering a shop and can pay hands-
free.59 Other competitors to NFC are, for example, QR Codes/2D Barcodes, 
which can be used on most devices and are inexpensive to adopt and 
maintain.60 Barcodes are commonly found in supermarkets on products and are 
normally scanned at the till by the cashier.61 However, barcodes do not possess 
strong security features and can also easily be obscured.62 This method has thus 
not become widely accepted.63 Otherwise, traditional plastic cards, such as, 
Europay, MasterCard and Visa (‘EMV’) which use chip-and-PIN or magnetic 
stripes, compete with NFC and clouds.64 Yet these technologies do not allow 
 
57 G. Gilchrist, Learning iBeacon (Packt Publishing 2014) Chapter 1. 
58 J. Xu, Digital Payment Systems, Managing Digital Enterprise 2014, 159-175; R. Borison, 
‘PayPal challenges NFC with bluetooth-enabled mobile payments’, Mobile Commerce Daily, 
2013 <http://www.mobilecommercedaily.com/paypal-gives-nfc-a-run-for-its-money-with-new-
bluetooth-mcommerce-option> accessed 30 December 2013. 
59 Borison (ibid). 
60 F. Stertz et al, 'NFC-Based Task Enactment for Automatic Documentation of Treatment 
Processes'. In I. Reinhartz-Berger et al (eds.), Enterprise, Business-Process and Information 
Systems Modeling (Springer 2017) 42. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 J.T.J. Penttinen, The Telecommunications Handbook: Engineering Guidelines for Fixed, 




customers to undertake anything else apart from the transaction and are 
therefore not suitable for m-payments.65  
Irrespective of the particular enabling technology (e.g. NFC, QR Codes 
or Bluetooth), the advantage is that customers are enabled to store e-money 
like in a conventional bank account in a digital wallet, which they can use to 
settle transactions and make payments by either tapping a screen or swiping 
their phone.66 Contactless cards, such as London Oyster Card, the Japanese 
Rail Suica Card, South Korean T-money or the Mumbai's transport system bus 
card, can already be used for transport or to pay in convenience stores.67 
Contactless pay and touch terminals have also been set up, for example, by 
Starbucks, Barclays, GooglePay and ApplePay.68 This, coupled with the 
increasing use of smartphones, has further paved the way for NFC or similar 
technologies to become integrated within mobile phones.69 
Apart from close-proximity m-payments facilitated through apps and, 
e.g. NFC or Bluetooth, remote m-payments can be made via mobile apps 
which are linked to the payer's credit and/or debit cards, or the customer’s 
account to pre-set payees.70 The advantage for m-payment customers is that 
 
65 Ibid; M. Liard and R. Gupta, ‘NFC vs Current Mobile Payment Alternatives, Transaction 
World Magazine’, 2013 <http://www.transactionworld.net/articles/2013/may/global-nfc.html> 
accessed 20 December 2013. 
66J. Xu, Managing Digital Enterprise: Ten Essential Topics (Atlantis Press 2014) 184. 
67 Rida et al n 73, 18. 
68 R. Boden, 'Barclays and Starbucks promote contactless in UK', NFC World, 18 June 2015 
<https://www.nfcworld.com/2015/06/18/336077/barclays-and-starbucks-promote-contactless-
in-uk/> accessed 1 March 2019; F. Campbell, 'Contactless payments continue to grow in the 
UK', Mobile Transaction, 2 January 2019 <https://www.mobiletransaction.org/contactless-
payments-uk/> accessed 1 March 2019. 
69 B. Leighton, ‘NFC mobile payments: overcoming the barriers for banks’, Banking 
Technology, 2013 <http://www.bankingtech.com/151452/nfc-mobile-payments-overcoming-
the-barriers-for-banks/> accessed 29 October 2013. 
70 N. Ozatac and K.K. Gökmenoglu, Emerging Trends in Banking and Finance: 3rd 
International Conference on Banking and Finance Perspectives (Springer 2018) 207. 
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they do not have to enter their details each time.71 Instead this is stored and can 
be easily confirmed by entering the username and password.72 These apps 
make use of either server-side73 or client-side wallets,74 both of which can be 
used with all types of merchants or only particular vendors.75 Server-side 
wallets store all data with a third party, whereas client-side wallets store all 
data on the device of the owner.76 Server-side wallets have particularly become 
facilitated due to the arrival of cloud-based solutions.77 Cloud computing 
involves various computers which all use the same application and are being 
connected through a network, most frequently the internet.78 Yet there are not 
that many cloud-based service providers so possible trust issues can arise.79 
This is because the few providers would have an oligopoly and could easily 
dominate the market and consumers may not want to entrust important data to 
just a few corporations.80 Nonetheless, in 2014, Visa launched the first cloud-
based system for m-payments.81 The cloud may become the favoured 
technology since banks and m-payment providers do not have to commit a lot 




73 The digital wallet can be stored on the server of the business. 
74 The digital wallet can be stored on the electronic device by the customer. 
75 Tabakovic n 16.  
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Y. Feng et al, ‘Price Competition in an Oligopoly Market with Multiple IaaS Cloud 
Providers’ (2014) IEEE Transactions on Computers 63(1), 59-73, 59; A.S. Horvath and R. 
Agrawal, ‘Trust in cloud computing’, South East Conference, 9-12 April 2015, 1-8, 1. 
79 Ibid (Feng et al). 
80 Ibid. 
81 VISA, ‘BBVA and Visa launch first commercial solution for cloud-based mobile payments’, 
2015 <http://www.visaeurope.com/newsroom/news/bbva-and-visa-launch-first-commercial-
solution-for-cloud-based-mobile-payments> accessed 18 July 2015. 
82 N. Daidj, Developing Strategic Business Models and Competitive Advantage in the Digital 
Sector (IGI Global 2015) 201l; B. Nicoletti, Cloud Computing in Financial Services (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2013) 80. 
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Another advantage for m-payment customers is that device security, 
application security and network security are ensured.83 For this purpose, 
cryptographic techniques have been integrated within mobile devices, the apps 
and the network in order to facilitate their use as money repositories and to 
make m-payments via apps.84  Indeed, mobile phones offer password 
protection and apps, including for cloud-based systems, and integrate further 
security features.85 Tokenisation has become particularly popular to achieve 
security in respect of m-payment services via apps.86 A higher value account 
number is being replaced by a lower value token which is only issued for one 
transaction, thereby screening the account number against unlawful use.87 
Hence, the static credentials are being replaced with different credentials.88 
Tokenisation reduces the amount of sensitive data that is being kept on mobile 
devices and sent over the network when a m-payment is made, which reduces 
the risk of security breaches.89 In addition, security is facilitated through Host 
Card Emulation (‘HCE’) which can be installed through an app, which verifies 
the data from the operating system of the phone against the data of the HCE 
app.90 All these technological developments have made m-payments possible 
since security risks have been curtailed. 
 
 
83 T. Nguyen et al, IBM Redbooks, IBM MobileFirst in Action for mGovernment and Citizen 
Mobile Services (International Business Machines Corporation 2015) 26-27. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 J. Stapleton and R.S. Poore, ‘Tokenization and Other Methods of Security for Cardholder 









The provision of m-payment services through digital devices is undoubtedly a 
very important future market with the potential to transform the payment 
system, the banking system and the retail sector.91 These developments may 
pave the way for a future cashless society.92 The leading technologies, e.g., m-
payment apps, digital wallets carrying e-money, NFC or Bluetooth (i.e., 
contactless or tap and go technology), realise the ‘jump’ from the traditional 
(physical) credit/debit card to a sophisticated m-payment system embedded 
within the various functionalities of today’s smartphones.93 As a result, m-
payment customers can easily access many different functionalities and 
services, the checkout becomes faster and simpler and the m-shopping 
customer experience becomes enhanced.94  
The life of consumers becomes simplified. Also, the accessibility of 
financial services to consumers is enhanced.95 Consumers are empowered to 
conduct financial transactions extremely easily. For instance, proximity 
payments through card swiper technology enables them to authorise 
transactions simply by tapping the device on the POS terminal.96 M-payment 
customers may also be able to scan products which they intend to purchase and 
 
91 C.J.F. Li et al, 'Exploring Mobile Peer-to-Peer Payment Adoption: The Effects of SNS and 
Native Mobile Banking Apps Usage' (2018) PACIS 2018 Proceedings, 109-118, 109. 
92 Marria n 13. 
93 M.Y. Zhang and M. Dodgson, High-tech Entrepreneurship in Asia: Innovation, Industry and 
Institutional Dynamics in Mobile Payments (Edward Elgar 2007) 144. 
94 E. Taylor, ‘Mobile payment technologies in retail: a review of potential benefits and risks’ 
(2016) International Journal of Retail and Distribution Management 44(2), 159-177, 164. 
95 X. Zhu, Emerging Champions in the Digital Economy: New Theories and Cases on Evolving 
Technologies and Business Models (Springer 2019) 40. 
96 J.T.J. Penttinen, Wireless Communications Security: Solutions for the Internet of Things 
(John Wiley & Sons 2017) 18. 
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to automatically pay for them when they visit stores.97 Consequently, m-
payment technology enables them to avoid waiting in any queues and they thus 
can save time.98 The available software also ensures that customers have a 
more seamless payment experience.99 
As a self-service technology, m-payments can increase efficiency and 
result in cost savings.100 Much more dynamic economic engagement is being 
facilitated between consumers and businesses.101 Such progression goes hand 
in hand with the evolution of the internet from web 1.0 to the more interactive 
and dynamic web 2.0 version and in the future web 3.0.102 A study about the 
US economy found that increased use of self-service technology could boost 
the US economy by US$130 billion annually.103 The potential boost to the US 
economy is likely to be replicated in the UK and SA where self-service 
technology is also being increasingly adopted. In the UK, many of the major 
banks104, as well as  companies, such as Facebook Messenger105 and PayPal, 
offer m-payment services.106 However, it will still take time to create the 
 
97 L. Tugby, 'Sainsbury's to launch scan-and-go smartphone shopping app', RetailWeek, 15 
April 2015 <https://www.retail-week.com/sectors/grocery/sainsburys-to-launch-scan-and-go-
smartphone-shopping-app/5073990.article> accessed 15th September 2017. 
98 Taylor n 94, 164. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid 165-166. 
101 Ibid 165. 
102 P. Kommers et al, The Evolution of the Internet in the Business Sector: Web 1.0 to Web 3.0 
(IGI Global 2015) 336. 
103 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach, Prepaid Cards, Mobile 
Payments and Internet-Based Payment Services’, June 2013, 1-47, 3 <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/guidance-rba-npps.pdf> accessed 1 March 
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infrastructure for proximity m-payments facilitated through NFC or Bluetooth 
because payment of sale terminals have to be further rolled out, e.g., for Apple 
Pay or other third-party payment specialists.107  Consequently, the m-payment 
infrastructure has to mature.  
Consumers must also become more accustomed to making use of their 
phones for payments, instead of traditional visa and debit cards or cash.108 In 
light of these emerging trends, the thesis focuses on remote m-payments. The 
reason is that the m-payment transformation is at present being facilitated 
through remote m-payments, which are provided by companies, such as PayPal 
and Facebook Messenger.109 It also discusses proximity m-payments 
transactions. 
The changes within the finance sector due to the use of these 
technologies necessitate that SA urgently updates its laws, as stressed in 
chapters five and the conclusion. Accordingly, the legislative analysis deals 
with m-payment services provided by banks and companies, such as Facebook 
Messenger, Apple Pay or PayPal. It is for this reason essential to close this 
legislative lacuna in SA in order to protect not only m-payment customers, but 
also the future financial system. 
Without legislative reform measures, the problem is that the risks which 
come with these technologies may be unfairly distributed. Consumer property, 
 
107 J.A. Martin, '7 reasons mobile payments still aren't mainstream', CIO Insider, 7 June 2016 
<http://www.cio.com/article/3080045/payment-processing/7-reasons-mobile-payments-still-
arent-mainstream.html> accessed 10th November 2016. 
108 H. Qasim and E. Abu-Shanab, 'Drivers of mobile payment acceptance: The impact of 
network externalities' (2016) Information Systems Frontiers 18(5), 1021-1034, 1021. 
109 Information Resources Management Association, Banking, Finance, and Accounting: 
Concepts, Methodologies, Tools, and Applications (Business Science Reference 2015) 183; 
Finder n 106. 
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as well as personal data, may not be adequately protected because of the 




CHAPTER 2         
 
FINTECH INNOVATION AND RISKS FOR CONSUMERS 
2.1 Introduction 
Whilst FinTech innovation has various advantages for m-payment customers, it 
also gives rise to a host of disadvantages and risks.1 This chapter therefore 
identifies the main sources of risk of m-payment services - 1. customer errors; 
2. technology problems and risks; and 3. risks and issues caused by third 
parties. The practical problems which can arise and cause disadvantages for m-
payment customers are explained. Any m-payment law must ideally mitigate 
the risk and practical issues and allocate responsibilities for the different 
sources of risk. Together with Chapter 1, this chapter thus provides the context 
for the discussions, especially in the later discussion of the legal position in the 
UK and SA and of potential reforms which might be introduced in the latter. 
Hence, this chapter highlights the most pressing matters which a legislator 
must consider when devising laws for m-payments designed to protect m-
payment customers. It particularly stresses the need to protect m-payment 
customers against unauthorised m-payment transactions and to protect 
consumers' data in order to maintain privacy. The reason is that security and 
data/privacy breaches are arguably the most serious concerns within the m-
 
1 Y.-C. Pan et al, 'Extending Technology Acceptance Model for Proximity Mobile Payment via 
Organisational Semiotics'. In K. Liu et al (eds), Digitalisation, Innovation, and Transformation 
(Springer 2018) 48. 
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payment space.2  Cyber attacks  which are perpetrated to commit fraud, disrupt 
or harm the payment system and/or collect data are on the increase and cause 
substantial losses.3 It is, therefore, essential to understand the potential sources 
of new security risks within the complex m-payment ecosystem which brings 
together different stakeholders, most notably banks, telecom operators, card 
issuers, software developers, security experts, cloud storage providers, mobile 
device operators, retailers and loyalty scheme providers.4 
Hence, the implementation of any of the m-payment technologies 
(discussed in chapter 1) requires banks to make investments to integrate instant 
payment features made available through NFC, iBeacon or other similar 
technologies.5 Banks must thus develop the technological capacity to create 
and maintain an integrated m-payment infrastructure.6 Alternatively, they must 
enter into new partnerships as already seen, for instance, by the Google Wallet 
adoption or development of applications, such as Orange, Barclays’ Quick Tap 
or Paym.7 New alliances must be formed which may be bank-led, i.e., the bank 
can remain responsible for ‘the customer account relationship’, but enter into, 
for instance, a joint venture with a non-bank or various partnerships and 
 
2 EY, 'The heightened threat of cyber attacks is fueling payment losses - how should your 
business respond? April 2018, 1-4, 2 <https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-
convergence-of-payments-and-cybersecurity/$File/EY-convergence-of-payments-and-
cybersecurity.pdf> accessed 10 July 2019. 
3 Ibid. 
4 DM Wallet Summit, ‘Digital Wallet Opportunity’, 2013 
<http://www.dmwsummit.com/digital-wallet-opportunity/> accessed 13th October 2013. 
5 Essvale Corporation Ltd, Business Knowledge in IT in Global Retail Banking, the Complete 
Handbook for IT Professionals (Essvale Corporations 2011) 16. 
6 Ibid. 
7 M. Warman, 'Orange and Barclaycard launch ‘Quick Tap’ mobile phone payments', The 
Telegraph, 20 May 2011 <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/8525031/Orange-and-
Barclaycard-launch-Quick-Tap-mobile-phone-payments.html> accessed 10 February 2019. 
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alliances.8  Alternatively, it may be bank-focused or non-bank led where the 
bank is responsible for safeguarding the funds but not account management on 
a daily basis.9 Whilst a non-bank led model may emerge in the future, this 
appears to be most likely based on collaboration.10 For example, many of the 
biggest US banks have teamed up with Google Wallet, ISIS, iPhone or Master 
Card/Visa.11 ISIS allows users to purchase goods through NFC at particular 
terminals.12 Google Wallet allows users to shop in stores, which allow 
contactless payments, to buy goods and services online and send money, 
including from users' debit and credit cards.13 
However, one disadvantage for m-payment customers is that some 
stores only accept a particular m-payment mechanism.14 For instance, whilst 
Apple Pay may work in most stores, it is not accepted by Walmart in the US.15 
This is because Walmart has its own m-payment app which it wants its 
customers to use.16 Consequently, m-payment customers may have to install 
several m-payment apps on their phones if they do not wish to use cash or 
credit and debit cards.17 They may find this frustrating as the use of multiple 
apps does not make their lives easier. The advantage of the otherwise more 
convenient m-payment channel may thus be lost. Non-acceptance of certain m-
 
8 Essvale Corporation Ltd n 5. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 B. King, Bank 3.0, Why Banking Is No Longer Somewhere You Go, But Something You Do 
(Marshall Cavendish Business 2013) 191. 
12 B. Nicoletti, Mobile Banking: Evolution Or Revolution? (Palgrave Macmillan 2014) 128. 
13 Google Wallet, ‘Shop, Save. Pay. With your phone’, 2013 
<http://www.google.co.uk/wallet/index.html> accessed 29 December 2013. 
14 S. Epstein, 'Is the fintech industry killing mobile payments?' Finextra, 16 August 2016 
<https://www.finextra.com/blogposting/12976/is-the-fintech-industry-killing-mobile-






payment apps by merchants also constitutes an entry barrier for new market 
participants.18 Similarly, the fact that there exist various different technologies 
which can be employed for m-payments may result in the market becoming 
more fragmented.19 However, the most significant risk and thus disadvantage 
for m-payment customers is that the complex technology and complicated 
relationships between different stakeholders give rise to new security risks. 
These risks may particularly impact payment transactions and payment data. 
For that reason, the next section discusses how m-payments heighten 
technological risks. 
 
2.2 M-payments and the magnified technological risks 
In any legal system, the law must find answers to the different practical 
problems which may arise when technological risk occurs in order to protect 
m-payment customers. Fundamentally, m-payments magnify technological 
risks as two extra elements are added – the mobile handset or electronic device 
and the mobile network.20 This is because the chain across which services are 
rendered is considerably extended.21 As a result, m-payments pose various new 
risks, specifically operational, credit and regulatory risk.22 Basel II defines 
 
18 Ibid. 
19 S. Pandy and M. Crowe, 'What's New with Regulation in the Mobile Payment and Fintech 
Space?' Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, MPIW Meeting with Regulators Report, 25 May 
2017, 1-7, 3 <http://www.asbasupervision.com/es/bibl/x-lecturas-recomendadas/1507-
lr229/file> accessed 2nd September 2017. 
20 J. Téllez and S. Zeadally, Mobile Payment Systems: Secure Network Architectures and 
Protocols (Springer 2017) 26. 
21 Essvale Corporation Ltd n 5. 
22 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Mobile banking and payments -supporting an innovative and 
secure market’, Thematic Review TR13/6, August 2013, 1-12, 6-7 




operational risk as damage due to failed or inadequate systems, people or 
processes, which can be caused by external or internal circumstances.23 Credit 
risk is occasioned when there is a default, i.e. when a credit obligation is not 
paid, including on time.24 Credit risk is a loss as a result of a ‘credit event’ 
which can be occasioned through fraud and theft; the risk of fraud may be 
elevated due to high operational risk.25 Strictly speaking, credit risk is best 
considered as part of operational risk.26 There is thus a certain degree of 
overlap since operational and credit risks particularly emanate from various 
security27 and technology risks.28 The newly emerging m-payment market also 
raises regulatory questions which impact customer protection. For instance, a 
pressing regulatory matter is e-wallet regulation.29 The reason for this is that e-
wallets are often provided by third parties, which thereby effectively assume a 
vital payment role.30 Hence, when banks collaborate with third-party digital 
wallet providers, it must be ensured that these third parties protect customer 
funds, including their data and privacy.31  Customers must also be empowered 
 
23 Bank for International Settlements, ‘Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative 
Document, Operational Risk’, Supporting Document to the New Basel Capital Accord, 2001, 
1-30, 2 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca07.pdf> accessed 28 October 2013; P. Curwen and J. 
Whalley, Mobile Telecommunications in a High-Speed World, Industry Structure, Strategic 
Behaviour and Socio-Economic Impact (Gower Publishing 2010) 218. 
24 M. Anolli et al, Retail Credit Risk Management (Palgrave MacMillan 2013) 34. 
25 M. Choudhry, The Principles of Banking (John Wiley & Sons Singapore Pte Ltd 2012) 143; 
I. Matthaus-Maier and J.D. von Pischke, New Partnerships for Innovation in Microfinance 
(Springer-Verlag 2009) 161. 
26 P. Goldmann, Financial Services, Anti-Fraud Risk and Control Workbook (John Wiley & 
Sons Inc 2010) 39-40. 
27 P. Suresh and J. Paul, Management of Banking and Financial Services (2nd ed, Dorling 
Kindersley (India) Pvt Ltd 2010) 500. 
28 J.L. Bayuk et al, Cyber Security Policy Guidebook (John Wiley & Sons Inc 2012) 192. 
29 G. Dorfleitner et al, FinTech in Germany (Springer 2017) 82. 
30  S. Pandy and M. Crowe, 'What's New with Regulation in the Mobile Payment and Fintech 
Space?' Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, MPIW Meeting with Regulators Report, 25 May 
2017, 1-7, 3 <http://www.asbasupervision.com/es/bibl/x-lecturas-recomendadas/1507-




to resolve disputes which arise because of e-wallet providers.32  Another 
important legal reform could be to establish digital identities with the help of 
banks.33 Both areas go to the core of customer protection. This is because fraud 
prevention ultimately protects the m-payment customer.  
In the context of m-payments, consumer protection especially requires 
that the magnified technological and thus operational risks are combated. 
Customers must be assured that payment transactions can be safely sent 
through the m-payment system and that the related data, including their 
privacy, is also safeguarded. The negative impacts which arise from security 
failures, including in respect of payment data, must be understood. Legislators 
must try and minimise the primary problems which arise from m-payments by 
addressing how liability should be allocated when customer funds are lost 
because technological and operational risks materialise and/or the vast amount 
of collected consumer data is not adequately protected.  
In other words, a purely contractual position and thus neo liberal 
position34 in the context of unauthorised transactions and the protection of 
customers’ data is unlikely to guarantee fairness for customers.35 For instance, 
research, which investigated whether bank terms and conditions in respect of 
accepting liability for unauthorised transactions was fair, found that banks 
 
32 Ibid. 
33 World Economic Forum, 'A Blueprint for Digital Identity, The Role of Financial Institutions 
in Building Digital Identity', August 2016, 1-108, 1 
<http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_A_Blueprint_for_Digital_Identity.pdf> accessed 1st 
May 2017. 
34 K. Birch, A Research Agenda for Neoliberalism (Edward Elgar 2018) 156. 
35 I. Becker et al, 'International comparison of bank fraud reimbursement: customer perceptions 
and contractual terms' (2017) Journal of Cybersecurity 3(2), 109-125, 109-110. 
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unfairly imposed liability on customers.36 Another study identified that bank 
terms and conditions lacked adequate information for customers to know how 
to comply with their contractual duties.37 It has also been observed that bank 
practices in respect of allowing personal identification numbers (PINs) changes 
sometimes facilitate that customers breach the terms and conditions.38  
It is for this reason important to discuss the different sources of risk to 
understand the various circumstances which can arise, so that legal liability can 
be correctly allocated.39 Otherwise, m-payment providers will act carelessly 
when it comes to guaranteeing security if customers were too easily held 
accountable for unauthorised m-payment transactions.40 Also economic 
efficiency will most likely be realised if the risks were allocated to the party 
who is most able to minimise the occurrence of the unauthorised transaction 
and who is able to adopt a clear process for retrieving funds.41 
Risk can be caused by m-payment customers, security issues, as well as 
third parties which provide the m-payment infrastructure together with banks, 
as discussed in the next sections: M-payment customers may not be refunded 
missing, lost, stolen or wrongly sent funds. They may fall victim to fraud, 
 
36 N. Bohm et al, 'Electronic commerce: Who carries the risk of fraud' (2000) The Journal of 
Information, Law and Technology, 3 <https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2000_3/bohm/> 
accessed 10 April 2019. 
37 S.J. Murdoch et al, 'Are payment card contracts unfair?' In: J. Grossklags and B. Preneel 
(eds), Financial Cryptography and Data Security (Springer 2016) 600-608, 600. 
38 Becker et al n 35, 110-111. 
39 Ibid, 111. 
40 Ibid. 
41 A.C.B. Hache and N. Ryder, 'Tis the season to (be jolly?) wise-up to online fraudsters. 
Criminals on the Web lurking to scam shoppers this Christmas: A critical analysis of the 
United Kingdom's legislative provisions and policies to tackle online fraud' (2011) Information 
& Communications Technology Law 20, 35-56, 35; ibid. 
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including identity theft. Their personal data may be used without authorisation, 
may be compromised, and their privacy invaded.  
Consequently, m-payments have various disadvantages because of 
technology-related practical problems. These issues must be understood in 
order to analyse in subsequent chapters how greater protection can be achieved 
for m-payment customers. Put differently, any legal system must consider the 
different sources of risk, i.e. whether a risk was caused by a m-payment 
customer, as opposed to security issues or third parties. The next sections 
therefore provide an overview of the practical technological problems which 
cause disadvantages for m-payment customers. For this purpose, it is firstly 
discussed which problems may be caused by m-payment customers. 
Thereafter, common security issues are highlighted, as well as which problems 
may arise because of third parties which help to create the m-payment 
infrastructure.  
 
2.2.1 Technological risks and consumer understanding 
One disadvantage of m-payment services is that customers may make mistakes 
and as a result lose money.42 The question of how the law should treat such 
customers depends on whether customers are conceptualised as reasonably 
circumspect or vulnerable, as briefly outlined in this section and discussed in 
 
42 M. Solin and A. Zerzan, 'Mobile Money: Methodology for Assessing Money Laundering and 
Terrorist Financing Risks' (2010) GSMA Discussion Paper, 1-35, 6-7 
<http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/amlfinal35.pdf> 
accessed 1st September 2016; Basel Committee, ‘Risk management for electronic banking and 
electronic money activities’, March 1998, 1-25, 20-21 
<https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc215.pdf> accessed 1st September 2016.  
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greater detail in chapter 3. Also, many different case scenarios may arise to 
which the law must find answers. M-payment customers may act negligently, 
follow bad customer security procedures, and have poor levels of information 
technology (‘IT’) literacy.43 Customers may enter incorrect details due to 
smaller mobile phone screens, so that there are more data-entry mistakes.44 
This may result, for example, in the wrong amount being paid or the wrong 
recipient receiving a payment. The instantaneous nature of m-payments can 
also result in hasty decisions and this tends to cause more mistakes.45 Mobiles 
are also generally prone to data loss because of decommissioned, lost or stolen 
devices.46 This is because users may make poor PIN selections, choose no 
password at all or fail to use encryption.47 Stolen phones on which customer 
data is stored thus heighten the risk of misuse.48  
The personal information of the customer is also at risk, as data can be 
seamlessly transferred to another device if security has been compromised, for 
example, as a result of a virus.49 Low technological literacy amongst 
consumers can equally result in wrong or incomplete transactions and careless 
safekeeping of personal data.50 Even ‘fat fingers’ can cause errors.51 Practical 
 
43 Ibid.  
44 A. Scupola, Developing Technologies in E-Services, Self-Services, and Mobile 
Communication: New Concepts (Information Science Reference 2011) 202. 
45 Curwen and Whalley n 23, 218. 
46 Cloud Security Alliance, 'Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Mobile Computing', 
November 2012, 1-60, 16 
<https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/mobile/Mobile_Guidance_v1.pdf> 
accessed 1st September 2016. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 R. Baldoni and G. Chockler, Collaborative Financial Infrastructure Protection, Tools, 
Abstractions, and Middleware (Springer-Verlag 2012) 222. 
50 Mobile Financial Services Working Group, 'Mobile Financial Services, Consumer Protection 
in Mobile Financial Services' (2014) Guideline Note No.13, 1-15, 3 <http://www.afi-
global.org/sites/default/files/publications/mfswg_guideline_note_7_consumer_protection_in_
mfs.pdf> accessed 1st September 2016. 
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factors, such as, an insufficiently charged mobile phone, may also cause 
uncertainty for the customer as to whether or not the transaction has been 
completed, or may result in duplicate transactions.52 Similarly, unstable 
internet connections may cause uncertainty for customers. All of these 
scenarios may result in customers losing funds and possibly not being refunded 
and may cause disputes in respect of unauthorised m-payment transactions. 
While customers may be responsible for losing funds or falling prey to 
cybercriminals in certain cases, this is not always the case and can also be 
attributable to security issues, which are discussed next. 
 
2.2.2 Technological risks and security 
The disadvantage for m-payment customers to lose money or have their 
personal data compromised is primarily present because operational risk is 
heightened when security is weak, and it is easy to gain illegal and 
unauthorised access.53 Any legal system must mandate risk management, 
prevent m-payment customers from being unfairly blamed for security failures 
outside their control and protect their data and privacy in a data-driven world. 
Security weaknesses can arise because of more seamless applications favoured 
by customers and enhanced functionalities, but which increase the risk of 
fraud.54 Smartphones are already equipped with different functionalities, for 
 
51 R. Jones, ‘Regulator warns of dangers of mobile banking’, The Guardian, 27 August 2013 
<https://www.theguardian.com/money/2013/aug/27/dangers-mobile-banking-regulator> 
accessed 1st September 2016. 
52 Curwen and Whalley n 23. 
53 Solin and Zerzan n 42. 
54  I. Schneider, ‘5 Critical Strategies for Mobile Banking Security’, BankTech, 2012 
<http://www.banktech.com/risk-management/5-critical-strategies-for-mobile-
banking/240003902> accessed 28 October 2013. 
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instance, Global Positioning System (‘GPS’), high-resolution cameras, storage 
of personal information, diary commitments and contacts, etc. As more data is 
available, security threats are likely to increase, especially since the data 
network is constantly connected to the internet.55 The security of mobile 
devices is thus threatened because of vulnerabilities of third-party applications, 
the devices, their operating systems and the design.56 This makes it easier to 
intercept transaction data at the service terminal when NFC is being used, 
thereby heightening the risk of fraud and theft.57 The risk of financial identity 
theft and fraud is also elevated since other parties may replicate the identity of 
the customer in order to carry out transactions.58 Theft and fraud are 
particularly facilitated since hacking programs are commercially available, 
including for mobiles.59  
Hacking denotes gaining unauthorised access over a remote mobile 
device.60 These malicious software programs are used to appropriate 
transaction details from customers when they access their digital wallets on 
 
55 J.J. Park et al, IT Convergence and Services, ITCS 2011 & IRoA 2011 (London, Springer 
2012) 158. 
56 Cloud Security Alliance n 46, 16.  
57 Ibid 3. 
58 N.S. van der Meulen, Financial Identity Theft: Context, Challenges and Countermeasures 
(TMC Asser Press 2011) 208. 
59 R. Sidel, ‘Mobile Bank Heist: Hackers Target Your Phone’, The Wall Street Journal, 26 
August 2016 <http://www.wsj.com/articles/mobile-bank-heist-hackers-target-your-phone-
1472119200> accessed 1st September 2016. 
60 A hacking team which researched the security of the Samsung Galaxy S3 mobile phone sent 
a malicious file (a Trojan horse) via NFC and this was routinely opened by the document 
viewer and an attack could be launched. The hackers had then access to all the data on the 
phone. Whilst Android 4.0.4 has adopted anti-exploit mitigations in its code, these were found 
to be easy to circumvent: R. Naraine, 'Exploit beamed via NFC to hack Samsung Galaxy S3 
(Android 4.0.4)', Zero Day, 19 September 2012 <http://www.zdnet.com/article/exploit-
beamed-via-nfc-to-hack-samsung-galaxy-s3-android-4-0-4/> accessed 1 September 2016; R. 
Samani et al, CSA Guide to Cloud Computing: Implementing Cloud Privacy and Security 
(Elsevier 2015) 83; House of Commons, Committee on Standards and Privileges, Privilege: 




their mobile phones or other digital devices.61 Moreover, SIM cards are 
particularly vulnerable to hacking, as they contain the identity of the customer 
and payment credentials of mobile wallets in NFC-enabled mobiles, which can 
then be remotely cloned.62 For instance, Zeus, a malicious Trojan horse, attacks 
personal computers (‘PCs’) and a new version has been developed to harm 
mobile operating systems, such as, Apple, Android, Blackberry, Windows 6.5, 
Palm OF and others.63 A malicious trojan horse tries to gain access by the user 
wrongly installing it, which then enables the malicious code to access the 
secure zone and to obtain control or send denial-of-service attacks.64 New 
hacking strategies are also continuously developed. For instance, in 2016, it 
was reported that there was a new ‘Android Stagefright Exploit’, which left 
millions of Android users vulnerable.65  It enabled the Android devices of all 
those who visited a webpage with a malicious multimedia file to be remotely 
hacked in under ten seconds.66 
As social media users and news outlets publish links increasingly to 
multimedia files, which are particularly popular, it is very difficult to screen 
against these types of security threats.67  
 
61 Ibid. 
62 S. Sposito, ‘Mobile Bank Accounts May Be Vulnerable from SIM Card Hack’, American 
Banker, 2013 <http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_141/mobile-bank-accounts-may-
be-vulnerable-from-sim-card-hack-1060802-1.html> accessed 28th October 2013. 
63 Scupola n 44, 202; E.P. Doherty, Digital Forensics for Handheld Devices (CRC Press 2013) 
4. 
64 See J.M. Stewart, Comp TA Security + Review Guide (2nd ed, Wiley & Sons 2011) Chapter 
3. 
65 H. Be'er, Metaphor, ‘A (real) real-life Stagefright exploit’, Exploit, 1-38, 1 
<https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/39527.pdf> accessed 1st September 2016 (Be’er); S. 
Khandelwal, 'New Exploit to 'Hack Android Phones Remotely' threatens Millions of Devices', 
The Hacker News, 16 March 2016 <http://thehackernews.com/2016/03/exploit-to-hack-
android.html> accessed 1st September 2016. 




Security is also compromised when the handset is used in Wi-Fi 
hotspots in public spaces.68 This is because mobiles can be more easily 
accessed illegally.69 Smart-devices are also vulnerable since hackers may steal 
information, money, listen to voice mails, send viruses and spy by exploiting 
the distinct vulnerabilities of mobiles.70 The risk posed by hacking is further 
compounded by the ever-changing modus operandi of hackers.71  Hackers are 
often at the forefront of technological innovation and make use of the latest 
criminal toolkits available online.72 Target banks, which are attacked by 
professional hackers, may therefore struggle with continuously maintaining 
and improving their systems in order to sufficiently protect the m-payment 
market.73 For example, in 2016, NatWest conceded that its online banking 
system was defective since cyberthieves could hack accounts through stolen 
smartphones and by pretending to be the victims in order to receive SMS sent 
 
68 P. Collinson, ‘Don't bank on your phone - it could be hacked by Zeus 'trojan horse'’, The 
Guardian, 2011 <http://www.theguardian.com/money/2011/jul/22/smartphones-hacked-zeus-
malware> accessed 28 October 2013. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Certified Ethical Hacker, ‘Ethical Hacking and Countermeasures Version 6, Module 
XXXVI, Hacking Mobile Phones, PDA and Handheld Devices’, 2008, 1-90, 9-10 
<http://blurredlogic.net/data/tut/Ethical_HackingV6/CEH-
v6_Instructor_slides/CEHv6%20Module%2036%20Hacking%20Mobile%20Phones,%20PDA
%20and%20Handheld%20Devices.pdf> accessed 30 December 2013. 
71 State of New Hampshire Department of Information Technology (2012), Monthly Security 
Tips Newsletter 7(1), 1-2, 1 
<http://www.nh.gov/doit/cybersecurity/resources/documents/nl1201-emerging-trends.pdf> 
accessed 27 December 2013; Sophos, ‘Security Threat Report 2012, Seeing the Threats 
Through the Hype’, 2012, 11-31 
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bank-accounts/422343-11.html> accessed 28 October 2013. 
72 R. O'Harrow, ‘Hacking tool kits, available free online, fuel growing cyberspace arms race’, 
Washington Post, 2013 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/hacking-tool-kits-
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ac85-e669876c6a24_story.html> accessed 8 January 2014; S.-P. Oriyano and M. Gregg, 
Hacker Techniques, Tools, and Incident Handling (Jones & Bartlett Learning 2011) Chapter 1. 
73 J. Rouse et al, Hacking Exposed Mobile: Security Secrets & Solutions (McGraw Hill 
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to other SIM cards.74 This latter hacking strategy is also known as ‘blagging’ 
where someone is impersonating another by using, for instance, a personal 
identification number (‘PIN’).75 
As mobile phones have similar applications as PCs, they are also prone 
to viruses.  In 2011, over 200 specific viruses targeted mobiles, such as, 
SpyEye,76 with this number being on the increase.77 Vulnerabilities caused 
through viruses are further elevated for m-payment services since anti-virus 
programmes for mobiles are not as effective as for PCs.78 Malware, i.e., 
malicious software to spy, invade or harm a mobile, can be accidentally 
downloaded when a m-payment product is loaded.79 In 2012, there were over 
350,000 malicious malware available for Android apps.80 This information-
stealing malware is mainly found on third-party app stores, i.e., those that are 
not on Google's Play Store.81 Kaspersky, a security company, explains that, 
whilst most mobile malware is designed for Android devices, the iPhone which 
 
74 M.-A. Russon, ‘NatWest online banking flaw enables hackers to drain bank accounts by 
stealing your smartphone’, IB Times, 7 March 2016 <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/natwest-
online-banking-flaw-enables-hackers-drain-bank-accounts-by-stealing-your-smartphone-
1548002> accessed 1st September 2016. 
75 House of Commons, Committee on Standards and Privileges, Privilege: Hacking of 
Members' mobile phones, Fourteenth Report of Session 2010-11 (TSO Shop 2011) 5. 
76 SpyEye is a toolkit for criminals, which functions like a Trojan and for instance, makes 
‘keylogging’ possible, ‘autofills credit cards modules’ and carries out daily backups: 
Symantec, ‘SpyEye Bot versus Zeus Bot’, 2010 
<http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/spyeye-bot-versus-zeus-bot> accessed 23 December 
2013; Baldoni and Chockler (n 30).  
77 C. Wild et al, Electronic Mobile Commerce Law, An analysis of trade, finance, media and 
cybercrime in the digital age (University of Hertfordshire Press 2011) 281. 
78 T. Beck and S.M. Maimbo, Financial Sector Development in Africa, Opportunities and 
Challenges (The World Bank 2011) 59; P. Lambert, ‘How effective is antivirus software on 
smartphones?’ IT Security, 2012 <http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/it-security/how-effective-
is-antivirus-software-on-smartphones/7629/> accessed 28th October 2013. 
79 N. Chesworth, ‘Be smart, stay safe: security and mobile banking’, The Telegraph, 2013 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/finance/natwest-mobile-
banking/10292506/smartphone-security-mobile-banking.html> accessed 28 October 2013. 
80 G. McIlraith, ‘How to Ensure Mobile Banking App Security’, BankTech, 2013 
<http://www.banktech.com/risk-management/how-to-ensure-mobile-banking-app-
securit/240163093> accessed 28 October 2013. 
81  Cloud Security Alliance n 44, 16.  
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uses iOS, namely, a closed system, is also at risk.82 According to Kaspersky, all 
systems have vulnerabilities and the risk of iPhones being infected by malware 
attacks may eventuate. This can lead to many iPhones being infected as there is 
no antivirus currently available since companies are not permitted at present to 
design such end-point security for Apple.83 Unofficial stores thus expose users 
to possible viruses, malware, Trojans and adware84 which they may 
accidentally download.85 
When customers unlock their smartphones and install apps from third 
parties,86 they also heighten the risk of spoofing attacks, which are strikes 
whereby a malicious application replicates the way another one looks; a 
popular spoofing attack is phishing.87 Phishing attacks result in users disclosing 
their password to an unauthorised application in order to obtain banking data.88 
McAfee, an online security firm, also points out the threats for mobiles, 
particularly from malware shopping sprees facilitated by the sale of apps with 
 
82 P. Sonne, ‘Data-Security Expert Kaspersky: There Is No More Privacy’, The Wall Street 
Journal, 3 September 2013 
<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324432404579053091175949708> accessed 
1st September 2016; M. Asay, ‘Why Your iPhone Will Inevitably Catch a Virus’, Hack, 5 
September 2013 <http://readwrite.com/2013/09/05/kaspersky-the-ios-malware-dam-will-
break/> accessed 1st September 2016; Samani et al n 58, 83.  
83 Ibid (Sonne).  
84 Adware in the mobile context is called ‘malware’, but is not illegal, but opens 
advertisements, but often spyware is concealed in adware: M.E. Vermaat et al, Discovering 
Computers 2014, Technology in a World of Computers, Mobile Devices, and the Internet 
(CengageBrain 2013) 231. 
85 S. Peng et al, ‘Smartphone Malware and Its Propagation Modeling: A Survey’ (2013), 16(2), 
IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 925-941, 925; M. Khosrow-Pour, Encyclopedia of 
Information Science and Technology (3rd ed, Information Resources Management Association 
2014) 5681. 
86 D. Chell et al, The Mobile Application Hacker's Handbook (Indianapolis, John Wiley & 
Sons Inc 2015) 491. 
87 L. Malisa et al, 'Detecting Mobile Application Spoofing Attacks by Leveraging User Visual 
Similarity Perception' (2015) International Association for Cryptologic Research, 1-17, 1 
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/709.pdf> accessed 1st September 2016. 
88 M. Dawson and M. Omar, New Threats and Countermeasures in Digital Crime and Cyber 
Terrorism (IGI Global 2015) 55. 
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worms by malware authors.89 The availability of NFC means that digital 
wallets have the potential to be common, particularly in densely populated 
places.90 This may result in mobile worm attacks which bump into the 
connection and then infect the phone to appropriate e-money.91 However, 
mobiles which have not been unlocked can be automatically updated to protect 
against recognised threats, though malware can prevent these updates.92 
Furthermore, mobile numbers store the International Mobile Subscriber 
Identity (‘IMEI’) of the consumer, but this can be stolen when a phone is 
infected.93 With this IMEI number, malware writers then inform mobile phone 
companies that the handset is stolen in order to obtain a new SIM card which 
they use to gain fraudulent access to the person's bank account.94 
Consequently, the mobile is taken over in order to sidestep the security checks 
of banks.95 
The adoption of technology like Bluetooth or NFC within m-payments 
can also lead to additional security breaches as Bluetooth and NFC are like 
radio communications which can be intercepted and even enhanced through an 
antenna.96 Even if encryption is used, a traffic analysis can nevertheless be 
 
89 McAfee Labs, ‘2013 Threats Predictions’, Report, 2013, 1-16, 4 
<http://www.mcafee.com/uk/resources/reports/rp-threat-predictions-2013.pdf> accessed 20 
December 2013. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid 4.  
92 Ibid. 
93 A. Klein, ‘SIM-ple: Mobile Handsets Are Weak Link in Latest Online Banking Fraud 
Scheme', Security Intelligence, 13 March 2012 <https://securityintelligence.com/sim-ple-




96 A. Dubey and A. Misra, Android Security, Attacks and Defenses (Taylor & Francis Group 
LLC 2013) 222. 
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carried out.97 For instance, NFC is prone to eavesdropping; an attacker can 
corrupt, change or insert data and there can be a ‘man-in-the-middle attack’ 
when two parties try to communicate.98 While eavesdropping is minimised 
when the device is in Passive Mode, it cannot be entirely prevented.99 Apple’s 
iBeacon is equally vulnerable.100 As Ozguc explains, the ‘iBeacon’s 
fundamentally open design means that any mobile app could be designed to 
pick up a retailer’s location broadcast, including apps developed by 
competitors or unscrupulous third-party developers’.101 Gonsalves further 
warns that ‘[t]hese apps could use that broadcast information to locate and 
track a user, possibly without their permission.’102 Some experts therefore warn 
that m-payments can result in ‘fraudsters' heaven’.103 
Research published in 2014 also found that 40 out of 60 apps from 
leading banks had serious security flaws which could possibly compromise 
financial data.104 Only under 20% of apps were designed to protect against 
 
97 Ibid. 
98  E. Haselsteiner and K. Breitfuss, ‘Security in Near Field Communication (NFC), Strengths 
and Weaknesses’, undated, 1-11, 4 
<http://ece.wpi.edu/~dchasaki/papers/Security%20in%20NFC.pdf> accessed 27 December 
2013, 4-6.  
99 Ibid 7-8.  
100 iBeacon is a technology standard which was developed by Apple. When apps are installed 
on Android and iOS devices, signals can be received from the beacons. iBeacon employs 
Bluetooth, a low energy, which can sense in close proximity in order to send an identifier 
standard, which is read by a compatible operating system or app: iBeaconInsider, 'What is 
iBeacon? What are iBeacons?' 2016 <http://www.ibeacon.com/what-is-ibeacon-a-guide-to-
beacons/> accessed 10th November 2016. 
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doesnt-say> accessed 20 December 2013. 
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103 Scupola n 44, 203; also see L. Bachelor, ‘Contactless card fraud is too easy, says Which?’, 
Guardian, 23 July 2015 <http://www.theguardian.com/money/2015/jul/23/contactless-card-is-
too-easy-says-which> accessed 17 July 2015. 
104 A. Sanchez, 'Personal banking apps leak info through phone', 8 January 2014, IOActive 
<http://blog.ioactive.com/2014/01/personal-banking-apps-leak-info-through.html> accessed 1st 




memory corruption attacks, i.e., no Stack Smashing Protection and Position 
Independent Executable were enabled.105 Additionally, 40% of tested apps 
failed to verify whether the Secure Sockets Layer (‘SSL’) certificates where 
authentic, thereby allowing ‘man-in-the-middle’ attacks.106 Half of the tested 
apps permitted emails and SMS to be sent from the consumer's device because 
the UIWebView was insecure and JavaScripts could be injected.107 
Furthermore, 90% of the tested apps had various non-SSL links which made 
interception possible and allowed HTML and JavaScript codes to be injected 
with a view to generating false login signals.108 Accordingly, one of the 
significant risks is that flaws within the m-payment technology may be 
exploited by cybercriminals, including employees of the stakeholders within 
the m-payment ecosystem, who may commit theft or fraud.109 Hence, security 
weaknesses may result in unauthorised m-payment transactions and/or 
data/privacy breaches. However, customers should not be responsible for 
security issues and should be refunded when they become victims of fraud 
without being at fault themselves. Otherwise, the convenience of using m-
payments apps is outweighed by the great disadvantage of cyber fraud. 
Certainly, security issues are not just caused by m-payment providers. Instead, 
issues can arise because of the inadequate performance by one or several 
players within the chain, which the next section discusses. It is also 
 
BGR, 14 January 2014 <http://bgr.com/2014/01/14/mobile-banking-apps-security-





109 Mobile Financial Services Working Group n 50, 4. 
102 
 
acknowledged that there exists an overlap between security issues and 
performance by third parties within the m-payment ecosystem. 
 
2.2.3 Technological risks and third-party collaboration 
Collaboration is required to fuse banking services with technological 
advances.110 Different stakeholders rely on the performance of other 
stakeholders.111 An interdependent relationship is thus created.112 In other 
words, supply chain risk is heightened due to the unique operational set-up 
required to facilitate m-payments.113 Technical problems, particularly the 
complex technical set up to deliver services, can cause service disruptions.114 
For example, customers may not be able to make transactions due to system 
outages.115 System outages may occur, for instance, because of a failure to 
properly organise the ecosystem between the various parties within the m-
payment infrastructure, i.e., the relationship between the mobile network 
operator, the issuer or bank, the mobile service provider, the trusted service 
manager(s)116 (‘TPPs’) and any other parties.117 Delays may happen anywhere 
 
110 DM Wallet Summit, ‘Digital Wallet Opportunity’, 2013 
<http://www.dmwsummit.com/digital-wallet-opportunity/> accessed 13th October 2013. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 
113 T. Hinkel, ‘Banks Beware: Operational Risk Increasing’, Bank Systems & Technology, 
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increasing/240005678> accessed 28 October 2013. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Responsible Digital Payments Guidelines. July 2016, 1-28, 6 
<http://www.cashlearning.org/downloads/btca-
responsibledigitalpaymentsguidelinesandbackground-(1).pdf> accessed 1st September 2016. 
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used. The role consists of establishing technical connections, as well as entering into 
agreements with device manufacturers, mobile network operators and other parties which are 
responsible for the security on mobile devices. A trusted service manager thus provides a 
contactless service management platform and thereby connects the service provider, the 




within the m-payment infrastructure and resultantly, it can be unclear whether a 
transaction has to be made again or not.118 Delays may also result in incorrect 
balances being shown, so that either transactions are declined or customers 
incur overdrafts.119 Another practical problem which can arise is that not all the 
changes to the value stored within the m-payment system are accurately 
identified on a daily basis.120 
Other issues can also arise. Banks’ agents may, for instance: charge 
unauthorised fees; tie customers in, e.g., by requiring that services or goods are 
bought to make use of their service; lose customer records or assets; incorrectly 
enter data; manage cash wrongly, so that the funds of customers are 
unavailable; or fail to address customer complaints and/or to pass them onto 
the bank.121 Agents may also be targets of third-party theft and fraud.122 
Moreover, criminals may try and steal funds from those agents which accept 
cash.123 Unauthorised agents may try to defraud customers. There further exists 
the risk that agents may accept counterfeit money when they load electronic 
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funds onto a mobile device.124 The risk of fraud may be elevated by the 
partnerships, especially when poor processes, product designs, compliance and 
monitoring practices are adopted.125 Due to the complex ecosystem, it may be 
difficult to establish which party is responsible for holding funds within the m-
payment infrastructure.126 It may also be difficult to identify which party failed 
to discharge its respective duty. As a result, customers may experience 
problems when they complain about violations of their consumer rights.127 
Another fundamental disadvantage for m-payment customers is the 
misuse of their sensitive personal data by those within the m-payment 
ecosystem.128 For instance, Facebook has made m-payment available via its 
Messenger app.129 However, it has also been found to have shared data from its 
users illegitimately with over 60 companies with which it entered into data 
partnerships.130 A drawback for m-payment customers may therefore be that 
their m-payment transaction history is shared with various companies which 
sell the data for commercial gain.131 Nonetheless,  the trend is towards 
predictive hyper personalisation.132 In other words, the personal data of m-
payment customers is likely to be utilised to create a personalised shopping 
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experience.133 Rhoen also notes that automated processes, including m-
payments, result in datafication and the Internet of Things ('IoT') (i.e. 
connected objects and devices) will further heighten data generation.134 The 
thereby generated big data will be tantamount to permanent consumer 
surveillance.135 This raises the question how the law should strike a balance 
between protecting the personal data of m-payment users and allowing 
companies to utilise such data. 
Moreover, cloud providers are entrusted with sensitive personal data 
which they may commercially utilise on the basis of broadly drafted privacy 
agreements or the cloud may be targeted by cybercriminals.136 As a result, data 
may be lost by the cloud provider or misutilised.137 Hence, m-payments raise 
consumer privacy issues as providers, including their agents and cloud 
providers, gather and retain sensitive data.138  Agents may also store 
insufficient e-funds to settle transactions, so that liquidity problems can 
arise.139 Equally, stored customer funds can be at risk, e.g. when the m-
payment provider which holds the funds is insolvent.140 A related issue is that 
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deposit insurance may not be taken out.  A deposit insurance protects 
customers in case a bank or payment institution or e-money institution goes 
insolvent.141 For instance, the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation offers 
pass-through deposit insurance, so that the funds which customers deposit are 
insured and the m-payment provider and its agents become custodians for their 
customers.142 A premium is payable by the bank or m-payment operator for 
having the funds insured up to a certain maximum limit.143 Yet even when this 
has been done, the insurance may not cover the entire amount when accounts 
are pooled, thus exposing customers and issuers.144 Customer claims may also 
not rank above creditor claims when funds are held by the issuer.145 
Anti-Money Laundering (‘AML’) checks may be less stringent for 
small values and criminals may exploit this by dividing transactions in order to 
circumvent AML checks.146 Moreover, when the ‘Know Your Customer’ 
(‘KYC’) rules are weak, criminals may use false identities to bring in funds.147 
Equally, merchants, intermediaries, banks’ agents and retail partners can 
undermine the integrity of the m-payment system when they allow criminals to 
use the payment system, particularly for cross-border transfers.148 
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Consequently, when bank’s agents use inadequate verification procedures for 
KYC purposes, it becomes more difficult to monitor whether accounts are used 
for criminal purposes.149 This may result in m-payment customers being 
wrongly accused of money laundering. Yet the traceable and digital nature of 
m- payments means that money laundering and terrorist financing risks are 
lower than for cash.150  
 
2.3 Conclusion 
M-payment services give rise to many new forms of risk and particularly 
heighten technological and operational risks. As the technology becomes 
increasingly popular, the potential for m-payment customers to become victims 
of financial crimes, especially fraud, theft, money laundering, unauthorised 
access and data security and data protection breaches, is significantly 
increased.151 The occurrence of financial crime is further exacerbated in a more 
globalised world in which people conduct m-payment services across borders. 
There thus exist various problems within the emerging m-payment market 
which require legislative impetus. For instance, the creation of digital identities 
with the help of banks,152 e-wallet regulation or even the question whether 
customers funds should be insured in case a m-payment provider becomes 
insolvent are areas which are important within the context of consumer 
protection. However, as the m-payment space matures, these other areas are 
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likely to receive attention and at present, the most pressing threat for 
consumers is the risk that they must shoulder the losses from unauthorised 
transactions and have little or no recourse when their data is misappropriated. 
The core reason why customers use m-payment services is that they 
want to make payments. An unauthorised m-payment transaction goes to the 
root of the agreement which a customer enters into with a m-payment provider. 
Loss of funds due to cyber fraud is also most concerning to the nascent m-
payment market which depends on customer trust. Also, as discussed, payment 
data is extremely valuable in our data-driven digital economy and it must, 
therefore, be equally protected. Rules must be developed which spell out the 
rights, duties and liabilities in respect of the different circumstances which can 
arise, as discussed above. Accordingly, the law must protect m-payment 
customers against the risks of unauthorised m-payment transactions and 
inadequately protected consumers' data, which in turn necessitates a 
determination of the parameters of protection available for m-payment 
customers. 
As discussed in the next chapter, the scope of protection depends on 
whether a given policymaker favours the neo-liberal or social welfare approach 
to consumer protection. Yet irrespective of the chosen policy direction, laws 
are necessary; this work offers detailed recommendations as to the scope and 
content of these laws, encompassing both changes to the content or 
interpretation of existing Saudi regulation, and suggestions as to new laws 
which might be introduced. The market entrants which facilitate m-payments 
must be regulated and adopt prudent business processes and engage in risk 
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management. Laws must address the topic of customer negligence and 
mistakes, security incidents in relation to unauthorised m-payment transactions, 
as well as the topic of protecting customers’ data in order to maintain privacy 
and to protect against breaches of privacy. It is essential for the law to describe 
in which cases m-payment providers are responsible to refund customers who 
have been defrauded and had their funds stolen. Equally, it must be identified 
when customers cannot seek a refund. For instance, a neo-liberal stance may be 
taken, so that no refund can be sought in cases where m-payment customers do 
not display sufficient technological literacy. Yet clearly, it would be unfair if 
m-payment customers could not seek refunds in instances where the provided 
services are not secure. Similarly, in instances where third-parties are directly 
or indirectly responsible for financial losses and data and privacy breaches, m-
payment customers should not shoulder the losses. When m-payment services 
are interrupted, the compensation of customers may be warranted in certain 
cases. However, customers may also be made to bear some responsibility for 
the loss of funds. The question of how best to balance customer economic 
interests against customer welfare interests depends on the priorities which any 
consumer protection law sets. The next chapter therefore reviews the literature 
about legal consumer protection measures in order to further identify the 
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This chapter identifies the paradigms of the Western and Islamic legal consumer protection 
literature and the legal consumer protection measures characteristic of the different 
approaches. This literature review helps to reflect on the UK and Saudi laws in chapters four 
and five and identifies the underlying policy orientation which underpin the different laws. 
While this chapter deals with consumers, it is relevant to customers/bank users of m-payment 
services, including businesses which make use of m-payment services. However, a consumer 
is often considered an individual1, whereas a customer/bank user is not just an individual but 
can also be a business. Nevertheless, making such a distinction is less important in this 
specific content since individuals and businesses can both be ‘final users’ of m-payment 
services.2  
Consumer law can be premised on a pre-interventionist and liberal approach or on 
interventionist regulation which seeks to promote welfare considerations.3 Accordingly, 
 
1 E.g. see the Consumer Rights Act 2015, s2(3). 
2 Also see Directive 2007/64/EC, Article 4(10)&(11); D. Parry et al, The Yearbook of Consumer Law 2009 
(Routledge 2008) 73. 
3 L. Nottage, 'Product safety regulation.' In G. Howells et al (eds) Handbook of International Consumer Law 
and Policy (Edward Elgar 2010) 257. 
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governments have different options when it comes to adopting consumer protection regimes.4 
They can adopt a non-interventionist approach rooted in neo-liberalism by adopting market-
based legal measures to protect consumers.5 In this context it is important to emphasise that 
contract law, including contracts, have played an important role to further neoliberalism.6 
Boilerplate i.e. standardised contracts empower companies to dominate at the expense of the 
consumer and undermine the idea that a consumer can give informed consent.7 Consumers 
are unable to act rationally to protect their own interests because the necessary legal 
framework and public institutions have not been created, including to challenge unfair 
contract terms.8 It is therefore difficult for consumers to pursue legal action or to employ 
dispute settlement procedures.9 As a result, consumers must themselves try to solve issues 
they may encounter.10  
Without interventionist regulation, consumers will most likely find it difficult to seek 
redress, whether for unauthorised m-payment transactions or data breaches, in circumstances 
where boilerplate contracts and fragmentary contracts are used and the consumer encounters 
readability issues and there exists no choice apart from not using the service.11 For instance, 
lengthy privacy agreements are typically used which consumers mostly do not read prior to 
clicking that they agree.12 Even if they read the agreement, they may struggle to comprehend 
it and the provided consent may lack voluntariness.13 As a result, access to a huge amount of 
 
4 UK Department of Trade and Industry, Comparative report on consumer policy regimes, 2003; L.M. 
Delgadillo, 'An Assessment of Consumer Protection and Consumer Empowerment in Costa Rica' (2013) 
Journal of Consumer Policy 36, 59-86,63. 
5 Ibid (Delgadillo). 
6 K. Birch, A Research Agenda for Neoliberalism (Edward Elgar 2018) 156. 
7 R.J. Mann, 'Contracting' for Credit' (2006) Michigan Law Review 104, 899-932, 901. 
8 Delgadillo n 4. 
9 Ibid. 
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11 Mann n 7, 902-904. 
12 M. Bashir et al, 'Online privacy and informed consent: The dilemma of information asymmetry' (2016) 
Proceedings of the Association for Information Science and Technology 52(1), 1-10, 1 




personal information is given to companies, resulting in consumers' data being inadequately 
protected.14  
At present and as discussed in more detail in chapter 5, a non-interventionist approach 
seems to have been adopted in SA which may in part be due to the lack of attention given to 
consumer protection by Islamic scholars and policymakers.15 As discussed in section 3.6, the 
Islamic consumer protection literature has been insufficiently developed and a central tenet of 
the Sharia which requires individuals to be given adequate legal protection to realise a fair 
society16 may, therefore, be undermined. Consequently, it is of utmost importance that a 
discourse ensues to promulgate the necessary Islamic consumer protection jurisprudence. The 
grant of consumer rights in line with the Islamic good faith principle is a particularly pressing 
issue, alongside the creation of relevant consumer rights institutions. Put differently; the 
existing Islamic business restrictions must be supplemented by a legal consumer rights 
discourse.17 This can safeguard m-payment customers against the heightened technological 
and related operational and credit risk discussed in Chapter 2 which can significantly 
disadvantage m-payment customers and override any of the advantages described in Chapter 
1. 
The OECD points out that consumers are increasingly offered more complicated 
services due to technological advances, new services, globalised markets and regulatory 
changes.18 One such new complex financial service is m-payment transactions. The question 
therefore arises whether legal consumer protection measures are required to safeguard m-
 
14 Ibid. 
15 D. Morris and M. Al Dabbagh, 'The development of consumer protection in Saudi Arabia' (2003) 
International Journal of Consumer Studies 28(1), 2-13, 2. 
16 H. Abdalati, Islam in Focus (2nd ed, Dar Al-Elm Printing and Publishing Co 1985) 10. 
17 A.S. Albaqme, 'Consumer Protection under Saudi Arabia Law' (2014) Arab Law Quarterly 28(2), 158-175, 
170. 
18 OECD, Consumer Policy Toolkit (OECD 2010) 2. 
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payment customers particularly against unauthorised m-payment transactions and to protect 
consumers' data and their privacy.  
Without legal consumer protection measures the risk is that consumers have to 
shoulder liability and are unable to seek compensation due to carefully drafted contractual 
terms and conditions.19 For instance, when automated teller machines (‘ATMs’) and Chip and 
Pin were introduced in the UK, banks were allowed to argue that customers were colluding or 
negligent in using their card and PIN.20 However, the shift of liability to UK bank customers 
led to banks acting carelessly in respect of security and significantly increased the occurrence 
of fraud.21 Without legal intervention, m-payment providers will use unfair contract terms to 
shift liability and will render the consumer liable for unauthorised m-payment transactions 
and prevent redress for data and privacy breaches in line with neo-liberal thought.22 
The lack of consumer protection in this field is also attributable to the insufficient 
international consumer protection measures for m-payments, as discussed in section 3.2 
below. It is therefore important to explore the two main policy options available to 
legislators: To intervene, including by curtailing unfair contractual terms and conditions23, in 
order to promote the social welfare ‘consumer protection interest’ objective or to opt for the 
“contract-modeled” neo-liberal24 ‘consumer economic interest’ objective.25 Depending on the 
choice, consumer law can be underpinned by either one of these objectives or a mixture. 
 
 
19 I. Becker et al, 'International comparison of bank fraud reimbursement: customer perceptions and contractual 
terms' (2017) Journal of Cybersecurity 3(2), 109-125, 109. 
20 Ibid, 111. 
21 R. Anderson and T. Moore, ‘The economics of information security’ (2006) Science 314, 610-613, 610; ibid.  
22 Becker et al n 19, 124. 
23 R.J. Mann, 'Contracting' for Credit' (2006) Michigan Law Review 104, 899-932, 922. 
24 D. Singh Grewal and J. Purdy, 'Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism' (2015) Law and Contemporary 
Problems, 1-23, 6 <https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol77/iss4/1/> accessed 15 April 2019. 
25 J.Q. Whitman, 'Consumerism Versus Producerism: A Study in Comparative Law' (2007) Yale Law Journal 
117, 340-406, 356. 
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3.1.1 The nature and purpose of consumer law 
Consumer law is a form of private law which fulfils a coordinative role.26 Put differently, 
consumer law honours the principle of party autonomy, so that parties can freely determine 
the main contractual matters.27 Consumer law thus interferes with the fundamental concept of 
freedom of contract, which is one of the cornerstones of market economies around the 
world.28 Freedom of contract is thought to efficiently allocate resources and to enhance 
community and individual welfare.29 However, unrestrained freedom of contract disregards 
that parties do not possess equal skill, knowledge and bargaining power.30 The law therefore 
steps in to create the public system which facilitates private ordering.31 The underlying 
rationale for the law to intervene is to reduce unequal bargaining power.32 In other words, 
consumer law tames the unfair excesses of freedom of contract.33 “Consumer-welfarism” 
requires fairness and reasonableness when contracting.34  
Consumer law can consist of rules, principles and specific illustrations of proscribed 
activities.35 Whilst freedom of contract is maintained, certain limits are imposed in the name 
of public policy and justice.36 It seeks to ensure that social ideas, including notions of 
fairness, are integrated into the market place.37 Whitman explains that “consumerism” means 
 
26 G.-P. Calliess, 'Transnational Consumer Law: Co-Regulation of B2C-E-Commerce' (2007) Law Research 
Institute Research Paper Series 3(3), 1-54, 1. 
27 Ibid. 
28 C. Edwards, 'Freedom of Contract and Fundamental Fairness for Individual Parties: The Tug of War 
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33 L. Mulcahy and J. Tillotson, Contract Law in Perspective (4th ed, Cavendish Publishing Ltd 2004) 41. 
34 Ibid. 
35 H. Collins, 'Harmonisation by Example: European Laws against Unfair Commercial Practices' (2010) The 
Modern Law Review 73(1), 89-118, 89. 
36 Calliess n 26, 1. 
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that the law protects the economic interests and rights of consumers.38 Hence, it is the 
opposite of “producerism” where the law prioritises the interests and rights of suppliers.39 
Consumer protection through legal means in the West is not something new. For 
instance, usury laws existed a very long time in the West and in the UK until the mid-19th 
century.40 These laws protected customers against excessive interest rates charged by 
moneylenders.41 However, these were abolished since they contravened free market ideas.42 
Hence, it was thought that such consumer protection measure contravened neoclassical 
economic ideology which argues that the market is the best means to regulate affairs.43 As a 
result, in the early twentieth century, a producerist legal order became primarily adopted in 
Europe.44 For instance, it was thought that guilds were beneficial for society, despite their 
having an anti-competitive effect.45 
In contrast, the Anglo-American legal system started to increasingly embrace the idea 
of consumerism since the 19th century.46  For instance, in 1912, Weyl stated that the new 
economic driver underlying America is that the interests of consumers have become united.47 
This change in the political attitude was primarily caused by increasing prices which 
stemmed from producers having monopolies.48 Consumerism therefore particularly gave rise 
to the law trying to prevent certain groups of competitors from coming together in order to 
 
38 Whitman n 25, 356. 
39 Ibid. 
40 I. Ramsay, '"A very intrusive proposition"? - the long and winding road to payday loan price controls', Credit 
Debt and Insolvency, October 2013 <https://creditdebtandinsolvency.wordpress.com/2014/07/22/a-very-
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protect themselves against new competitors.49 The prime change in the policy approach was 
therefore that it was no longer accepted that groups of producers could protect themselves 
since it was considered that consumers should enjoy low prices.50 Accordingly, promoting 
competition became an important strand of protecting the economic interests of consumers. 
In the context of m-payments, such a consumerist policy orientation would mean encouraging 
other market-entrants to enter the market and not to keep it solely restricted to banks. 
However, the economic interests of consumers, e.g., to receive services and goods at 
very low prices, to be able to have access to finance or to purchase goods and services around 
the clock, do not constitute legal consumer protection measures.51 Legal consumer protection 
measures refer to safety and protection laws which outlaw unfair commercial practices, such 
as exclusion clauses and defective services.52 Rigid legal provisions are thus enacted which 
impose specific requirements.53 Additionally, broader legal provisions are enacted to foster 
substantive fairness, for instance, through the law governing unfair contract terms.54  This is, 
therefore, a more welfare-oriented approach since specific rules, and general standards are 
adopted to firmly embed the broader values of conscience and fairness.55 However, as noted 
by Whitman, such an approach is paternalistic and does not promote consumer choice.56 The 
reason is that these legal requirements make it more difficult for new market participants to 
enter the market. 
 
49 Whitman n 25, 362. 
50 Ibid 363. 
51 Ibid 366. 
52 Ibid 367. 
53 J.M. Paterson and G. Brody, '"Safety Net” Consumer Protection: Using Prohibitions on Unfair and 
Unconscionable Conduct to Respond to Predatory Business Models' (2015) Journal of Consumer Policy 38, 
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54 Ibid. 
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56 Whitman n 25, 367. 
117 
 
Nonetheless, the adoption of legal consumer protection measures has become an 
increasingly common occurrence in what some, e.g., Ramsay, describe as ‘regulatory 
capitalism’.57 Regulatory capitalism considers that neo-liberalism has not resulted in the state 
retreating ,58 but rather that the form of regulation has shifted.59 It is being delegated through 
self-regulation and, correspondingly, government is regulated more tightly to prevent 
corruption.60 The adoption of new regulatory measures requires corporations to engage in 
internal monitoring.61  It means that international technical standards are increasingly 
imposed.62  The term also denotes the global communication of regulatory concepts through 
regulatory organisations.63  Heightened regulation takes place due to international 
competition in reaching certain thresholds.64  New regulatory bodies have been set up to deal 
with pressing public matters.65 However, even when a mixture of the neo-liberal and social 
welfare approach has been adopted, it is possible to determine whether a country leans more 
towards the neo-liberal or the social welfare paradigm of consumer protection. It is therefore 
important to understand the different aims and objectives of these two distinct approaches. It 
must also be identified which approach is supported by the Sharia and has been adopted by 
the UK and SA at present. Otherwise, the risk is that the findings from the analysis of the UK 
legal framework in chapter 4 and the analysis of the Saudi Arabian legal framework in 
chapter 5 result in recommendations which are not Sharia compliant. In this context, it is 
argued that a Sharia-compliant approach requires social welfare considerations to be firmly 
embedded in what otherwise can be a free market place. The reason for this is that the Sharia 
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emphasises the importance of protecting the weak in order to create social cohesion within 
society.66 
It is against this background that this chapter builds on chapter 2 and looks 
predominantly at the consumer protection legal literature and links it to the academic 
contractual literature on unauthorised transactions. This is done to present the various 
arguments/rationales formulated to advocate for, or caution against, providing consumer 
protection through legal means. Hence, this chapter focuses on evaluating the consumer 
protection literature in order to determine what arguments have been made in the academic 
literature about the following: The aims/objectives of consumer protection measures; the 
problems or advantages of formulating consumer protection policies; and the use of the law 
to achieve those objectives, including in respect of unauthorised transactions. It seeks to 
identify what aims and objectives ought to be prioritised to protect m-payment customers as 
well as the pitfalls, if any, of seeking to provide adequate protection to consumers. In order to 
achieve these objects, the literature is synthesised in order to establish what is known and, by 
extension, the gaps in existing knowledge which may be addressed by this research. The 
review seeks to identify whether there are any gaps in the literature which the thesis intends 
to fill in and respond to in subsequent chapters. The review of the consumer protection 
literature also serves as a framework for the analysis of UK and Saudi laws in subsequent 
chapters in order to ascertain the consumer protection approach being taken by each 
jurisdiction respectively in the context of m-payment services and helps with the 
recommendations which are derived from this research. There are therefore two purposes of 
this chapter: Firstly, to evaluate the arguments for consumer protection, including in the 
context of unauthorised transactions and the protection of consumer data and their privacy, 
 
66 K.B. Jedidia, 'How can Islamic banks achieve social justice? A discourse’. In T. Azid and L. Sunar (eds), 
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and how these arguments may inform and influence the various theoretical approaches; and 
secondly, to identify gaps in the literature which may fall to be addressed in this work. This 
duality is reflected in the chapter structure set out below.  
In terms of structure, the chapter firstly commences by studying international 
guidelines, such as the United Nations Guidelines for Consumer Protection (‘UNGCP’) in 
section 3.2. This section examines whether substantive guidance exists at the international 
level to afford protection to customers, which include the protection of m-payment customers 
or which pre-date the recent shift to m-payments and therefore did not originally envisage 
protection for such customers but may nevertheless have been drafted in a way which is 
amenable to extension to this context. The analysis in section 3.2 will show that there is a 
lack of international consumer protection instruments for m-payment customers. Section 3.3 
then analyses the potential aims/objectives which consumer protection policies and laws 
governing m-payment services should have. In other words, the two main policy options 
available for legislators are introduced, namely to promote either the ‘consumer protection 
interest’ objective or the ‘consumer economic interest’ objective. 
Section 3.4 builds on this by discussing how liability can be allocated in respect of 
unauthorised transactions in a manner representative of the social welfare or neoliberal 
approach. It is also explored how the conceptualisation of a consumer in law can practically 
reflect these different aims/objectives. The way in which a consumer can be conceptualised is 
particularly important for the analysis of the UK and Saudi legal frameworks in chapters four 
and five, as well as the recommendations in the conclusion. Subsequently, section 3.5 
presents the arguments made in academic materials. However, most of the literature is written 
mainly by Western academics, who are writing about consumer protection in relation to 
Western legal systems. They therefore tend to focus on identifying problems or advantages of 
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formulating consumer protection policies, and in trying to use the law to achieve the 
objectives identified in section 3.3 from the perspective of Western legal systems. It is 
evaluated whether legal consumer protection measures are necessary to protect consumers 
against unauthorised m-payment transactions and their data in order to maintain privacy or 
whether other options are available to legislators. Accordingly, it is further probed whether 
the neo-liberal approach can sufficiently protect m-payment customers. For this purpose, 
recourse is made to the scholarly work of academics, such as, Iain Ramsay, Geraint Howells 
and Thomas Wilhelmsson. 
Furthermore, relevant materials written by Islamic scholars relating to consumer 
protection more generally and also on m-payment are presented in section 3.6. The purpose 
of analysing how Sharia law protects consumers, including m-payment customers, is to 
compare and assess the approach with that in the West. Additionally, it is identified what 
underlying policy considerations the Sharia advocates in order to protect consumers, as well 
as how this is currently achieved. Such an analysis is important to ensure that the evaluation 
of the Saudi legal framework and the recommendations comply with the overarching 
direction which the Sharia gives. Islamic business law principles which safeguard consumers 
are discussed, including the principle of good faith and the concepts of halal and haram. 
Thus, part of the aim of this literature review is to identify the extent to which there is 
available literature on consumer protection that could be used to develop a more pro-
consumer set up of legislation that includes consideration of other legal systems, particularly, 
a Sharia legal system. The literature review also helps to identify whether there is a gap 




 The chapter concludes with a summary of how the law can ensure consumer 
protection objectives are embedded within the law. The discussion in subsequent chapters 
then draws on the legal literature and relevant Sharia tenets relating to consumer protection in 
order to evaluate how, why and when the law should (or should not) intervene in order to 
provide protection to consumers against unauthorised m-payment transactions and to protect 
their data in order to maintain privacy. It is argued that providing consumer protection 
through legal means is no easy task in the context of m-payments. Consumers can greatly 
contribute to occasioning losses and have to therefore act with heightened due diligence when 
using their smart-devices. Yet m-payment service providers must ensure that the platforms 
which they make available to their customers are operated properly, including by third 
parties. They must therefore ensure that the infrastructure which they make available to m-
payment customers is safe and secure and functions properly. 
 
3.2 International consumer law 
Durovic and Micklitz explain that Article 10bis of the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property of 1883 was the first international instrument which required some degree 
of consumer protection by proscribing unfair commercial practices.67  In 1985, the United 
Nations then published Guidelines on Consumer Protection, which were amended in 1999 
and 2016 respectively. These guidelines particularly focus on ensuring fair advertising 
practices so that consumers can reach decisions on an informed basis, as well as 
independently.68 The 2016 version further extended the rules in order to prevent fraudulent, 
deceptive, and misleading online advertisements.69 Accordingly, these guidelines focus on 
 
67 M. Durovic and H.W. Micklitz, Internationalization of Consumer Law: A Game Changer (Springer 2016) 29. 
68 UN Guidelines on Consumer Protection, Articles 17 and 22-26. 
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disclosure, i.e., providing correct information to consumers, so that they can reach informed 
decisions about goods and services in line with autonomy theory.70 Hence, the right of 
consumers to receive information is advocated. The guidelines are not a strong instrument for 
consumer rights because their scope is limited to advertising. Also, an international 
instrument could have been adopted which incorporates broader consumer rights, e.g., not to 
be treated unfairly or to have one’s economic rights protected. 
Apart from the UN Guidelines on Consumer Protection which call for consumer 
protection, the OECD also published the Guidelines for Protecting Consumers from 
Fraudulent and Deceptive Commercial Practices Across Borders in 2003. Like the UN 
Guidelines, these Guidelines focus on deceptive and fraudulent commercial practices. They 
are therefore an expression of a market-based approach towards consumer protection. The 
same can be said of the International Chamber of Commerce’s Code on Advertising and 
Marketing Communication Practices 2011.71 As observed by Calliess, a co-regulatory 
approach has been adopted and no multilateral treaty has been enacted.72 The absence of a 
multilateral treaty arguably leaves consumers unprotected against corporate interests, 
including customers who make use of the new technologies which facilitate m-payment 
transactions.  
The international legal framework for consumer protection is therefore explored too 
narrowly from a neoliberal perspective which allows too little room for contemplation of a 
social welfare approach.73 It also does not address the main problem which arises in the 
context of m-payment transactions. The issue when making m-payments is not necessarily 
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that m-payment service providers publish misleading information. Instead, the fundamental 
question is how to allocate liability fairly for unauthorised payment transactions between m-
payment service providers and consumers and when data is not adequately protected. Put 
another way, the instances in which consumers should be able to seek redress from m-
payment service providers because they have failed to manage risk properly should be spelt 
out. Equally, it should be addressed whether more leverage should be conferred on 
consumers when it comes to companies using consumer data. Yet a determination of this 
question depends on the aims/objectives of consumer protection measures which law makers 
may choose to pursue. This in turn depends on the policy orientation which a country may 
pursue. As pointed out by Dagan and Heller, consumer protection policies and laws diminish 
autonomy.74 They therefore undermine the neoliberal ideal of individual freedom, including 
in respect of contracting.75 The extent to which autonomy should be diminished in relation to 
this emerging market must therefore be analysed. This is arguably also important in order to 
promote m-payment innovation which may benefit consumers as discussed in chapter 1. 
However, as emphasised by the OECD’s G20 High-Level Principles on Financial 
Consumer Protection, a market can only properly function if there exists consumer trust and 
confidence.76 This in turn requires that steps are taken to protect consumers and to promote 
financial stability.77 The G20 principles therefore call on governments to create financial 
consumer protection frameworks.78 Yet, the principles acknowledge that a balance must be 
struck between allocating responsibility.79 Customers therefore also have certain 
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obligations.80  The principles emphasise the need for a supervisory, legal and regulatory 
framework.81  Specific oversight bodies must be created to ensure financial consumer 
protection,82 such as, an ombudsman service or the UK Competition and Markets Authority.83 
The principles further provide that consumers must be treated in a fair and equitable 
manner.84  However, what this precisely means in the context of m-payment transactions is 
unclear. Moreover, like the other international instruments, emphasis is placed on providing 
consumers with important information, i.e., through transparency and disclosure.85 
Consumers must be educated and awareness must be raised about their responsibilities and 
consumer rights,86 including how to resolve complaints and seek redress.87 However, the 
neoliberal approach of providing information may be problematic in respect of unauthorised 
m-payment transactions. The reason is that research suggests that even knowledgeable and 
skilled customers are vulnerable to digital banking fraud.88  
The principles further stipulate that competition should be encouraged.89 It is 
mandated that financial services providers as well as their agents, must adopt responsible 
business practices, especially to ensure that consumer assets are protected against misuse and 
fraud and their data and privacy rights are safeguarded.90 The OECD principles are a 
reflection of a neo-liberal approach which emphasises individual autonomy and that might 
cause the principles to have more limited effect for consumer protection purposes. Williams 
 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid 5. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ramsay n 32, 11. 
84 OECD n 76, 5. 
85 Ibid 6. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid 7.  
88 J. Jansen and R. Leukfeldt, 'Phishing and Malware Attacks on Online Banking Customers in the Netherlands: 
A Qualitative Analysis of Factors Leading to Victimization' (2016) International Journal of Cyber Criminology 





also states that the framework which the principles spell out is a neoliberal variant.91 This 
model was primarily devised as a tool to address financial instability following the global 
financial crisis which started in 2008.92 Hence, it was not necessarily conceived as a policy 
tool to ensure comprehensive consumer rights. 
The G20 principles are therefore not necessarily prescriptive since governments can 
still determine which policy model they want to adopt. Put differently, countries can choose 
whether to opt for more public and thus statutory and other more stringent regulatory 
measures, or for more private measures to protect consumers, e.g., through disclosure and 
voluntary industry codes. Ramsay comments that the protection of consumer interests in the 
context of finance is still rather weak.93 Similarly, Calliess points out that consumer 
protection is not a topic which has received much attention at the international level.94 As a 
result, it is difficult to enforce domestic consumer protection frameworks due to insufficient 
international cooperation.95 The lack of international guidance on substantive consumer rights 
constitutes an issue which may disadvantage m-payment customers. In light of the 
inadequacy of the international consumer protection instruments to provide clarity on how to 
protect customers who use m-payments services, it is particularly important for all legislators 
and policy makers to be clear on which aims and objectives they choose to promote. This is 
discussed in the next section. 
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3.3 Consumer policy and legal protection measures: Aims and objectives 
At the outset, it is essential to understand the ‘menu’ of underlying policy aims and objectives 
which can be reflected in m-payment laws. Whitman observes that there exist two competing 
policy objectives which legislators may want to pursue when they enact consumer protection 
laws:96 The first is the objective of upholding the “consumer economic interest”, i.e., to 
promote consumer choice and low prices.97 The other objective can be the “consumer 
protection interest”, i.e., to protect consumers against low-quality and unsafe goods and 
services.98 As these latter goods and services are typically cheap, it may be difficult to align 
these two consumer policy objectives.99 Like Whitman, Ramsay states that policymakers and 
legislators can focus on social welfare by enacting robust consumer rights and creating the 
institutions to enforce the “consumer protection interest”.100  In the alternative, they can 
prioritise economic interests by promoting increased competition and innovation.101  
Accordingly, when the consumer economic interest is prioritised less concern is raised about 
consumer protection. When dealing with the broader question of the research, namely how 
the law protects m-payment customers against unauthorised m-payment transactions and 
safeguards customers’ data and their privacy, the question of whether the consumer economic 
interest trumps the consumer protection interest is very relevant. 
Whilst those favouring the consumer protection interest objective require bureaucratic 
regulation, those advocating the consumer economic interest leave more to the market in line 
with neo-liberal thought.102 The latter is a soft approach characterised by promoting best 
practices and requiring information disclosure, but does not overly focus on minimising the 
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social costs to consumers.103 This is because consumer law is primarily viewed as a tool to 
promote business interests.104 The objective of consumer law and policy is therefore to 
simply facilitate consumer confidence without granting substantive rights.105 In this context, 
Whitman points out that policymakers who opt for promoting the consumer economic interest 
often tend to encourage consumer spending, whereas this is not the underlying aim of 
safeguarding the consumer protection interest.106 
Micklitz explains that, in the EU, consumer policy and law have been primarily 
employed to develop the internal market.107 As a result, social justice has not been promoted 
as much.108  The EU approach to devising consumer protection rules is therefore not an 
example of the ‘consumer economic interest’ approach. Winn and Jondet share this opinion 
and point out that the EU has adopted a “co-regulation” approach, so that standard developers 
and legislators work together.109  The co-regulation approach is only used to cut down 
technical barriers with a view to facilitating trade.110 The law has thus been driven by market 
considerations, mainly to realise economic efficiencies.111  This is not to say that consumers 
have not been granted rights. As explained by Valant, initially consumer protection was 
based on five core rights in the EU: Health and safety rights for consumers; the consumer’s 
right to receive education; the right of consumers to be heard; and to have their economic 
interests protected.112 This later became expanded to equipping consumers with easy 
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enforcement measures, including for the settlement of disputes.113 Nonetheless, such a rights-
based approach poses a risk to consumers who do not have the requisite abilities to make use 
of their legal rights.114 Micklitz states that, as a result, more vulnerable individuals are at risk 
of being disadvantaged.115 Soederberg also cautions against perceiving consumer protection 
as a tool to strengthen market mechanisms.116 It reinforces market-based citizenship by 
allowing risky practices, as long as rudimentary standards are met.117 To this extent, the EU 
approach represents a compromise between the two approaches which offers the ‘best’ (or 
perhaps from a more critical perspective, the ‘worst’) of both options.  
A consumer protection framework for m-payment customers engages a wide range of 
core rights, which reflects the fact that there are a variety of ways in which Fintech may 
damage consumer interests and wellbeing, as discussed in chapter 2. As pointed out by the 
Financial Stability Board in the UK, the protection of financial consumers forms an aspect of 
a public policy regime and can, therefore, be found in most prudential, regulatory or 
legislation structures.118 For instance, in the context of consumer lending, the UK Consumer 
Credit Act 2006 focuses on creating a competitive, more transparent and fairer credit 
market.119 A mix of consumerist and producerist policy objectives are thus pursued. The 
consumer credit literature is useful and relevant since it highlights the importance of giving 
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rights to consumers so that they can challenge unfair agreements and can resolve disputes 
easily, including in respect of unauthorised transactions.120  
In the m-payment context, unfair practices must also be combated through specific 
action, such as, ensuring that consumers are furnished with information. Hence, like in the 
consumer credit context, steps should be taken to support welfare and social objectives. 
Regulation should also be adopted to enhance the licensing system, which indirectly protects 
consumers.121 However, Ramsay argues that, despite consumer rights having been granted, 
the policy orientation in jurisdictions like the UK, has been to prioritise consumer choice.122  
As a result, the objective of protecting consumers from market risks has been marginalised.123 
Certainly, there is always the risk that a legal consumer protection regime is not 
entirely balanced so that both business and consumer interests are not entirely equally 
promoted. Nonetheless, it is argued that a policy mix as found in, for instance, the UK 
Consumer Credit Act 2006 appears most advantageous for the newly emerging m-payment 
market. Yet, as observed by Poncibò, this can be difficult, though not impossible, since both 
are to a certain extent complementary.124 Accordingly, one aim should be to promote 
competition so that consumer choice is increased.125 Care must be taken when legal duties are 
imposed on m-payment service providers so that new market entrants are not deterred by 
stringent regulatory requirements and legal obligations.126 Otherwise, the risk is that 
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competition, and thus consumer choice, will be adversely affected.127 Nonetheless, it is 
crucial that consumer law ensures honest and fair market practices so that consumers can 
have faith in m-payment services.128 Trzaskowski states that this means that businesses must 
exercise professional diligence.129 
Professional diligence in the m-payment context particularly requires that specific 
attention is paid to the governance of information and communication technology (‘ICT’). 
Winn and Jondet explicate that ICT standards are a very important means to heighten 
consumer protection.130 They argue that effective consumer protection requires that the 
objectives of consumer protection laws are embedded by standards organisations.131 
However, ICT standards are normally promulgated by informal standards organisations and 
not the legislator.132  Yet in the context of m-payments, it may be useful for domestic 
authorities to spell out ICT standards, especially in respect of consumer protection.133 
As discussed in the previous chapter, in the context of m-payments, the issue is how 
to ensure that the heightened technological and thus operational risk is adequately addressed, 
particularly the issue of unauthorised m-payment transactions and that consumer data is 
protected in order to maintain privacy. The conditions must be analysed which must be 
created through the legal framework for this new market to operate in order to contribute to 
economic growth. Large scale cyber-attacks of increasingly digital outlets of banks are likely 
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to become more commonplace.134 More importantly, consumer funds must be protected, as 
well as their data. Whilst the aim of the law ought to be to promote consumer choice and 
allow a more market-oriented policy approach, it must nonetheless ensure that consumers are 
adequately protected against financial losses and privacy breaches. 
The adoption of legal means to heighten security for m-payment customers, 
particularly in respect of unauthorised payment transactions, the utilisation of consumer data 
by m-payment providers, as well as data breaches, should, therefore, be on the policy agenda 
of all legislators.135 As identified in chapter 4, consumer protection laws should impose legal 
duties (e.g., through tort law, especially the negligence and duty of care concept, general 
contract law in the form of the law governing unfair exclusion clauses and terms to promote 
fairness and justice), as well as specific statutory and regulatory obligations (e.g., mandated 
disclosure,136 and to operate effective risk management systems and adhere to certain ICT 
standards). As one of the main issues is the allocation of liability when consumer funds go 
missing, the law must address how liability should be allocated and this depends on how one 
conceptualises a consumer, as discussed next. 
 
3.4 Allocating liability: A neo-liberal or social welfare consumer construct 
Whitman defines a consumer as any person who consumes services or goods.137 Valant also 
favours a broad construction of the term consumer.138  She even suggests the adoption of the 
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notion of “prosumers”, i.e., a hybrid of a professional, a producer and a consumer.139 This is 
because, in an increasingly collaborative economy, also known as ‘sharing economy’, it is 
more difficult to distinguish between professionals, freelancers and hobbyists.140 Durovic and 
Micklitz also caution that, without a broad construction of what constitutes a consumer, the 
danger is that material inequalities arise between natural and legal persons.141 Whilst traders 
have arguably more leverage to negotiate terms than individual consumers, in the context of 
banking, standardised terms are provided.142 It is for this reason that it is argued that all those 
making m-payment transactions should be classified as consumers. Accordingly, anyone 
making use of m-payment services should be considered a consumer (even if the m-payment 
is enacted on behalf of a company, as a company like a natural person would not enjoy any 
power to negotiate the terms of use of the service with a provider, such as Facebook). 
The more complicated legal question is whether the consumer should be 
conceptualised as vulnerable, credulous, average or rational and therefore reasonably 
circumspect.143 Such a question is important when assessing whether a consumer has been 
negligent and thus the question of loss allocation. Abbamonte explains that the way in which 
a consumer is conceptualised serves as a legal threshold.144 Against this threshold, it is 
evaluated whether there exists unfairness against which a consumer should be protected.145 
Quirk and Rothchild observe that consumer protection systems normally benchmark their 
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legal safeguards on the “average” or “reasonable” consumer.146 Ramsay explains that those 
subscribing to the neo-liberal paradigm favour such a depiction of the consumer. 147 
Such a threshold is laxer and, by extension, fewer legal consumer protection measures 
and interventions are required. Faure and Luth explain that the rational/average consumer 
standard is rooted in rational choice theory.148 Rational choice theory posits that individuals 
opt for the choice which increases their welfare most when faced with decisions.149 However, 
they criticise rational choice theory which is based on the neo-liberal paradigm on the 
grounds that it is an oversimplification to assume that human beings always act rationally.150 
History also proves that human beings do not always act rationally.151 Faure and Luth do not 
consider that there exists one general theory and therefore favour the behavioural economics 
and law approach.152  
Those endorsing a behavioural economics and cognitive psychology approach and 
who argue in favour of a vulnerable/credulous consumer standard challenge the rational 
choice theory on the grounds that individuals are inherently irrational.153 In other words, the 
notion of the rational or average consumer bears no resemblance to real life.154 For instance, a 
study by Gidlöf et al found that consumers did not reach adequate economic decisions when 
choosing products in store, despite not receiving misleading information.155 Hence, it is 
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wrong to assume that consumers reach rational decisions and possess the cognitive abilities to 
do so.156 They may not have unlimited time to analyse information and read lengthy terms 
and conditions and privacy agreements.157 
Esposito argues that effective information disclosure is an inadequate consumer 
policy which disregards the findings of the behavioural science literature.158 Equally, 
Incardona and Poncibo question the workability of the average consumer standard.159 They 
argue that providing information and trusting that consumers are rational is insufficient to 
protect consumers.160 Faure and Luth also stress that it is not enough to provide consumers 
with standard form contracts and to assume that such information disclosure rectifies market 
failures.161 Consumers often sign/agree to standard contract terms without reading what is 
actually written.162 Similarly, Van Boom argues that furnishing more information to 
consumers does not enhance their ability to reach decisions, especially since this often results 
in a cognitive overload.163 Weatherill further points out that there is no one homogenous class 
of consumers and whilst some may be circumspect and informed, others may lack such 
attributes.164 Even opponents of behavioural economics, such as Epstein, concede that 
consumers frequently make fundamental errors.165 
The problem of choosing a rational/average consumer threshold for the m-payment 
context is thus that it imposes a very high threshold for consumers to meet. Trzaskowski 
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therefore labels this test unrealistic.166 This is supported by a study by Daly and 
Scardamaglia.167  The research investigated whether the average internet user in Australia has 
a general understanding of how Google’s search engine operates.168 It was found that there 
was a significant imbalance which disadvantaged consumers in the online context.169 The 
behavioural economics approach is arguably very relevant to the m-payment context. 
Consumers may not be sufficiently knowledgeable to adequately protect their funds against 
cybercrime and illegal privacy intrusions.170 It is for this reason that it is arguably important 
that consumer interests are proactively protected.171 A conceptualisation of the m-payment 
customer as credulous and vulnerable will heighten the level of protection for consumers.172 
It will also incentivise the system operator to adopt precautionary measures.173 
A vulnerable consumer test is less rigid than the average consumer test.174 Yet 
Incardona and Poncibo argue that such a test is too paternalistic, unnecessary and devoid of 
any coherent base.175 The vulnerable consumer test contravenes the notion of ‘the literate 
consumer’ who is empowered by knowledge.176 Such a consumer should have 
responsibilities177 and it appears justified to judge him/her according to the rational/average 
consumer test. A compromise is to adopt a rational/average consumer test, but to lower the 
threshold for specific consumer groups, e.g., those who are more vulnerable, such as, the 
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elderly.178 Certainly younger people may be more accustomed to using mobile apps and may 
therefore be more circumspect. This is because they may know more about how to secure 
their smart devices against cyber-attacks. However, this is a generalisation and it would 
contravene the principle of equality to protect one group of consumers less than others. 
Durovic and Micklitz state that precisely such an approach has been integrated by 
Article 5(3) of EU Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices which provides that 
the “mental or physical infirmity, age, or credulity” are to be considered when assessing 
whether commercial practices are fair.179  A European Commission Report on the application 
of this Directive points to evidence that suggests that more steps should be taken to protect 
citizens who are in a weak position, especially children, elderly persons and others who are 
particularly vulnerable.180 However, such an approach may be problematic in the context of 
m-payments. If a m-payment customer has competence in law (that is, is compus mentus and 
over the legally prescribed age limit for the activity in question) and can in practice install 
and use a m-payment app, it should arguably not be an excuse to plead, e.g., old age, when 
that person fails to keep his/her PIN code safe. It may also introduce a subjective assessment 
into legal proceedings which is difficult for judges to decide objectively. A m-payment 
customer should be expected to owe certain basic obligations. A customer ought not to be 
able to seek redress or only to a limited extent from their m-payment provider in certain 
circumstances, as discussed in chapter 2, section 2.2.1. For instance, the right to have an 
unauthorised payment refunded could be curtailed in circumstances, e.g. where a customer 
failed to keep the PIN securely stored; or did not install security software or run anti-virus 
and malware scans; failed to install updates; or conducted transactions in a more high-risk 
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environment through a more unsecure public Wi-Fi network. These are very different 
situations to the scenarios, discussed in chapter 2, sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3, where a m-
payment provider fails to ensure that it has an adequate risk management system, or it is the 
fault of a third-party provider and where it is unfair to allocate responsibility for financial 
losses to m-payment customers. 
Yet if m-payment customers are uneducated, e.g., because technology is very fast 
moving, including in respect of new cybercrime, a consumer protection model premised on a 
vulnerable consumer may be more appropriate initially. However, as time passes and 
consumers increasingly become accustomed to using their mobile phones to conduct m-
payment services, it may be possible for the law to move towards a conceptualisation of a 
reasonable consumer approach. Nonetheless, this necessitates that the technological and 
operational risks discussed in chapter 2 for which m-payment providers and third parties are 
responsible become reduced. For instance, this may happen in the future because the digital 
identity of customers is more easily verifiable through, e.g., the creation of a new legal digital 
identity.181 The researcher would argue that a vulnerable consumer conceptualisation appears 
best suited since m-payment technology is still in its infancy. More steps must be taken to 
promote IT consumer literacy further and to reduce risk. Arguably, the legal test should only 
be changed to the more onerous rational/average consumer test once more public awareness 
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Accordingly, it may be better to conceptualise consumers as regulatory subjects, who 
must be taken to act responsibly.182  Hence, consumers not only have rights, but also 
duties.183 Such an approach recognises that in the specific context of unauthorised 
transactions, losses can be most effectively minimised by allocating them with the party 
which is most able to prevent or decrease them, as observed by Geva.184 It is argued that such 
an approach is particularly useful for the m-payment context since it helps to overcome the 
tension which exists between the neo-liberal and the social welfare approach185 which 
underlie the average/rational and credulous/vulnerable consumer tests. Put differently, this 
means that it becomes unnecessary to opt for “soft paternalism” in line with a more liberal 
approach or hard paternalism in line with the behavioural and more socialist approach.186  
Instead, a middle path can be chosen, so long as consumer education is made a 
priority by policymakers and m-payment providers alike. Geva also states that the 
overarching framework to implement or maintain consumer fairness in the specific context of 
allocating losses from unauthorised funds transfers should be market-oriented.187 Geva 
further illustrates how such an approach works by citing UK consumer legislation governing 
credit accounts as an example.188 Under s.83 of the  Consumer Credit Act 1974, a debtor 
cannot be held liable by the creditor in circumstances where another person uses the credit 
facility and causes any loss, except for up to £35 from when the authorised person has no 
longer possession of the credit-token.189 However, the no-liability provision does not apply if 
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the debtor has consented to another person using the credit token.190 However, liability for up 
to £35 or for any loss191 ceases from the point when the creditor has been notified that the 
credit-token has been stolen, lost or is being misused.192 The onus of proof rests with the 
creditor to demonstrate authorised use, including that the use occurred prior to it receiving 
notice.193 Geva observes that there are ultimately three scenarios:194 Under the first scenario, 
it is proven that the use was unauthorised, but the user did not contribute to the loss and is 
fully exonerated. In the second case, it is shown that there was an unauthorised use and the 
user contributed to the loss and must shoulder significant liability. In the third instance, there 
is an unauthorised use, though it is not evidenced that the user contributed to any loss and 
liability is thus limited. In other words, according to Geva, the best approach to consumer 
liability in respect of unauthorised transfers is to hold the creditor accountable, except where 
the debtor is to blame and in unclear cases to partly hold the debtor liable but at a capped 
amount. This reflects a market-oriented approach and incentivises both parties to try their 
best to minimise losses. 
An Anglo-Saxon market-oriented approach must adhere to the “principles of 
economic efficiency” which require “loss spreading, loss reduction, and loss imposition”, 
according to Cooter and Rubin.195 These principles highlight the importance of 
supplementing private payment service agreements, including m-payment service 
agreements, in order to address market failures, particularly the issues of asymmetrical 
information and high negotiation costs,196 which also exist in respect of unauthorised m-
payment transactions. Under the loss spreading principle, it is thought that financial 
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institutions should be liable for losses, as they can spread the costs which are caused by 
unauthorised transactions among its customers.197  The loss reduction principle commands 
that rules are created which incentivise the party with the ability to lower the losses by 
imposing liability on the party for whom it is the easiest to prevent the loss.198 Negligence 
rules which also include a defence of contributory negligence arguably incentivise each party 
more than a simple strict liability or no liability rule.199 The loss imposition principle requires 
that efficiency is promoted by considering what is the cheapest enforcement process.200 
However, this does not mean imposing liability on the creditor.201 Instead, it requires that 
legal mechanisms are developed which enhance consumers’ readiness to evoke their legal 
rights.202  
When rules are devised to allocate liability in line with the “principles of economic 
efficiency”203, it must be also considered who can avert the unauthorised transaction prior to 
it arising and also subsequently after the first one has occurred.204 In a case where it is only 
the financial institution which can minimise the loss, strict liability should be imposed on 
it.205 When each party can reduce the unauthorised transaction, liability for losses should fall 
on both parties, though the consumer should only be held responsible for a small amount.206 
Hence, the consumer’s liability should be capped.207 The reason is that a technology-driven 
system, such as m-payments, is most likely best placed to reduce losses.208 Facciolo also 
 
197 Ibid 71. 
198 Ibid 73. 
199 Ibid 74. 
200 Ibid 78. 
201 Ibid. 
202 Ibid 81. 
203 Ibid 63. 
204 F.J. Facciolo, 'Unauthorized Payment Transactions and Who Should Bear the Losses' (2008) Chicago-Kent 
Law Review 83(2), 605-631, 605. 
205 Cooter and Rubin n 195, 124. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Ibid 63. 
208 Mann n 173, 638. 
141 
 
stresses that the increasing complexity within payment transactions arguably requires that 
financial institutions are best placed to police payment systems and to avert unauthorised 
transactions.209 However, account holders should shoulder liability when they can prevent 
unauthorised transactions by exercising due diligence.210 Hence, losses should not just be 
allocated to the financial institution, but to both the financial institution and the consumers in 
accordance with negligence principles,211 and as also mandated by the economic and 
efficiency promoting loss reduction principle, discussed above.212 
However, a social welfare centric consumer approach would ignore negligence by the 
consumer prior to the first transaction taking place.213 In contrast, a mixed social welfare and 
neo-liberal approach would consider whether a consumer was negligent or a neo-liberal 
stance would permit strict liability, so that the consumer is responsible so long as the security 
procedure by the provider was reasonable.214 Once an unauthorised transaction takes place, it 
is normal to request the consumer to notify the unauthorised transaction.215 If this is done 
promptly, no liability may be imposed for the first and other unauthorised transactions.216 In 
contrast, a lengthy delay typically bars a consumer from recovering any losses.217 However, 
as pointed out by Facciolo, in light of account holders making numerous transactions, it may 
be challenging for them to monitor whether transactions are unauthorised.218  
As private agreements vary and address the issue of loss allocation differently, UK 
law has adopted a flexible and general fairness concept in respect of unfair terms found in 
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consumer contracts219, including in respect of m-payment service agreements. Fairness has 
been linked to the concepts of reasonableness and good faith,220 though good faith is more of 
a civil law concept.221 Hence, norms such as good faith and reasonableness in the earlier 
legislation, such as the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations (UTCCR) 1999222 
and Unfair Contract Terms Act (UCTA) 1977223, have found their way into consumer 
protection literature and legislation and case law.224 The Consumer Rights Act 2015225 also 
integrates a fairness concept, as further discussed in Chapter 4, section 4.4.1. The use of these 
concepts has allowed the law to respond to various circumstances226 and which consumers 
can utilise to challenge unfair terms which govern unauthorised m-payment transactions. The 
adoption of such a broad and flexible fairness concept avoids that courts have to construe 
exemption clauses in an extreme manner in order to prevent them from operating.227 A 
statutory fairness concept is thus “a powerful weapon against unfair terms”228 which payment 
institutions impose to escape liability in respect of unauthorised m-payment transactions. The 
English approach tempers classical contract theory which upholds a bargain between 
parties.229  It makes it possible to safeguard the consumer who has less power and as a result 
agrees to prejudicial terms.230 It is thus a way to overcome the problems which arise from a 
purely contractual approach which relies on boilerplate contracts, lengthy terms and unfair 
exclusion clauses. 
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However, English contract law does not require that the contract performance and 
interpretation is governed by a good faith principle, as the common law adopts a piecemeal 
approach.231 Such an approach is more reflective of a neo-liberal, as opposed to a 
paternalistic consumer protection approach.232 The reason is that it is not a “general fairness 
model” under which the state does not permit agreements which are significantly unfair.233 
Instead, it represents a “consumer protection model” which focuses on an imbalance and the 
bargaining power between the consumer and the business.234  Hence, it is a consumer 
protection calibrated neoliberal approach which values private autonomy, rationality and 
market forces235 and only indirectly regulates fairness.236  
Accordingly, there exist various ways to allocate liability and it depends on whether 
one opts for a neo-liberal or social welfare consumer construct. The adoption of either the 
credulous/vulnerable or average/rational consumer test in law, specific loss allocation rules 
and general fairness and reasonableness standards, presuppose that legal consumer protection 
measures are adopted. However, the literature highlights that consumer protection policies 
and law have advantages and disadvantages. The next section, therefore, explores the 
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3.5 Advantages and problems with legal consumer protection measures and policies 
According to the OECD, the main reason for formulating consumer protection policies and in 
trying to use the law is that this helps to remedy market failures.237 Circumstances can arise 
where markets do not create optimal outcomes.238 Baker and Siegelman emphasise the danger 
of an unregulated and therefore free capitalistic market, as advocated by neo-liberals.239 They 
cite as example of such a danger the insurance market where consumers are offered add-on 
insurance cover when they purchase services or products. The cover is only for low-value 
losses. However, an application of utility theory shows that it does not make economic sense 
to purchase such insurance. A neo-liberal paradigm nonetheless allows insurance companies 
to charge amounts which are far in excess of the actual cost of insuring against these low-
value losses. Similarly, Delgadillo explains that markets are not perfect.240  There exists 
insufficient competition, negative externalities and information asymmetries.241 Soederberg 
further argues that we live in an era of “cannibalistic capitalism” where social protections 
from the state have been increasingly eroded.242 Instead, individual responsibility has been 
advocated.243 
One advantage of consumer protection law is that it addresses the tension which has 
been created by diminishing the exploitation of consumers.244 Trentman cites as example 
welfare systems in Scandinavia which have adopted extensive social protections to lessen the 
impact of social and economic issues.245 Similarly, Soederberg argues that consumer policy 
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and consumer protection law help to address the unequal relationship which exists between 
consumers and businesses.246 The unequal relationship is particularly apparent when 
standardised contracts are used, which most likely prejudice the weaker party, namely the 
consumer, deprive the consumer of the possibility to revise the contractual bargain and allow 
the professional party to exploit superior information.247  
The extent to which a level playing field is being created between businesses and 
consumers depends on whether one subscribes to the social welfare or the neo-liberal 
paradigm. The researcher would argue that the Sharia requires that the social welfare 
approach is firmly embedded within the law for the reasons discussed in more detail below. 
Legal consumer protection measures are needed to supplement the contractual agreement 
between m-payment providers and customer. Most fundamentally, Saudi law must clearly 
define the circumstances when m-payment customers should not shoulder financial losses 
and/or are entitled to compensation or refunds. Saudi law must also ensure that the data of m-
payment customers is protected. Consequently, specific statutory provisions and substantive 
law must be enacted which ensure that overall fairness is being promoted, including through 
the Islamic good faith principle. The law must prevent that m-payment providers use their 
stronger bargaining power to exploit customers. The rights and responsibilities of both m-
payment providers and customers must be detailed. Additionally, legal procedures must be 
spelled out for customers to enforce the substantive law. 
Ramsay states that the financial crisis in 2008 highlights that the standard policy 
assumptions about neo-liberal approaches are not necessarily correct.248 Individuals do not 
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reach logical decisions when they are provided with adequate information, markets do not 
correct themselves, and the distribution channels also require oversight.249 Financial 
consumer protection policies and law help to increase risk management, promote financial 
stability and also competitive markets.250 More oversight is being created and regulatory 
weaknesses and gaps which may otherwise pose risks to consumers are closed.251  More 
accountability is realised as more monitoring is required. Ramsay states that, in the UK, this 
is particularly visible since the focus has been on realising transparency, formality and 
accountability, including through codes of conduct.252 One fundamental advantage of 
consumer protection policies and laws is that irresponsible market behaviour is combated.253 
In the context of m-payments, legal consumer protection measures can ensure that m-
payment providers do not offer high-risk services to consumers.254 As discussed further 
below, the Sharia particularly requires adherence to the principle of good faith which further 
highlights the need for legal consumer protection measures. 
In addition, learning and self-reflection by consumers can be encouraged.255  In the 
context of m-payments, this means that certain minimum legal obligations should be imposed 
on consumers. For instance, they may be required to store passwords safely and to install up 
to date security software. However, this can arguably be achieved through the terms and 
conditions of m-payment providers and does not necessarily require the law to intervene. 
Epstein also reasons that the fact that consumers hear about the mistakes from others and also 
learn from errors means that consumer protection through legal means is superfluous.256 Such 
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a view is challenged by Bar-Grill, who argues that all depends on the context.257 Also, there 
exist certain limits to learning.258 Certainly, when consumers first use m-payment apps, they 
may not be familiar with ensuring that their smart devices are adequately secured. Even when 
they are apt users, they may fall prey to the latest trends in cybercrimes. Legal intervention, 
therefore, closes possible gaps which may leave customers unprotected. Also, the terms and 
conditions of companies are likely to contain broad exclusion and limitation clauses. For 
example, an analysis of Facebook’s terms and conditions found that it contained various 
provisions which contravened consumer protection law in Europe.259 Facebook's privacy 
settings also did not meet European requirements concerning consent by data subjects.260 
Ben-Shahar and Schneider point out that learning and self-reflection by consumers 
may also be promoted by mandated disclosure.261 M-payment providers can be required by 
law to provide information, so that it becomes easier for customers to reach decisions.262 
Even Epstein, who favours a more liberal and market-based approach, acknowledges that 
information is crucial for consumers to reach informed decisions.263 Hence, even those who 
caution against providing consumer protection through legal means concede that some degree 
of legal prescription is necessary in order to create a level playing field between businesses 
and consumers. 
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Put differently, even a reasonably circumspect m-payment customer, as opposed to a 
vulnerable one, may require at least some degree of legal consumer protection measures in 
the form of mandated disclosure or the requirement to obtain consent in respect of the 
collection of consumer data.264 In the context of m-payments, the average consumer may 
know about the importance of securing his/her smart device. The standardised terms and 
conditions provided by m-payment providers must spell out the scope of the mandate, 
including the instances in which liability rests with the provider or the consumer. However, 
as pointed out by Ben-Shahar and Schneider, mandated disclosure is often not an effective 
regulatory technique.265 Not all information may be provided or consumers may not be able 
to fully take into account the information.266 For instance, m-payment customers may be too 
busy to properly read the terms and conditions.267 They may not understand the information 
due to innumeracy and illiteracy or may not be able to fully evaluate or remember it.268 
Accordingly, they may find the information simply too complex.269 
There will also exist a great information asymmetry in the context of m-payments. It 
is virtually impossible for m-payment customers to pinpoint and evidence where fault exactly 
lay when a transaction is not properly executed or funds go missing. Also, mandatory 
disclosure does not protect m-payment customers adequately against the new technological 
risks discussed in chapter 2. The main advantage of using more interventionist legal 
consumer protection measures is therefore that responsibility and risk are not placed unfairly 
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on m-payment customers. It also ensures that sufficiently knowledgeable customers, who are 
confronted with a difficult and new situation, are better safeguarded.270 
It is for these reasons advantageous to require m-payment providers to additionally 
provide assistance to customers, e.g., the necessary security updates in order to help 
customers safeguard their m-payment apps. Risk management may also be heightened 
through regulatory oversight and supervision. 271 The threat of punishment in the form of 
fines by oversight bodies and/or compensation awards or refunds to customers help to create 
a level playing field between m-payment providers and customers. 272 
Bar-Grill acknowledges that it matters whether there is standardisation.273 Clearly, in 
respect of m-payment apps, a standardised service is being provided, and most available 
information about m-payment apps is relevant for other consumers.274 However, each m-
payment  provider may opt for a slightly different interface of the m-payment app. Bar-Grill 
further calls for consumer protection through legal means since the use patterns vary from 
consumer to consumer.275 For instance, one customer may use the m-payment app only for a 
limited amount of payments, whereas another may frequently use the service. Consumers, 
Epstein argues, can seek advice276 (e.g., on how to protect their smartphone from cyber-
attacks, including their digital wallets, through the installation of a particular software or 
cryptographic techniques) but others may solely rely on m-payment providers to provide a 
secure infrastructure.277 Imposing legal measures on m-payment providers to protect 
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customers may incentivise them to educate them.278 In other words, m-payment providers 
would have to ensure that their customers do not underestimate the technical and operational 
risks inherent when using their m-payment services.279 However, Epstein considers it 
unrealistic to expect businesses to be responsible for correcting customers’ mistakes.280 Even 
aside from the impracticalities of such an approach, the cost associated with this additional 
responsibility would ultimately either deter providers from entering the market or would be 
passed on to more careful customers.281  
An advantage of formulating consumer protection policies and laws is that 
“systematic misperception(s)” by customers can be addressed and that m-payment providers 
cannot design services which exploit these misperceptions.282 Put differently, m-payment 
customers are optimistic about the new services which are being made available to them283 
and may fail to fully appreciate the higher technological and operational risks, discussed in 
chapter 2. For instance, a study by Gross and Souleles lends support to the claim that 
consumers display irrational behaviour.284 Legal consumer protection measures may, 
therefore, safeguard consumers against otherwise irrational behaviour. Without legal 
consumer protection measures, m-payment providers may strategically abuse failures by 
customers (e.g., to secure their mobile devices adequately) in order to escape legal liability 
for financial losses or other harm (e.g. data protection breaches).285 In some scenarios, it may 
be warranted for the law not to hold m-payment providers liable for unauthorised payment 
transactions, as further explored in chapter 4, section 4.3.3. The advantage of consumer 
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protection through legal means is that risks which arise from the new technologies are not 
borne unequally only by customers. 
Moreover, Warren emphasises that innovative financial products are far more unsafe 
than tangible goods.286 The same can be said of m-payment services since the technological 
and operational risks are much higher than with traditional banking services, as discussed in 
chapter 2. Warren is therefore in favour of strong consumer protection and advocates that a 
new regulatory organisation ought to be created for this purpose.287 Such a body should be 
entrusted in ensuring that financial products and services are safe.288  She justifies such a 
paternalistic approach by stressing that companies devise many different strategies, such as 
lengthy terms and conditions, in order to avoid being held liable for misconduct.289  She also 
points out that there exists insufficient consumer-friendly regulation.290 
Furthermore, Ramsay states that the finance industry is rather well-organised and can, 
therefore, exert influence.291 The risk that consumer interests are not properly protected is 
heightened.292 Consequently, an advantage of consumer protection law is that the influence 
which financial institutions have exercised over time in respect of lawmaking becomes 
eroded and more balance is achieved.293 Ramsay notes that this was one of the reasons for the 
creation of the UK Financial Ombudsman Service.294 The Financial Ombudsman Service 
may evoke notions of fairness to determine disputes which individuals have with financial 
institutions.295 Another advantage is that consumer protection law can help with building 
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public realisation of the creation of value and positive welfare for people.296 Economic 
growth may be promoted since a market must also ensure that consumers are served well.297 
More importantly, consumer protection law confers rights on m-payment customers. 
M-payment customers are enabled to seek remedies, e.g., by pursuing court proceedings or 
through dispute resolution procedures.298 The decisions by judges can be incorporated in the 
standardised terms and conditions and can also shape business processes.299 Yet no consumer 
protection framework can close all gaps which may leave consumers exposed.300 The 
adoption of legal rules can to some extent assist in shielding companies which are already 
regulated against new competitors.301 Nonetheless, in the context of m-payment, it is 
important to licence service providers, even if this creates market barriers for new joiners.302 
While there are clear advantages, some of the literature also cautions against 
providing consumer protection through legal means. Proponents of anti-regulation are 
advocates of free markets and freedom of contract and neo-liberalism.303 They reject legal 
consumer protection measures since they interfere with the ideal of freedom of contract and 
go against liberal market ideas.304 Hence, it is assumed that issues which may arise can be 
resolved through market mechanisms. For instance, Durovic and Micklitz argue that 
consumers do not necessarily have to be protected through legal means since it is possible to 
self-regulate.305 Equally, Delgadillo argues that consumer protection can be promoted 
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through the adoption of non-binding industry codes.306 Callies also favours codes of conduct 
and considers that these can be effective tools to protect consumers.307 Private regulation by 
industry sectors can extend beyond regional or national borders.308 It appears particularly 
attractive for the increasingly fluid m-payment transactions which can be executed in one 
corner of the world and reach another almost instantaneously. Durovic and Micklitz stress 
that private regulation is more flexible because stakeholders can incrementally develop their 
own codes.309 
The adoption of voluntary codes of conduct also saves public money since 
governments do not have to ensure that the law is being complied with.310 Governments can 
endorse a code instead of adopting a law.311 Additionally, consumer advocacy groups can be 
consulted on those codes and can highlight particular issues.312 Codes of conduct are certainly 
a less intrusive form of intervention than compulsory legal provisions.313 Abbamonte notes 
that it is easier to change codes of conduct.314 This makes it possible to quickly react to 
market developments, whereas lawmaking often takes more time.315 Self-regulatory bodies 
may also come to decisions more quickly than courts.316 Yet, as voluntary codes only apply 
to members, this can leave consumers exposed.317 There is also the issue of whether the 
industry sector would adopt principles and codes of conduct which adequately protect 
consumer interests.318 Policymakers must, therefore, assess whether there exist consumer 
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issues which pose a significant detriment to consumers and require government 
intervention.319 Protection can be further bolstered through trustmarks.320 Trustmarks are 
granted by an independent party for meeting certain technical standards.321 For instance, m-
payment providers can get ISO 31000 risk management certified. Responsible norms of 
business behaviour can thus be established.322 
Another reason why some caution against the adoption of social welfare based legal 
consumer protection measures (i.e. far-reaching consumer rights) is that market pressures can 
help ensure that consumers receive what they ask.323 For example, negative publicity in the 
media about m-payment providers attributing liability to customers for a cyber attack can 
result in customers switching to competitors. Online reputation can thus perform an important 
mechanism to prevent unfair behaviour.324 The internet makes it possible to communicate to a 
very broad mass through leaving feedback.325 However, it is doubtful that reputational loss is 
sufficient in the absence of substantive consumer protection laws which consumers can evoke 
in their favour.326  In other words, the leverage of consumers must be strengthened by 
granting certain legal rights. It is also not necessary to resolve disputes through the courts, 
which often takes a long time, as a Financial Ombudsman Scheme can be created, as the UK 
has done.327 Such a Financial Ombudsman Scheme negates the risk of links to industry (as 
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the state guarantees the impartiality of the Ombudsman) while preserving the benefits of 
efficiency.328 
As the m-payment industry is still developing, policymakers should seriously consider 
whether they want to opt for comprehensive legal consumer protection measures in line with 
the social welfare approach. A light-touch approach through government-approved codes of 
conduct, certification standards, statutory and regulatory requirements, technical standards, 
together with certain basic default rights for consumers may prove to be a more flexible 
approach.329 It may help to encourage Fintech innovation330 which in turn is likely to increase 
consumer choice. However, the trade-off is that overall fairness may not be prioritised as 
much as business interests. It is argued that as consumer’s finances are concerned, great care 
must be taken. A robust legal framework must be enacted to safeguard m-payment customers. 
The question arises whether Sharia law would also require far-reaching legal consumer 
protection measures. The next section, therefore, explores the aims/objectives of consumer 
protection as advocated by Islamic law, including Islamic banking law. Problems or 
advantages of formulating consumer protection policies based on the Sharia and in trying to 
use Sharia law to achieve those objectives are identified. Gaps within the Sharia legal 
literature are highlighted. 
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3.6 Safeguarding customers through Sharia law 
All major religions spell out moral and ethical values and, in the past, the law was also 
interwoven with religious principles.331 In the case of Islam, this is still the case to this 
present day. 332 Islam is based on the Quran, as well as the Sunnah.333 While the Quran is the 
primary source, the Sunnah is essential because it is ‘a set of rules deduced from the 
pronouncement and conduct of the Prophet’.334 Where the Quran deals with a particular 
situation, it takes precedence over the Sunnah.335 There are also the following secondary 
sources: Firstly, Ijtihad, which can be translated as logically reaching one's own opinion by 
interpreting the Quran, i.e., “progressive reasoning by analogy”. Secondly, Ijma, which 
denotes the generally agreed opinion of learned persons, i.e., “consensus”. Thirdly, Qijas, 
which means a comparison when things are similar, i.e., “analogy”.336 These diverse sources 
validate different eclectic interpretations but result in Sharia concepts not being universally 
ascertainable.337 This issue is further heightened by the fact that different schools of thought 
advocate for the implementation of different equivocal Sharia standards.338 In SA, Sharia 
principles are based on the Hanbali School.339     
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The Hanbali School values doctrinal purity by interpreting the Quran literally, 
resulting in it being the strictest of the four main Sunni Schools.340 More weight is given to 
firstly the Quran and after that the Sunnah, Ijma of the companions of the Prophet, individual 
opinions by companions of the Prophet, weak Hadiths, i.e. actions, words and unspoken 
approval by the Prophet and Qiyas, i.e. deductive analogy.341 It is essential for Islamic jurists 
to recognise that consumer protection constitutes an area where Qiyas must be liberally used. 
One way is to view consumer protection as falling within the commercial sphere and an 
extension of Islamic business values. Such an approach would ensure that consumer 
protection is interpreted liberally. The reason is that the Hanbali School is only “strict in 
…personal morality and criminal law” but is otherwise “liberal on economic and business 
issues.”342 However, as discussed above, a purely liberal policy orientation may not 
necessarily adequately protect m-payment customers. 
Put differently, an overly liberal approach towards commercial matters appears to 
fundamentally contravene the primary objective of Islamic law, namely that wealth creation 
promotes unity within society through high business standards.343 Islam also commands that 
every person considers how his/her behaviour impacts others, including when wealth is 
created.344 Accordingly, the welfare of society is more important than individual welfare.345 
In the context of m-payment, this should mean that m-payment providers cannot prioritise 
their welfare over those of their customers and must, therefore, safeguard customers against 
unauthorised payment transactions and protect customers' data. As explained by Albaqme, 
the prime aim of the Sharia is to guarantee the rights of individuals and to ensure that society 
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is united.346 Consumer protection is and should, therefore, be a central and indispensable 
element of any Islamic legal system. As the Sharia governs all aspects of life347, it must also 
extend to consumer protection.   
However, at present Islamic consumer protection is primarily achieved through 
morals and values which apply to commerce.348  Mannan opines that those parts of the Quran 
which deal with economics emphasise that social aspects must be incorporated.349 Honesty, 
transparency, being considerate, offering high-quality products and discharging the respective 
obligations under an agreement, including any specific rules which apply to it, constitute 
some of these important business values.350 Various Quranic verses stress that Allah requires 
adherence to the duties to transact fairly and honestly.351 For instance, Surah Al-Rahman 55:9 
provides that “And establish weight in justice and do not make deficient the balance.”352 
Surah Al-lsra' 17:35 states “And give full measure when you measure, and weigh with an 
even balance. That is the best [way] and best in result.”353  
These ethical commands are very similar to the Western social welfare consumer 
construct discussed above. Social justice thus plays a prime role within Islam, as made clear 
by the Quran which states that the objective is ‘establishing what is right and forbidding what 
is wrong’.354 However, one notable distinction to the Western social welfare approach is that 
Islam achieves this not through the grant of rights, but through the imposition of duties, as 
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observed by Rice.355 In contrast, in the UK various legal rights have been granted through the 
imposition of contractual liability for breach of a term of contract, tortious liability, implied 
terms (such as a statutory duty of reasonable care and skill356), legislation regulating unfair 
contract terms, as well as sector-specific legislation, such as the PSR 2009 and PSR 2017, 
which thereby comprehensively embed the consumer protection rationale, and as explored in 
chapter 4, sections 4.3 and 4.4.  
In contrast, as explicated by Ayob, Islamic consumer needs are addressed through the 
aqad (the legal relationship) relating to a transaction and trading. 357  In other words, 
consumer needs can be made part of the contractual obligations which the parties determine, 
as the “The Contract is the Law of the Parties.”358 However, it also permits companies to 
utilise exclusion and limitation clauses by making them part of the legal relationship, subject 
to the caveat that they are clearly defined, do not contravene the good faith principle and the 
matter can also not be haram as discussed below.359 Additionally, consumer needs are 
addressed through ethical and moral principles and spiritual matters.360 Spiritual matters 
concern the relationship between Allah and consumers, whereas ethical and moral matters 
concern the relationship between the trader and the consumer. It is assumed that this ensures 
that rights are automatically guaranteed.361  
Nonetheless, one issue with such an approach premised on ethical and moral 
principles and spiritual matters is that it creates vagueness and legal uncertainty. Countries, 
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such as SA have recognised this issue and have started to “codify Sharia ‘for clarity.”362 
However, such reform has only progressed slowly and has not extended to consumer law.363 
The failure to take legal steps to protect consumers is also reflective of the fact that the topic 
of consumer protection has not received much attention in Islamic societies.364 By default, 
neo-liberal contractual primacy has thus been permitted due to the failure to clearly and 
comprehensively specify and develop the ethical, moral and spiritual principles on which 
consumers can rely.  
One serious issue with such an approach is that it causes problems in respect of the 
enforcement of consumer rights. In the absence of clearly formulated consumer rights, as 
opposed to broad and vague principle containing social justice concepts, it arguably falls on 
the state to ensure that businesses discharge their Islamic holy duties. By corollary, this 
necessitates that the necessary state bodies and institutions are created to monitor compliance 
with Islamic business morals and values. Nonetheless, this alone is insufficient to ensure that 
individual cases are properly dealt with. Without knowledge of wrongdoing in a particular 
case, e.g., through the consumer’s right to complain, it is difficult to see how an Islamic duty 
can be enforced in specific cases. In this context, Radwan states that Sharia law is insufficient 
without consumers being sufficiently aware.365 It is thus imperative for Islamic scholars to 
develop the concept of consumer rights in order to rein in contractual primacy.  
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Duties create rights and rights create duties366, and there is a gap within the Islamic 
literature on consumer rights, as such rights are not being clearly articulated within Islamic 
law at present. As a result, companies are given more leeway on how to draft their terms and 
conditions. They do not have to ensure that specific consumer rights are upheld, as is, for 
example, the case in the UK, as discussed in chapter 4, sections 4.3 and 4.4. A more liberal 
market approach is thereby facilitated, but this appears to contravene the social welfare 
approach which Islam otherwise commands. It is thus more appropriate to speak of Islamic 
consumer protection through business regulation. As explained by Mancuso, Prophet 
Mohammed was a merchant, and he, therefore, spelt out specific prescriptions.367 Islamic 
scholars should nevertheless deliberate what the consequences are when these specific 
prescriptions are not met towards consumers. Put differently; it must be addressed whether a 
failure to meet a specific Islamic business obligation entitles a customer to bring a legal 
claim.  
Yet one obstacle may be that conservative Hanbali scholars view these as holy duties 
which can only be interpreted narrowly.368  For this reason, it may be difficult to apply them 
to particular commercial transactions, including m-payment services.369 As suggested above, 
this problem may be overcome by considering consumer protection a commercial matter and 
treating it in a liberal and not doctrinally pure manner. That is to say, the concept of qiyas 
could be utilised to overcome such an issue, particularly in light of the rich Islamic 
jurisprudence on social justice, as, e.g. found in the aforementioned Quranic verses, Surah 
Al-Rahman 55:9 and Surah Al-lsra' 17:35. Arguably any other approach fundamentally 
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contravenes the equity, fairness and justice commands of the Sharia and thereby frustrates the 
primary goal of Islam.370 
Such a progressive approach is also necessary since contemporary society is very 
different from the times when Prophet Mohammed lived. Consequently, it is important that 
Islamic scholars apply these holy prescriptions liberally. They must also not uphold pre-
Islamic Arab tribal customs at the expense of the holy commands of the Sharia.371 They 
should, therefore, abandon rigidity, focus on core values and the essence contained in the 
holy text.372 Undoubtedly, the Islamic social justice principles can serve as an immensely 
helpful ethical base from which a jurisprudential discourse about consumer rights can be 
developed. Mancuso further states that there are many Quranic verses which emphasise that 
individuals must be protected, especially against undue interference. 373 Islamic scholars must 
thus focus on these verses in order to interpret them in relation to the consumer protection 
specific context, including m-payment transactions.  
This particularly requires that important Islamic business principles are elaborated on 
in respect of the different consumer protection areas where they may be relevant:374 One such 
principle is that sellers and buyers ought to be allowed to trade freely.375 Another Islamic 
business principle imposes a duty on agents and brokers to offer assistance to sellers and 
buyers, so that a fair bargain can be reached.376 Ignorance can also not be exploited by 
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principals.377 In the context of m-payments, this could be interpreted as requiring other 
stakeholders in the m-payment transaction network to support each other in such a way that 
customers are treated fairly. Hence, the operations must be managed effectively, so that 
customers are not left exposed to additional risks. The principle could thus be used as a base 
to impose a duty on the various stakeholders involved in m-payment services to be a good 
manager by facilitating that electronic financial transactions are safely processed, as, e.g. 
South Korea has done.378 Additionally, the principle could be evoked to allow customers to 
notify any party within the m-payment ecosystem when they lose or have their mobile device 
stolen.379 This would be a more helpful approach to customers.  
Another Islamic business principle provides that a creditor who recovers money from 
a debtor must duly consider the debtor's financial circumstances.380 However, when goods 
have not been paid for, the seller is entitled to them.381 In the context of m-payment, this 
could be interpreted as the court having to determine whether the m-payment customer 
should shoulder responsibility for a specific cyber attack. The caveat that a seller is entitled to 
unpaid goods could be interpreted as meaning that a m-payment provider is entitled not to 
pay back its customer when the customer has not fulfilled his/her respective duties under the 
agreement.  
Another Islamic principle is the requirement for goods not to harm individuals.382 
Goods should be extended to services by analogical reasoning in light of the overall aims of 
Islam, including m-payments. Another important Islamic duty in the context of consumer 
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protection is the requirement to conduct business fairly and to protect consumers. 383 
Moreover, when Islamic law is not adhered to, a transaction is unenforceable.384 However, in 
the context of unauthorised payment transactions and customers' data breaches, a different 
remedial response must be developed than rendering a transaction unenforceable, e.g. they 
must be refunded the unauthorised amount and/or compensated for the data breach if 
sufficiently serious. 
While some Islamic scholars may aver that Islamic principles cannot be changed, as 
pointed out by Albaqme, this does not appear necessary.385  As suggested above, qiyas can be 
employed, so that the Islamic principles remain intact, but are just interpreted so that current 
issues can be solved.386 Albaqme also does not consider that this constitutes a problem387 and 
Islamic scholars ought to work on ensuring that the application of these Sharia principles are 
fully understood in respect of modern day consumer law affairs. One way to facilitate this is 
for SA to enact secular consumer laws, just like it has done in respect of commercial laws.388  
The adoption of consumer laws would also resolve the issue that at present the precise 
scope of the protection of consumers within Islamic law has not been further explored. 
Albaqme stresses that Muslim customers are normally unaware of the Islamic verses which 
may relate and be applicable to customer protection.389 Morris and Al Dabbagh confirm that 
this is because the topic of consumer protection has received very little attention in Muslim 
countries, including in SA.390 However, consumer protection will remain inefficient, even if a 
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consumer law was enacted, without an academic discourse by Islamic scholars.391 The main 
reason why consumer protection will not be effective without promulgating Islamic consumer 
protection jurisprudence is that the Sharia is supreme over civil law.392 Put differently, even if 
a statute was enacted, its provisions could be overridden on the basis that there is a conflict 
with the Sharia. However, there exist Islamic principles which have received more attention, 
as the principles mentioned above and which can serve as important tools to the Islamic 
social justice command and from which an Islamic customer protection discourse can be 
developed. These principles are discussed next. 
 
3.6.1 The Islamic principle of good faith 
A particularly important Islamic business principle is that of good faith,393 as it forms the 
base of Islamic contract law jurisprudence.394 In Islam, the concept of good faith requires 
being sincere, straightforward, just, fair, truthful, transparent and requires each party to 
honour promises.395 Islamic scholars have defined good faith in different ways, for instance, 
as decency, communal standards concerning fairness or reasonableness.396 The good faith 
principle is important in respect of unauthorised payment transactions by m-payment 
providers to their customers since it can help to delineate the extent to which Sharia law will 
impose or permit the exclusion of liability. It also provides a point of comparison on 
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unauthorised m-payments with English law, particularly with the CRA 2015 and the test of 
fairness and treatment of exclusion of liability, discussed in chapter 4, section 4.4. 
The Islamic good faith principle requires both parties to a transaction to be honest and 
truthful i.e. corporate and private individuals must abide by the principle.397 In the context of 
m-payment, the Islamic good faith principle could be utilised to impose a duty on the m-
payment provider and third parties and the customer to act in good faith and to cooperate. For 
instance, m-payment customers must keep their PIN codes safe and must be honest when 
they have failed to keep them safe. Equally, m-payment service providers must admit when 
they have failed to provide a secure m-payment infrastructure or third-party collaborators are 
to blame. 
The rule that transactions should be conducted justly and honestly is evident for 
instance from Surah Al-Bayyinah 98:5; Surah Al-Baqarah 2:188; Surah Al-Anam 6:152, 
Surah Al-Mutaffifin 83:1-5, Surah Al Baqarah 2:177; Surah Al-Isra' 17:35; Surah Al-Isra 
17:34, Surah Al-Baqarah 2:190; Surah Al-Mu'minun 23:8 and Surah Al-Humazah 104:1-4.398 
The requirement that business transactions are fair399, is also apparent from the following 
Quranic verse: ‘Who to those who deal in fraud, those who, when they have to receive by 
measure from men, exact full measure, but when they have to give measure or weight to men 
give less than due. Do they not think that they will be called to account on a mighty day, a 
day when (all) mankind will stand before the Lord of the Worlds?’400 Another Quranic verse 
which requires that transactions are fair is found in Surah An-Nisa 4:29 and which states “O 
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ye who believe! Eat not up your property among yourselves in vanities: But let there be 
amongst you Traffic and trade by mutual good will.”401 
There are many other Quranic verses which command fair and honest dealings, such 
as Surat Al-Baqarah 2:224-25, and Surat Al-Ma'idah 5:89.402 It has been said that the Prophet 
declared that a trustworthy and truthful merchant will join the Prophets.403 Fundamentally, 
Islam emphasises fairness and considers the contract divine in accordance with Surah Al-
Ma'idah 5:1.404 It thus strikes a balance between social welfare interests and neo-liberal 
tenets, similar to the position in the West discussed in section 3.4. The Islamic requirement 
for the deal to be fair appears different to the Western concept which permits freedom of 
contract. 405 However, as discussed in chapter 4, sections 4.3.1 and 4.4, fairness rules have 
also been developed in the West to protect consumers against oppressive and sharp practices 
which arise as a result of unequal bargaining power, most notably the CRA 2015.406 Also, the 
Islamic dogma of the contract being divine means that in Islamic legal culture, the Western 
concept of pacta sunt servanda is firmly recognised.407 It means that in Islam, contracts, 
including all contractual duties, are upheld so long as the Sharia or a Sharia public policy is 
not contravened.408 In this context, Ibn Taymiya, a Hanbali jurist, observed that any 
contractual clauses are permitted if valid and not forbidden or deemed forbidden because of 
qiyas or a text.409  
When determining what is a valid and forbidden exclusion of liability in the context 
of the good faith principle, it is important to understand that it relates to three areas: The 
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contracting parties, the goods and the value of the goods.410 By virtue of qiyas, this must also 
extent to services, particularly in an age where service technologies, such as NFC discussed 
in chapter 1, play an essential part within today’s knowledge economy.411 
For instance, in respect of the contracting parties, the principle requires that there is 
mutual consent which has been freely given.412 The seller is not permitted to lie, should be 
kind, prioritise justice, not engage in speculation or interfere in another person’s contract or 
resell goods before receipt.413 Furthermore, Uqba bin Amir, a companion of the Prophet, 
noted that a thing can also not be sold which is defective or has issues, except if the buyer 
was informed of it.414 Hence, the seller cannot hide any defects.415 This highlights that the 
Western concept of mandated disclosure (i.e., providing intelligible information to 
consumers) can be said to exist in Islam. This is further supported by the Quran, verse 33:70 
which states ‘...make your utterance straightforward’.  
Accordingly, the principle of good faith extends to the pre-contractual stage where 
bargaining or talks take place.416 In the m-payment context, it may be important to require 
that prospective customers are informed about the key security features, e.g. which in-app 
protection against unauthorised transactions and malware form part of the service. Such an 
initiative has been proposed by the Islamic Malaysian Central Bank, Bank Negara.417 The 
way in which personal data is being dealt with should also be clearly stipulated. The rule not 
to sell a thing which is defective also arguably necessitates that m-payment providers only 
offer services to customers when, in all honesty and good faith, they know that customers’ 
 
410 Choi et al n 395, 250. 
411 E. G. Popkova et al, Industry 4.0: Industrial Revolution of the 21st Century (Springer 2019) 61. 
412 Choi et al n 395; Surah An-Nisa 4:29. 
413 Ibid (Choi et al) 251-252. 
414 Foster n 393, 429. 
415 Choi et al n 395, 251-252. 
416 D. Elkarkouri, 'Pre-Contractual Liability in Islamic Construction Contracts' (1992) International 
Construction Law Review 4, 544-551, 545-546. 
417 J. Chin, 'Bank Negara plans minimum standards for mobile payments, more safeguards', The StarOnline, 12 
April 2018 <https://www.thestar.com.my/business/business-news/2018/04/12/bank-negara-plans-minimum-
standards-mobile-payments-more-safeguards/> accessed 13 February 2019. 
169 
 
funds and their personal details will be safe. This facet of the Islamic good faith principle, if 
properly developed, has the potential to encourage them to adopt the latest technology and 
operational processes and comply with their obligation to maintain secure systems. 
 
In respect of goods, it is not allowed to trade in things which are deemed unlawful, 
e.g. pork.418 Accordingly, it must be considered whether something is halal or haram, as 
discussed in the next section. Moreover, the quantity and any characteristics of the item must 
be clear.419 In this context, uncertainty or excessive risk i.e. trickery must be avoided.420 In 
relation to the value of the goods, the price must be clearly stated.421 Payment must also not 
be delayed.422 
 
A breach of the Islamic good faith principle entitles a buyer to return goods when s/he 
notices a defect (i.e. anything which decreases its value), though s/he can opt to keep the 
goods (though without seeking compensation).423 Even when a buyer was not ignorant and 
knew about the defect, s/he can choose to rescind the contract or affirm it.424 Sellers must 
thus give refunds for defective products.425 Such a rule appears similar to the implied terms 
contained in the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979, the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 
and the Consumer Rights Act 2015, mentioned in chapter 4, section 4.3. Through the 
application of qiyas (analogy), the same principle arguably also applies to defective services. 
Accordingly, when a defect is not revealed, the contract is unenforceable under Islamic 
 










law.426 The fact that an exemption clause has been inserted in the agreement does not change 
this, so long as the consumer establishes that the defect was known, but not disclosed.427  
The consumer protection rationale clearly underlies this Islamic rule, and which has 
the potential to fulfil a similar protective role as, e.g. the tortious duty of care and the UK 
CRA 2015 do, as discussed in chapter 4, section 4.4. While at first sight it appears that there 
is a disconnect between Islamic and Western contract law, this is not necessarily the case.  
 
Similarly, when there is dishonesty, the deceived party can revoke the contract and 
thereby bring it to an end.428 Hence, the contract is unenforceable when either one of the 
parties engages in fraud or misstatements.429 Accordingly, liability cannot be excluded for 
these matters. This fundamental rule not to deceive but to be honest governs all business 
transactions, as proclaimed by Prophet Mohammed (peace be upon him).430 Yet deception 
can take many different forms and there are also different standards of honesty. A business 
may choose to disclose basic information about its services but may not detail everything. 
Important information may be provided but in such a form that most consumers will not read 
it. This is arguably the case when m-payment customers are provided with very lengthy terms 
and conditions. While some may consider that this is a weak form of deception, this has 
become a standard practice around the world.  
 The various aspects of the Islamic good faith principle highlight that it is a well-
developed Islamic business principle which promotes fairness. It should ideally be utilised to 
address to what extent Sharia law will impose or permit the exclusion of liability of m-
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payment providers in the context of unauthorised payment transactions and data utilisation 
and data  
breaches. It would be desirable for Islamic jurists to promulgate a consumer protection 
discourse based on it, alongside the broader command for wealth to create social unity, as 
well as other relevant business principles, such as the halal and haram concepts discussed in 
the next section.  
 
 
3.6.2 The halal and haram concepts  
Consumer protection is also indirectly promoted through the Sharia outlawing sinful 
activities, such as, alcohol, gambling, and anything related to pornography.431 The halal 
concept proscribes unethical business methods, such as, high risk activities, fraud and 
deception, as well as those which are considered socially harmful and thus sinful.432  Such 
activities are examples of what is termed haram.433 Hence, haram denotes unacceptable 
Islamic activities, whereas halal denotes acceptable practices.434 In other words, goodness 
must govern business activity in the spirit of God and the legal framework must enact values 
which promote this.435 Justice, honesty and public interest are such values, whereas 
malpractices must be prevented, e.g. greed, fraud and speculation.436 Those economic 
activities which exemplify positive values are permitted i.e. halal and those which are 
negative are proscribed i.e. haram. The halal and haram concepts could be utilised as a legal 
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balancing tool to determine situations where the acceptable Islamic ethical business values 
have become transgressed. 
The concepts are particularly useful when determining whether a payment transaction 
is authorised or unauthorised. For instance, m-payment services can only be offered to 
customers if they are not high risk and fraud and deception are adequately combated. Hence, 
the risks detailed in Chapter 2 which contribute to unauthorised payment transactions and 
data breaches must be adequately mitigated for the service not to become haram. If a m-
payment service is found to be too risky and exposes customers to fraud (e.g., because of 
inadequate risk management), liability should not rest with consumers. The concepts of halal 
and haram could also be used to declare unenforceable terms and conditions in m-payment 
service agreements, e.g. which leave too much risk to customers.437 Such terms and 
conditions would then become haram and would no longer be deemed halal, despite the fact 
that prima facie m-payments should be deemed halal.  
As mentioned above, Islam emphasises the importance of benefiting the wider 
society.438 Aldohni therefore argues that, while parties can freely agree to their respective 
rights and obligations, this has to be done constructively within the parameters of Islamic 
law, including the good faith principle and the halal and haram concepts.439 This also 
highlights that Islamic law requires that welfare considerations are upheld. It therefore 
resembles in some aspects the more paternalistic and interventionist approach advocated by 
some Western scholars, as discussed above. Hence, despite the different heritage of English 
and Sharia law, these principles share similar policy considerations. However, one gap within 
the Islamic consumer protection literature is to spell out whether a finding of haram, as well 
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as any other contravention of the ethical and moral Islamic business rules, will prevent the 
operation of exclusion clauses. The remedial consequences which flow from a breach of the 
Islamic business rules have also not been sufficiently clarified, leaving customers exposed. 
 
3.6.3 The Islamic profit and loss sharing principle 
Another important Islamic banking principle is the profit and loss sharing principle.440 Under 
the principle, profits can not be determined and are thus variable and vague and may even not 
eventuate.441 The underlying requirement is to employ money productively and to share the 
rewards which come from wealth, as well as the risk.442 It originates from the idea that the 
weak party needs to be protected.443 In the context of m-payments, the weak party is the 
consumer. It is, therefore, a principle which promotes fairness. While it is normally applied in 
the context of sharing business risks and profits,444 it could serve as a basis for an Islamic 
consumer protection jurisprudence. Quranic verse 2:275 from which this principle has been 
developed445 states “Allah hath permitted business and forbidden usury.” Under the principle, 
profits cannot be reaped from financial products and services without the beneficiary also 
facing potential loss.446 The risks which stem from customers' activities should therefore not 
be separated from m-payment providers and third-party collaborators. In other words, the m-
payment provider and third-party collaborators which benefit from m-payment services 
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should not be allowed to exclude all liability at the expense of the customer. The customer 
may also be held liable for losses. Consequently, each party to a m-payment transaction must 
share the risk under the profit and loss sharing principle447, ideally the risk for which each 
party is responsible as discussed in chapter 2. Geva also argues that loss allocation is best 
done by holding those responsible who are most able to prevent or decrease the particular 
risk.448  The profit and loss sharing principle therefore rules out the option that customers 
bear the full cost of any loss that follows from an unauthorised payment transaction. 
However, despite this Islamic principle, in SA customers currently bear the full cost of any 
loss that follows from an unauthorised transaction, as discussed in chapter 5. This approach to 
loss allocation presents a problem since it contravenes the underlying fairness commands 
inherent in the profit and loss sharing principle. The alternative of shifting the loss entirely to 
the m-payment provider equally violates the principle. Instead, the principle requires that 
there is balance. 
The principle is justified on the grounds that the resources of the economy are thereby 
more efficiently allocated.449 The extension of this principle to the m-payment context may 
ensure that m-payment providers are incentivised to educate customers about the importance 
of updating security and anti-virus programs; and exclusion and limitation clauses may not be 
used to the detriment of consumers. However, like with the other principles discussed above, 
the issue is that the profit and loss sharing principle has been left undefined and it remains 
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The question in the case of unauthorised payment transactions and customers' data breaches 
is to identify against which types of business conduct consumers should be protected. 
Answering this question will invariably depend on the type of values and policy orientation 
which a country chooses to promote.450 A very neo-liberal stance will permit a purely 
contractual position in the context of unauthorised transactions and data protection. The 
middle approach is to adopt public and private measures to protect consumers.451 In other 
words, legal measures are adopted so that consumers can enforce their legal rights in the 
courts. However, self-regulation is also employed to protect consumers by virtue of market 
forces. When devising rules in relation to loss allocation, it may be taken into account that m-
payments are a technology-driven system and that liability should be curtailed only in 
circumstances when consumers can prevent unauthorised transactions.452 In respect of data 
protection, legal rules are created which safeguard personal data but they may be mainly 
concerned with providing information and obtaining consent.453 Hence, the focus is on 
getting consumers to consent i.e. a neo liberal informational model is employed. The other 
model which can be adopted is one rooted in paternalism and therefore characterised by 
extensive state intervention.454 Accordingly, more far-reaching legal consumer protection 
measures are adopted. For instance, rules may be adopted which attribute responsibility for 
losses predominantly with m-payment providers.  Such an interventionist approach also 
necessitates that the state dedicates resources to create the necessary bureaucratic structures 
to monitor compliance. 
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Paterson and Brody argue that an effective legal consumer protection framework 
employs a range of provisions, such as, bright-line rules, bans, and prohibitions which 
incorporate broader moral standards of unconscionable and unfair conduct.455 Similarly, 
Abbamonte argues that self-regulation plays a useful role, but it is essential to create 
regulatory safeguards.456 Nottage states that to date a post-interventionist approach has been 
preferred. 457  Such a stance ensures that neo-liberal ideas are maintained through 
deregulation while “re-regulation” takes place through a “neo-proceduralist” approach.458 
This thesis argues that a purely private approach towards consumer protection is difficult to 
align with the broader social welfare concerns stipulated by the Sharia. While the Saudi 
Arabian Hanbali school makes it possible to integrate neo-liberal ideas and therefore promote 
consumer choice, it must fundamentally ensure that customers’ funds are safe and also that 
their privacy is protected.  
Hence, the main aim and objective which ought to be prioritised are to protect the 
financial assets of m-payment customers, as well as their privacy. When this is not ensured, 
customers ought to be granted rights to hold their m-payment provider and third-party 
collaborators accountable. This arguably necessitates that, as consumers, customers have to 
discharge their respective duties to the m-payment provider. Yet, as discussed above, the 
legal threshold to establish this depends on whether one conceptualises them as vulnerable, 
average or reasonably circumspect. A vulnerable customer should still be able to seek 
compensation from his/her m-payment provider, even in circumstances where s/he is partly to 
blame, e.g., for having fallen prey to a new cybercrime trick.  
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In contrast, a reasonably circumspect customer will find it more difficult to pursue 
his/her m-payment provider for omissions on his/her part. The adoption of a vulnerable 
consumer approach within consumer protection law may promote naivety and moral hazard 
but does not encourage learning. However, it also arguably incentivises m-payment providers 
to adopt stronger security measures and to engage in heightened risk management. The 
Islamic halal and haram doctrines arguably mandate such an approach. It highlights one of 
the pitfalls of seeking to provide adequate protection to m-payment customers. 
Nonetheless, such an approach may help to promote social unity because a more 
comprehensive safety net is created for customers.459 Legislators must, in turn, identify the 
circumstances in which m-payment customers should be protected against unauthorised 
payment transactions and data breaches.460 It should possibly always be the case when 
customers have discharged their basic obligations. In such instances, they should be granted 
the legal right to seek financial redress from their m-payment providers for unauthorised 
transactions and data breaches. 
For Islamic m-payment customers, it is currently complicated due to the absence of 
consumer rights and the undeveloped Islamic jurisprudence and the resultant primacy of 
contract law. More steps must, therefore, be taken to ensure that the holy Islamic 
prescriptions are upheld. Islamic consumers must be granted rights. Enforcement channels 
must be created, especially for consumers, through private and public means. ICT standards 
which incorporate consumer protection objectives should be promulgated, as the m-payment 
infrastructure is created through ICT. 
 




While the Islamic consumer protection discourse is still rather rudimentary, it has 
been shown that the basic tenets which underlie consumer protection policies and laws are 
very similar in both the West and Islam. In both systems, the ideas of social welfare and 
fairness are firmly established. However, without the topic of consumer protection being 
explored by Islamic scholars, including the question of the extent to which Sharia law will 
impose or permit the exclusion of liability, the problem is that Muslims are deprived of 
Islamic social justice. It undermines the positive transformative effect which the Sharia can 
have on Muslim societies. Additionally, it might make those countries less competitive in the 
global financial world stage. Muslim countries may otherwise become “cannibalistic” 
societies dominated by capital.461 The overall objective to create wealth for society in a way 
which promotes solidarity will then also become more challenging to realise. In other words, 
the moral compass which Islamic law provides must not be lost. The good faith principle 
could be further developed to achieve fair outcomes for consumers, alongside the halal and 
haram and profit and loss sharing concepts, especially in the context of the problem of 
unauthorised transactions and data protection and to determine the extent to which Sharia law 
will impose or permit the exclusion of liability by m-payment providers. That way it will be 
prevented that SA customers bear the full cost of any loss that follows from an unauthorised 
m-payment transaction and are left without recourse when their data is misutilised. 
It is against this background that the next chapter analyses the UK legal framework 
which has been created to regulate m-payment services. It is explored how these different 
strands of consumer protection policies and laws have been embedded in UK law. 
 
461 Soederberg n 116, 495&499. 
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CHAPTER 4           
 
THE M-PAYMENT PROVIDER-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP IN THE M-PAYMENT 




The aim of this chapter is to conduct a doctrinal analysis of the UK legal framework 
concerning m-payment services and evaluate the policy orientation which underpins the UK 
law. The legal evaluation is significant to the overall thesis as it permits a comparative 
analysis with the Saudi legal framework and supports the exploration of this thesis’ central 
research question concerning whether SA might be positively influenced by the UK model. 
As discussed in chapter 2, the extension of finance into mobile information and 
communications technology (‘ICT’) creates a new complex environment in terms of the law 
and, subsequently, liability and this area is one of crucial importance in terms of mitigating 
consumer risk in this new financial market.1 The use of technology particularly increases the 
risk of unauthorised m-payment transactions and renders it more difficult to protect 
customers’ data in order to maintain privacy which raises particularly essential legal 
questions, such as, who should be held responsible for these issues, what happens when 
errors occur, when liability may be seen to be discharged and when transactions may be 
 
1 D.A. Zetsche et al, 'From Fintech to TechFin: The Regulatory Challenges of Data-Driven Finance' (2017) 
European Banking Institute Working Paper Series 3, No.6, 1-36, 1. 
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reversed.2 Legal answers must be found to address the new technology’s operational and 
security risks. The law must delineate responsibility, at least in relation to the main factual 
scenarios, i.e. when risks arise because of customers, security or third-party collaboration (as 
discussed in chapter 2) and which result in unauthorised payment transactions or cause 
privacy issues and data breaches. Otherwise, it is unlikely that consumers will reap the 
advantages identified in chapter 1 and trust in m-payment services may be eroded. Financial 
stability may also be undermined without laws which create accountability – whether vis-à-
vis the customer, the m-payment provider or other third parties. 
The literature review in chapter 3 highlighted how legislative responses depend on 
whether the legislator endorses a neoliberal or social welfare consumer protection framework. 
Chapter 3 argued that the preferred consumer protection approach for SA should be 
predominantly rooted in principles of social welfare due to Islamic ethics being culturally 
important, while, nonetheless, still promoting innovation and progress. The mode of social 
welfare better mitigates technological risks and, relatedly, the security and privacy perils 
faced by customers using m-payment services. 
This chapter advances the argument that the UK’s approach is neoliberal, with a firm 
emphasis on ‘consumer economic interest’, though equally embeds social welfare 
approaches, resulting in a mixed approach. The initially more permissive approach of the 
Payment Services Regulations 2009 (‘PSR 2009’) enabled the UK to promote Fintech 
innovation. As the market matured, however, second-generation legislation was adopted. 
Hence the Payment Services Regulations 2017 (‘PSR 2017’) signalled that social welfare 
objectives were being further developed and strengthened as this introduced regulations for 
new services – namely, payment initiation services ('PIS') and account information services 
 
2 A. Rosenberg, ‘Better than cash? Global proliferation of payment cards and consumer protection policy’ 
(2006) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 44, 520-578, 563. 
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('AIS'), as well as new conditions for e-money issuers and payment services providers,3 as 
discussed in section 4.3.3. The PSR 2017 has thus struck a balance between allowing 
competition within the financial services market and subjecting those offering m-payment 
and related services to legal consumer protection measures. 
This distinctive legislative approach has been conducive to the development of the 
emerging m-payment market, and increasing economic growth.4 Despite these laws being 
framed in a neoliberal manner, they are also influenced by the more paternalistic social 
welfare-based consumer protection model and this philosophy of regulation has been 
promoted across various interrelated forms of, legislation, as examined in this chapter. 
Comprehensive legal consumer protection measures have been enacted in order to equip UK 
m-payment customers with various rights. The policy objectives of social welfare have, 
therefore, not been ignored, despite the impact of neoliberal, free-market ideas on this 
legislation. A protective safety net has been created for vulnerable m-payment customers who 
make use of these innovative m-payment technologies which inherently pose greater risks. 
M-payment customers are, indeed, better protected against unauthorised m-payment 
transactions and personal data breaches in the UK than in SA, despite Sharia’s social welfare 
commands, as discussed further in chapter 5. 
 
4.1.1 The structure of this chapter 
This chapter firstly discusses the background to m-payment regulation in the UK and how the 
emergence of technological innovation within the financial services sector has resulted in 
 
3 FCA, 'Implementation of the revised Payment Services Directive (PSD2): Approach Document and final 
Handbook changes', Policy Statement, PS17/19, September 2017, 1-279, 1.7. 
4 The Wall Street Journal, 'How Mobile Money Drives Economic Growth', 2017 




new authorisation regimes for what are effectively ‘limited banks’,5 i.e., payment institutions 
and e-money institutions. It is explored how communications companies which act as 
‘limited banks’ are prevented from undermining their competition and narrowing consumer 
choice within the emerging m-payment market. The section thus examines the tools which 
are employed to promote a pro-competition stance. The use of e-money via prepaid debit 
cards or apps which can be used to purchase goods at selected retailers is another potential 
growth area in the context of m-payments.6 E-money and its associated authorisation regime 
and its regulation, particularly in terms of the Electronic Money Regulations 2011 (‘EMR 
2011’), as well as voluntary codes, are therefore analysed. It is considered whether the EMR 
2011 is framed in a way which adequately protects customers in terms of the issues posed by 
the utilisation of the new electronic financial world.  
The next section examines relevant sources of law which govern the rights and 
obligations of m-payment providers and customers in the UK: Contract and tort law; the 
mainly repealed PSR 2009 and the new PSR 2017; the FCA’s Banking Conduct of Business 
Sourcebook (‘BCOBS’) and the voluntary Standards of Lending Practice 2016. It is identified 
how customers and, particularly their funds, are protected through these different sources of 
rights when using these new technological forms of fiscal transactions. 
The penultimate section scrutinises the requirements imposed by contract law and the 
extent to which consumers can challenge m-payment terms and conditions. Issues with 
information disclosure and transparency are identified. Particular recourse is made to the 
CRA 2015 and relevant case law.  
 
5 A. Scupola, Innovative Mobile Platform Developments for Electronic Services Design and Delivery (Business 
Science Reference 2012) 181. 
6 B. Masters and E. Moore, 'E-money' challenge for high street banks', The Financial Times, 14 April 2013 
<https://www.ft.com/content/88d9b378-a1fa-11e2-ad0c-00144feabdc0> accessed 13 December 2017. 
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The final section looks at the issues of data protection, and privacy, which are of 
particular importance as highly sensitive big data is collected during the provision of m-
payment services. It provides a brief analysis of how the risk of money laundering is 
combated via the AML requirements (contained in the Money Laundering, Terrorist 
Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 (‘MLRs 
2017’)) and the impact that these provisions may have on the balance between the prevention 
of money laundering and consumers’ rights, or offer potential legal loopholes which may 
allow data to be accessed without consent, giving rise to related data protection issues. 
All of this material provides a basis for the discussion in chapter 5 and, particularly 
the conclusion, of, firstly, whether SA’s approach to m-payments should rightly adopt a 
social welfare approach in order to be compliant with Sharia law and principles and, 
secondly, whether Saudi legislation could usefully mirror the UK approach of combining 
neoliberal and more paternalistic models of consumer protection. 
 
4.2.1 Background to m-payment regulation in the UK 
In 2007, the online bank, Virgin Money, launched a prepaid MasterCard with the e-money 
issuer PrePay.7 Similarly, Vodafone was granted a licence to operate as a small issuer of e-
money for its m-pay service.8 Moneybookers have also obtained an e-money licence.9 This 
 
7 Finextra, 'Virgin Money to launch pre-paid MasterCard', 18 November 2016 
<https://www.finextra.com/newsarticle/17133/virgin-money-to-launch-pre-paid-mastercard> accessed 10 
November 2016. 




type of service consists of issuing e-money which can be stored electronically and spent 
later.10 
A distinction, however, should be drawn between the services provided by e-money 
institutions and m-payments made through apps.11 Mobile apps offer different options, e.g., 
payments via credit and/or debit cards and payment transfers from one account to another.12 
The former do not involve direct access to the funds in the customer’s bank account.13  
The first UK bank to offer customers the possibility of making payments from their 
mobiles was Barclays with its ‘Pingit’ app, which was launched in 2012.14 This app allows 
person-to-person mobile transfers, including the payment of bills.15 The mobile network 
operator, O2, also launched a mobile wallet app, but closed this in 2014.16 In 2014, ‘Paym’ 
was launched and this app resulted from a collaboration between the main UK banks, 
including Barclays.17 Like Pingit, Paym can be used by customers to pay other businesses 
which also have the app.18 In 2015, Barclays, together with First Direct, HSBC, Nationwide, 
Metro Bank and Santander entered into an agreement with Zapp, a digital payment service, 
 
10 Directive 2000/46/EC on the taking up, pursuit of and prudential supervision of the business of electronic 
money institutions, OJ L 275/39, paras 5-7. 
11 D. Hinds, ‘Micropayments: A technology with a promising but uncertain future’ in N. Mallat, M. Rossi and 
V. K. Tuunainen (eds), ‘Mobile Banking Services’ (2004), 47(5) Communications of the ACM, 42–46, 44; A. 
Boden, 'Explaining PSD2 without TLAs is tough!' Starling Bank, 9 October 2015 
<https://www.starlingbank.com/explaining-psd2-without-tlas-tough/> accessed 10 September 2016.  
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 M. Brignall, 'Barclays launches Pingit money-sending service for smartphones', The Guardian, 16 February 
2012 <https://www.theguardian.com/money/2012/feb/16/barclays-pingit-money-sending-smartphone> accessed 
1 November 2016. 
15 Zapp, 'Barclays Pingit set to be first bank app live with Zapp', 7 July 2015 
<http://www.zapp.co.uk/blog/2015/07/barclays-pingit-set-be-first-bank-app-live-zapp-2> accessed 10 
November 2016. 
16 K. Rushton, 'O2 to launch mobile money transfer app to rival Barclays' Pingit', The Telegraph, 27 February 
2012 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/mediatechnologyandtelecoms/telecoms/9109155/O2-
to-launch-mobile-money-transfer-app-to-rival-Barclays-Pingit.html> accessed 10 November 2016; O2, O2 
Momey <http://www.o2.co.uk/money> accessed 10 November 2016. 
17 S. Murrant, 'Pingit will be marginalized by Pam, Verdict Financial, 15 May 2014 
<http://www.verdictfinancial.com/pingit-will-be-marginalized-by-paym/> accessed 10 November 2016. 
18 T. Green, 'Zapp and Paym - just what is the difference?' Mobile Money Revolution, 25 March 2014 




which enables customers to pay merchants online.19 Corporate customers can, therefore, 
receive money and various retailers, such as, Shop Direct and Sainsbury’s, have signed up to 
it, so that customers can use mobile phones to make payments in their shops.20 
Banks also compete against card providers, e.g., Visa's 'V.me', and other digital 
payment providers, such as, Sage Pay, Worldpay, Optimal Payments and Eleavon.21 Another 
important competitor is Apple, which launched 'Apple Pay' in the UK.22 This service allows 
users to add a credit or debit card and, for additional security, it is linked to the person's 
registered fingerprint.23 In the UK, over 250,000 shops now accept Apple Pay so that not only 
remote but also proximity payments can be carried out at stores like M&S and Waitrose.24 
Indeed, the introduction of biometric identification seems to be increasing with banks as 
well.25 For example, Natwest and Royal Bank of Scotland are now using a fingerprint login.26 
 
4.2.2 The m-payment third-party collaboration environment and the legal distinction 
concerning bank status 
These new developments raised specific challenges for the banking industry from a legal 
perspective as new players had to be accommodated within the legal framework for financial 
services in order that customers were adequately protected in this new world of technology. 
 
19 E. Dunkley, 'UK banks seek to Zapp Apple with digital payment services', Financial Times, 7 July 2015 
<https://www.ft.com/content/4bc7b682-23e0-11e5-9c4e-a775d2b173ca> accessed 10 November 2016. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Dunkley, 'UK banks seek to Zapp Apple with digital payment services' (n 19). 
22 R. Williams, 'How to set up Apple Pay', The Telegraph, 14 July 2015 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/apple/11737576/How-to-set-up-Apple-Pay.html> accessed 10 
November 2016. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid.  
25 D. Drinkwater, 'RBS and NatWest to let mobile customers sign-in with biometrics', SC Magazine, 18 
February 2015 <https://www.scmagazineuk.com/rbs-and-natwest-to-let-mobile-customers-sign-in-with-




However, the distinct nature of m-payment transactions meant that the authorisation regime 
that was in place which allowed banks to carry out regulated activities as credit institutions 
was unsuitable for these new types of services.27 The stringent authorisation regime for banks 
would have stifled innovation in the m-payment market. A new authorisation regime was, 
therefore, developed by virtue of the PSR 2009 which transposed Directive 2007/64/EC, the 
first Payment Services Directive (‘PSD’), so that m-payment services were regulated, but 
might also be offered by mobile operators as an additional feature.28 Payment institutions 
(‘PI’s) have to adhere to those Regulations, which applied to banks, e-money issuers, 
building societies, money remitters, non-bank merchant acquirers and non-bank credit card 
issuers.29 They are, therefore, regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (‘FCA’).30 
Consequently, the legislation promoted consumer choice through increased 
competition and innovation; such an approach was also thought to be more appropriate since, 
unlike credit institutions, payment institutions are not allowed to engage in a broad range of 
business activities,31 such as, providing guarantees or taking deposits.32 By contrast, credit 
institutions can also be payment institutions, but not all payment institutions will be credit 
institutions.33 
 
27 FSMA 2000, s22 and Schedule 2; also see the FSMA 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order (Statutory Instrument 
2001/544), the FSMA 2000 (Carrying on Regulated Activities by Way of Business) Order 2000 (Statutory 
Instrument 2001/1177) and the FSMA 2000 (Carrying on Regulated Activities by Way of 
Business)(Amendment) Order 2014 (Statutory Instrument 2014/3340). 
28 Directive 2007/64/EC on payment services in the internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 
2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC, OJ L 319/1, Article 5. 
29 FSA, Payment Services Regulations, 2013 <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/doing/regulated/banking/psd> accessed 1 
April 2013. 
30 Ibid.  
31 FSA Handbook of the Electronic Money, paras 4.2.3, 4.3.2–4.3.7 and 6.9.1 
<http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/ELM/4> accessed 29 March 2013. 
32 P. Makin, ‘Regulatory Issues around Mobile Banking in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’. In OECD (eds), The Development Dimension ICTs for Development: Improving Policy 
Coherence (OECD Publishing, 2010) 145. 
33 Directive 2007/64/EC, paras 8 and 11. 
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As further discussed in section 4.3.3 below, the less interventionist PSR 2009 was 
replaced by the more forceful PSR 2017, which came into force on 13 January 201834 and 
transposed the Second Payment Services Directive 2007/64/EC (‘PSD2’).35 Both the PSR 
2009 and the PSR 2017 adopted a unified liability approach between the companies and the 
customer, which is aimed at fostering consumer protection by providing clearer and more 
accessible avenues of recourse for consumers and accountability for service providers. Yet, 
the PSR 2017 heightens consumer protection since it clarifies how liability is allocated when 
unauthorised transactions occur and thus it appears to promote a social welfare-based legal 
policy too. 
As noted in chapter 2, it is not only m-payment customers who may be responsible for 
unauthorised transactions as they may also occur because of common security issues for 
which m-payment providers are to blame, or even third parties who helped to create the m-
payment infrastructure. Clarification of such liability sues by the PSR 2017 signifies a slight 
shift towards a more social welfare-oriented model of consumer protection. The PSR 2017 
further extended the definition of payment institutions by including third party payment 
providers (‘TPPs’).36 In doing so, producerist policy objectives have found their way into the 
PSR 2017 as more participants can enter the market, thus promoting business interests.  
 
34 Explanatory Memorandum to the Payment Services Regulations 2017, 1-6, 1 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2017/752/pdfs/uksiem_20170752_en.pdf> accessed 15 December 2017. 
35 Directive 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment 
services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation 
(EU) No. 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC (Text with EEA relevance) (‘PSD2’) entered into 
force on 12th January 2016 and has to be implemented by Member States within two years: European Banking 
Authority, 'Consultation on the Guidelines on the criteria on how to stipulate the minimum monetary amount of 
the professional indemnity insurance under PSD2', 22 September 2009 <https://www.eba.europa.eu/news-
press/calendar?p_p_id=8&_8_struts_action=%2Fcalendar%2Fview_event&_8_eventId=1586016> accessed 10 
September 2016. 
36 TPPs fulfil either the role of a payment initiation services provider ('PISP') or an account information service 
provider ('AISP'). They thus create the Application Programming Interface ('API') which establishes the 
requisite connection to link merchants with banks. Hence, these TPPs deal with mobile payments and have 
direct access to customers’ bank accounts: European Commission, 'Payment Services Directive: frequently 
asked questions.' Brussels, 8 October 2015, 1-8, 3. 
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A neoliberal, consumer choice stance can also be seen from the expansion of a 
regulatory regime for e-money institutions.37 As discussed in chapter 1, mobiles can function 
as e-wallets in terms of carrying e-money. This facilitates the use of prepaid cards which can 
be stored on a phone. In the UK, businesses that provide this function have been empowered 
to enter the market by the authorisation system made possible by Art.8 of Directive 
2000/46/EC concerning the taking up, pursuit of and prudential supervision of the business of 
e-money institutions ('the first Electronic Money Directive 2000'), which permitted a waiver 
in relation to some or all provisions of the Directive if certain conditions were met.38 These 
were implemented in the UK by virtue of the Electronic Money (Miscellaneous 
Amendments) Regulations 2002, which made changes to the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000.39  
The first Electronic Money Directive 2000 was, however, replaced by Directive 
2009/110/EC on the taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the business of e-money 
institutions (‘the second Electronic Money Directive’). The capital requirements were 
lowered40 and laxer regulatory conditions were introduced for so-called small e-money 
issuers.41 In the UK, these changes were given effect by the Electronic Money Regulations 
2011 (‘EMR 2011’), as further discussed in sections 4.2.4.1 and 4.2.4.2 below.42 A less 
 
37 Electronic Money (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2002, Regulation 21(a); Payment Service 
Regulations 2009, Regulation 2(1); also see Directive 2006/48/EC relating to the taking up and pursuit of the 
business of credit institutions, Article 4 explains that a credit institution means ‘(a) an undertaking whose 
business is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account; 
or (b) an electronic money institution within the meaning of Directive 2000/46/EC’; also see Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000 (Prescribed Financial Institutions) Order 2013, Regulation 1(2). 
38 First Electronic Money Directive 2000, Article 8(1)(a)-(c). 
39 I. Lloyd, Information Technology Law (7th ed, OUP 2014) 460. 
40 Directive 2009/110/EC on the taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the business of electronic 
money institutions (the second Electronic Money Directive), Regulation 19. 
41 HM Treasury, 'Laying of regulations to implement the new E-Money Directive, a consultation document.' 
October 2010, 1-112, 10 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/81328/emoney_directive_consu
ltation.pdf> accessed 10 September 2016. 
42 (SI 2011/99); FCA n 3. 
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stringent authorisation regime has been adopted which favours a neoliberal vision of 
consumer protection.43 
Until 12 July 2018, e-money institutions were permitted to issue e-money and also 
offer m-payment services44, even if they were not registered or separately authorised under 
the PSR 2009.45 Under the PSR 2009, authorisation by the FCA for e-money institutions did 
not require separate authorisation for payment service purposes. However, this is no longer 
possible under the PSR 2017.46 Instead, the PSR 2017 requires compliance with the PSD2 in 
that e-money institutions must apply for re-authorisation.47 Initially, the law was driven by a 
neoliberal emphasis on market considerations, mainly to realise economic efficiency and 
development. However, the adoption of the PSR 2017 signals a slightly more interventionist 
social welfare approach in terms of the regulation of the m-payment market, thus consumer 
protection interests are being increasingly given prominence as the technology and services 
available, and so too the inherent risks to customers, grows. As a result, mobile financial 
services providers now have to be granted authorisation.48  
The EMR 2011, PSR 2009 and PSR 2017 recognise that m-payments are different in 
scope than the general payment services currently provided by banks via the use of mobiles, 
as discussed in the introduction.49 The term ‘mobile’ deals with the medium of delivery and 
whether or not an institution is a bank will depend on the functions and services it provides.50 
 
43 FSMA 2000, ss40-41; see esp. FSMA (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 (Statutory Instrument 2001/544), s4; 
also see Directive 2000/46/EC on the taking up, pursuit of and prudential supervision of the business of 
electronic money institutions (the first Electronic Money Directive 2000), para.7 of the preamble; A. Murray, 
Information Technology Law: The Law and Society (3rd ed, OUP 2016) 530. 
44 FCA, 'Authorised electronic money institution (authorised EMI)', 22 September 2017 
<https://www.fca.org.uk/authorised-electronic-money-institution-authorised-emi> accessed 15 December 2017. 
45 FCA n 3. 
46 FCA n 44. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s19(1). 
49 OECD, ‘Report on Consumer Protection in Online and Mobile Payments’, 17 August 2012, 1-45, 8. 
50 FCA, 'Payment Services and Electronic Money - Our Approach, The FCA’s role under the Payment Services 
Regulations 2017 and the Electronic Money Regulations 2011', September 2017, 1-237, 23. 
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The distinction between a bank, a payment institution and an e-money institution, therefore, 
depends on the range of regulated activities which the particular institution pursues.51  
For example, if an institution provides deposit-taking, whether via a high street 
branch, mobile, internet or telephone, it is, arguably, a ‘bank’ for the purposes of Part IV of 
the FSMA 2002 and the Banking Act 2009, s2 (which is the relevant definition of ‘bank’ 
adopted for the purposes of this work).52 It must therefore seek authorisation from the 
Prudential Regulation Authority (‘PRA’) for deposit-taking activity.53 The fact that a 
payment is made via a mobile, rather than through conventional methods, does not mean that 
the service should fall outside the package of services one ordinarily associates with what 
banks do, i.e. making and collecting payments on behalf of their customers.  
However, at present, an exception has been permitted for payment and e-money 
institutions which results in m-payments being afforded special status.54 M-payments made 
through payment institutions or with e-money from e-money institutions are not deemed to 
constitute deposit taking; these institutions are thus not equivalent to banks.55 Ordinarily, 
deposit-taking denotes paying money to a financial institution for it to hold and generate 




52 E.P. Ellinger et al, Ellinger's Modern Banking Law (5th ed, OUP 2011) 79&90. 
53 A. Hill-Smith, Consumer Credit: Law and Practice (2nd ed, Routledge 2015) 38. 
54 P. Delimatsis and N. Herger, Financial Regulation at the Crossroads: Implications for Supervision, 
Institutional Design and Trade (Kluwer Law International 2011) 349. 
55 Ibid. 
56 A.K. Kashyap et al, ‘Banks as liquidity providers: An explanation for the coexistence of lending and deposit‐
taking’ (2002) The Journal of Finance 57(1), 33-73, 33. 
57 Delimatsis and Herger n 54, 349. 
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4.2.2 Communications companies and the furtherance of a consumerist policy 
orientation to facilitate entry by third parties 
 
As noted above, UK legislation has been adopted which has paved the way for mobile phone 
operators to enter the payments market, so long as they obtain the necessary e-money 
institution or payment institution authorisation. Mobile service operators which enter the m-
payment market may, therefore, compete with banks.58 One of the key areas pertaining to m-
payments is access and the interoperability between different electronic communications 
services.59 Electronic communications services include those which consist wholly or mainly 
in the conveyance of signals on electronic communications networks.60  
As m-payments depend on mobile phone services, including internet access, problems 
may arise when operators have undue market dominance.61 In other words, consumer choice 
may suffer in the neoliberal sense as there will be decreased competition. Hence, the EU 
regulatory framework for electronic communications places the notion of significant market 
power (i.e., having a 25% market share)62 at its heart within both the Access63 and 
Framework Directives.64 Access has been emphasised, i.e., ‘the making available of facilities 
 
58 Communications Act 2003, s151; see also Eur-Lex, 'Access to electronic communications networks', 10 
September 2015 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Al24108i> accessed 10 
November 2016. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Directive 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and 
services (‘Framework Directive’), Article 2(c). 
61 Eur-Lex n 58. 
62 Commission guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under the 
Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, para. 3, Official 
Journal C 165, 11/07/2002 P. 0006 - 0031. 
63 Directive 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and 
associated facilities (‘Access Directive’). Further amendments were made to the framework with the 
introduction of Directive 2009/140/EC amending Directives 2002/21/EC, Directive 2002/19/EC, and Directive 
2002/20/EC, which amended both the Access and Framework Directive. 
64 The Framework Directive. 
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and/or services, to another undertaking, under defined conditions, on either an exclusive or 
non-exclusive basis, for the purpose of providing electronic communications services’.65 
Access is defined very broadly and includes access to physical infrastructure, software 
and virtual network services as well as interconnectivity as a ‘specific type of access 
implemented between public services operators’.66 Interoperability is expressly recognised in 
order to enhance freedom of choice for end users.67 Consequently, the neoliberal notion of 
‘consumerism’ discussed in chapter 3 is powerfully promoted. 
In the UK, the Framework and Access Directives were transposed through the 
Communications Act 2003, the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) 
Regulations 2003 and the Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006.68 An underlying policy objective is 
to promote an open and competitive market for electronic communications networks, services 
and associated facilities in line with the proposals of the 2000 Communications White Paper 
– A New Future for Communications (Cm 5010).69  
This market-based approach is clearly illustrated by the Office of Communications 
(‘OFCOM’) being entrusted with ensuring adequate and fair competition between the 
communication entities within these various market sectors.70 As the national regulatory body 
for the communication industries, including the telecommunications spectrum, OFCOM 
enhances the interests of the public, including consumers, by fostering competition in a 
 
65 Access Directive, Article 2(a). 
66 Access Directive, Article 2(b). 
67 Access Directive, Recital 9 of the Preamble. 
68 Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 'Implementing the revised EU Electronic Communications 
Framework, Impact Assessment', April 2011, 1-204, 8 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/77643/Implementing_revised_E
U_ElectronicCommunicationsFramework_IA.pdf> accessed 10 November 2016. 
69 Framework Directive; Communications Act 2003, Article 7, Explanatory Notes, 4 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/21/notes/division/2> accessed 10 November 2016. 
70 O. Boyd-Barrett, Communications Media, Globalization, and Empire (John Libbey Publishing Ltd 2016) 192. 
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neoliberal fashion.71 It does so by regulating ex ante, whether market participants have 
significant market power.72 
For this purpose, a non-discrimination obligation is contained in s. 87(6)(a) of the 
Communications Act 2003 which permits OFCOM to impose ‘a condition requiring the 
dominant provider not to discriminate unduly against particular persons, or against a 
particular description of persons, in relation to matters connected with network access to the 
relevant network or with the availability of the relevant facilities’.73 If OFCOM determines 
that a provider has significant market power jointly or singularly in a particular market 
segment, it can impose extra conditions on the entity in order to realise adequate and fair 
competition.74 OFCOM also discharges its duties under the Competition Act 199875 by virtue 
of s371(1) of the Communications Act 2003. It may, therefore, be possible that, as mobile 
companies enter the payments market, competition law rules start to come into play that 
prevent market dominance and these laws may affect how m-payments operate in future. 
Consequently, active steps have been taken to remove market barriers for new entrants, thus 
promoting the neoliberal policy model and possibly heightening consumer risk, even as there 
is increased consumer choice.  
 
 
71 Competition and Markets Authority and the Office of Communications, 'Memorandum of understanding 
between the Competition and Markets Authority and the Office of Communications - concurrent competition 
powers’, 2 February 2016, 1-21, 6 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/502645/Ofcom_MoU.pdf> 
accessed 10 November 2016. 
72 Communications Act 2003, ss79-93; M. Feintuck and M. Varney, Media Regulation, Public Interest and the 
Law (2nd ed, Edinburgh University Press 2006) 68. 
73 W. Lemstra and W.H. Melody, The Dynamics of Broadband Markets in Europe: Realizing the 2020 Digital 
Agenda (CUP 2015) 184. 
74 Boyd-Barrett n 70, 192. 
75 See also Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Articles 101-102. 
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4.2.4 Electronic money, m-payments and addressing the risk which arise from third-
party collaboration 
As noted above, transactions using electronic money (‘e-money’)76 on mobiles are another 
potential growth area for m-payments which are becoming a salient feature of mobile 
financial services in the UK.77 E-money need not be held on mobiles and can be kept on 
servers and prepaid cards, or transferred through web-based providers, e.g., PayPal.78 That 
means that e-money can be stored in digital, electronic, mobile or virtual wallets.79 
 
4.2.4.1 The Electronic Money Directive 2009: An authorisation framework to promote 
third-party collaboration within the emerging m-payment space 
In light of global industry trends, the UK implemented the Electronic Money Directive 
200980 through the EMR 2011. These Regulations create a new authorisation framework and 
rules of conduct for e-money institutions and issuers.81 They are intended to foster the 
development of secure and innovative e-money services, as well as competition, by enabling 
other companies to access the market and they are, therefore, critical to the future of m-
payments.82 E-money institutions are allowed to issue and administer not only e-money and 
store data, but also provide different business activities.83 The FCA further has to take into 
 
76 Directive 2007/64/EC on payment services in the internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 
2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC, Article 4(5). 
77 Masters and Moore n 6. 
78 J. Firpo, 'E-Money - Mobile Money - Mobile Banking - What's the Difference?', The World Bank, 21 January 
2009 <http://blogs.worldbank.org/psd/e-money-mobile-money-mobile-banking-what-s-the-difference> accessed 
10 November 2016. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Directive 2009/110/EC on the taking-up, pursuit and prudential regulation of the business of electronic money 
institutions amending Directives 2005/6-/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 2000/46/EC. 
81 Explanatory Memorandum to the Electronic Money Regulations 2011, No.99, 1. 
82 European Commission, ‘E-money’, 2013 <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/payments/emoney/> accessed 
28 May 2013. 
83 HM Treasury n 41.  
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account ‘the desirability of facilitating innovation in connection with the issuance of e-money 
and the provision of payment services.’84 Hence, the neoliberal concept of consumer 
economic interest appears to be the underlying objective behind these Regulations. 
A more updated definition was adopted for e-money, which includes value that is 
stored magnetically or on IT servers and plastic cards, for making payment transactions by 
legal and natural persons.85 Consequently, e-money denotes cash stored on electronic devices, 
including mobile phones.86 The ‘electronic money institution’ is regulated through a separate 
regulatory regime than a payment institution, discussed in section 4.3.3.87 Regulation 6 of the 
EMR 2011 sets out the conditions which have to be satisfied in order for authorisation to be 
granted. Regulation 6(5)(a)-(c) recognises the risks inherent in the use of e-money, even in 
m-payments, in order to protect consumers by requiring applicants to demonstrate that they 
have: 
a) robust governance arrangements for its electronic money issuance and payment 
service business, including a clear organisational structure with well-defined, 
transparent and consistent lines of responsibility; 
b) effective procedures to identify, manage, monitor and report any risks to which it 
might be exposed; and 
c) adequate internal control mechanisms, including sound administrative, risk 
management and accounting procedures. 
These measures must be comprehensive and proportionate to the nature, scale and complexity 
of the e-money to be issued and the payment services to be provided. The risks include 
 
84 Electronic Money Regulations 2011 (‘EMR 2011’), Article 47(2)(d). 
85 HM Treasury n 41, 6. 
86 European Commission n 82. 
87 HM Treasury n 41, 6. 
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settlement, operational, counterparty, liquidity and market risk, as well as financial crime 
risk, which are similar to the risks addressed by the PSR 2009.88 Similar conditions in 
relation to governance and risk are imposed on small e-money institutions seeking 
registration.89 However, as these rules are slightly more relaxed for smaller operators, one 
may conclude that the consumer protection interest was not considered as much a priority as 
the consumer economic interest. 
This does not mean that more social welfare-based consumer interests have been 
completely disregarded. New conditions were imposed in relation to redeeming and 
protecting customer funds, replacing provisions that were unclear in the First Electronic 
Money Directive 2000.90 For example, when funds are received, e-money had to be issued at 
par value without delay and the customer had to be able to redeem the e-money at any time at 
the par value.91 The agreement had to clearly spell out the conditions in relation to 
redemption and fees and the customer had to be informed of these prior to entering into any 
contract.92 In other words, a typical neoliberal approach of information disclosure is 
mandated which places an emphasis on enabling comprehension by a circumspect consumer. 
However, the consumer is still protected as redemption fees can only be charged in 
certain narrow circumstances;93 these have to be proportionate and commensurate to the 
actual costs.94 No time limit or interest can be imposed in relation to the right of redemption, 
 
88 FSA, 'Tracked changes version of the FSA's role under the Electronic Money Regulations 2011: Our 
approach', April 2013, 24 <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/international/draft-approach-emoney.pdf> 
accessed 1 April 2013. 
89 EMR 2011, Regulation 13. 
90 Directive 2000/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on the taking up and prudential supervision 
of the business of electronic money institutions; HM Treasury n 41, 6. 
91 EMR 2011, Article 39. 
92 EMR 2011, Article 40. 
93 EMR 2011, Article 41(1)(a)-(c). 
94 EMR 2011, Article 41(2). 
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redemption has to take place for amounts below €1095 and it is not possible to contract out of 
the provisions of the EMR 2011 (or the PSR 2017).96 The provisions in the EMR 2011 (and 
the PSR 2017) governing unauthorised e-money payment transactions cannot be excluded 
when an e-money issuer and an e-money holder or a payment service user enter into an 
agreement.97 Such social welfare requirements are essential in order to protect consumers 
against providers contracting out of statutory obligations, especially important rights, such as, 
redemption and refund. 
 
4.2.4.2 The regulation of e-money institutions 
Another indication of social welfare-based consumer protection interests being entrenched in 
the regulation of the e-money sector, despite the neoliberal objective to encourage new 
market entrants, is that prudential requirements will now apply to e-money institutions, 
whereas, in the past, all e-money institutions were exempted. However, the €150 storage limit 
for devices has been lifted.98 Consumers’ ability to store e-money on electronic devices is no 
longer curtailed despite the risk which comes with higher limits, a move that posits 
consumers as circumspect and responsible in a neoliberal sense. Not all prudential 
requirements are applied to small e-money institutions, i.e., those which have total liabilities 
of less than Euros 5 million within a six months period.99 This reflects the prevalence of 
neoliberal policy considerations which may compromise and subordinate consumer 
protection to the commercial needs and realities of operators, particularly, small institutions. 
 
95 FSA n 165, 7; see also EMR 2011, Article 45. 
96 EMR 2011, Article 73. 
97 Ibid. 
98 HM Treasury n 41, 17; also see Electronic Money Directive 2000/46/EC, Article 8 where the previous 
limitation of €150 was established. 
99 HM Treasury n 41, 6; HM Revenue & Customs, ‘Financial Services Authority to supervise small electronic 
money issuers’ <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/mlr/news/supervision-semi-fsa.htm> accessed 25 July 2013. 
198 
 
Banks and building societies have a separate authorisation regime from non-bank e-
money issuers but all institutions issuing e-money have to adhere to the same provisions 
relating to e-money issuance, redeemability, interest and complaints.100 This is based on the 
distinction drawn between issuance of e-money and deposit taking as regulated activities, 
with the former constituting a means of paying and not saving.101 Consequently, a less 
stringent approach has been permitted in order to promote business interests and a neoliberal 
policy objective. This permissive stance is visible in the exemption offered in respect of 
limited networks for a narrow group of services or goods or in relation to e-money in online 
accounts which are held on an electronic device or card.102 There is no definition for limited 
networks, but examples are single retailer cards, membership cards or vouchers.103 This 
definition is likely to cover banks which decide to venture into the issuance of e-money as 
part of their m-payment services and other potential m-payment providers, e.g., mobile 
companies. The issue then is that, due to the expected growth within the m-payments sector, 
it will become difficult to distinguish limited networks, which are exempt, and general 
purpose networks, which are not, and this makes consumers vulnerable.104 
 
4.2.4.3 Voluntary codes of conduct 
It is important that voluntary codes of conduct and/or statutory measures are adopted in order 
to safeguard customers who use limited networks. The adoption of voluntary codes of 
practice, as opposed to statutory measures, may be better until this new sector becomes more 
consolidated, so that innovation is not stifled.  
 
100 Ibid 7. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid 11. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid 12. 
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However, with a code, there is a problem with voluntary subscription.105 Those which 
do not subscribe to the code are not bound to follow it. For this reason, it is essential that 
statutory obligations are at least imposed on general purpose networks in order to protect 
customers, as well as financial stability. Hence, the OECD’s G20 High-Level Principles on 
Financial Consumer Protection must be honoured, as discussed in chapter 3. One way to 
achieve this is through requiring e-money institutions to comply with capital requirements, 
i.e., to have at all times at least €350,000 in order to comply with the funds requirement of 
paragraph 13 of Schedule 2.106 Customer funds are protected to a certain degree by such a 
requirement. 
The EMR 2011 further imposes requirements for safeguarding funds received in 
exchange for e-money which may be discharged through either option 1 or option 2.107 Under 
option 1, funds have to be segregated from other funds of the e-money institution. Under 
option 2, insurance cover or a guarantee from an authorised insurer or credit institution has to 
be obtained, so that the funds become payable in case of an insolvency event. A case in point 
is the HMV Rewards Scheme:108 The administration of HMV illustrates the risk still faced by 
consumers. When HMV went into administration, it was initially announced that customers 
could not redeem their gift and prepaid cards  because administrators normally were not 
obliged to honour these.109 The HMV case illustrates the complexities and problems with the 
 
105 E. Stokes, 'Double Movements in the Regulation of New Technologies: The Case of Nanotechnology'. In B. 
Lange et al (eds), Regulatory Transformations: Rethinking Economy-Society Interactions (Hart Publishing 
2015) 213. 
106 EMR 2011, Article 19. 
107 EMR 2011, Articles 20-22. 
108 J. Thompson, ‘U-turn on HMV gift cards as its survival hopes improve’, The Independent, 2013 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/uturn-on-hmv-gift-cards-as-its-survival-hopes-improve-
8460995.html> accessed 2 April 2013. 
109 Daily Record, ‘HMV customers furious as collapsed music chain refuse to honour vouchers and gift cards’, 
2013 <http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/uk-world-news/hmv-cutomers-angry-as-music-chain-1535990> 
accessed 28 May 2013. 
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use of e-money in the event of an issuer’s insolvency, which may constrain the extent to 
which a social welfare approach to consumer protection might be effected.110 
E-money issued by building societies and banks is not protected by the Financial 
Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) as it does not constitute deposit taking.111 Deposit 
taking denotes storing value, which is repayable as a debt, whereas e-money means buying a 
way to make payments.112 The FSCS will only apply to e-money if Article 9J of the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 is amended.113 An 
amendment would ensure that treatment of e-money in the UK is comparable to some 
European countries,114 but it would place a burden, particularly for low value transactions, on 
businesses.115 
This is likely to be of relevance for m-payments on two levels. Firstly, where new 
practices and systems are being developed, an overly strict regulatory regime may hinder 
innovation and limit the use of such practices. Secondly, where large sums of money are 
stored on a mobile, the risk of loss is high without statutory protection. Accordingly, the 
downside of this business-friendly approach is that customer protection is not maximised and 
consumers using these services are still at risk. Instead, the exclusion of e-money from the 
FSCS reflects a typical neoliberal approach which emphasises the disclosure of information 
by payment service providers to their customers so that they are informed of the risks 
involved. The provisions of the FCA’s BCOBS, which provide mandatory rules for the 
 
110 Deloitte, ‘HMV Administration-FAQ’, 2013 <http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_GB/uk/services/corporate-
finance/restructuring-services/updates-for-
insolvencies/hmv/4d244ad0cd24c310VgnVCM2000003356f70aRCRD.htm> accessed 2 April 2013. 
111 HM Treasury n 41, 13. 
112 FCA, The Perimeter Guidance Manual, Chapter 3A, Guidance on the scope of the Electronic Money 
Regulations 2011, 1-14, 11 <https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/PERG/3A.pdf> accessed 10 
November 2016. 
113 Ibid; E. Todoroki et al, Making Remittances Work: Balancing Financial Integrity and Inclusion (The World 
Bank 2014) 185. 
114 Several European countries have extended the financial services compensation scheme to e-money.  
115 HM Treasury n 41, 14. 
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conduct of banking business, further do not apply to the issuance of e-money,116 as BCOBS 
applies only to accepting deposits from banking customers.117 
Consumer protection is, therefore, not provided to customers of e-money institutions 
which do not fall within the PSR 2017 discussed below in section 4.3.3. 118 This is 
unfortunate, as Chapter 5 of the BCOBS, especially rule 5.11R (which renders banks liable 
for unauthorised payments) and rule 5.1.12R (which provides the liability of banking 
customers for unauthorised payments), as well as rules 5.12R-5.1.19R, contain similar 
provisions as Part 7 of the PSR 2017.119 The BCOBS, therefore, fails to address a lacuna 
within the law for e-money institutions and to mitigate against the risks which may arise, 
including the exclusion of e-money from the FSCS. It may, therefore, be concluded that a 
neoliberal vision still dominates and a more interventionist legal consumer protection 
measures should be enacted to regulate e-money. 
 
4.3.1 The sources of law which govern the rights and obligations of m-payment 
providers and their customers, including in respect of unauthorised m-payment 
transactions: 
The different sources of law which confer rights and obligations on m-payment providers and 
customers must be examined in order to explore the form of consumer protection framework 
that has been adopted for m-payment customers. Hence, the following sections analyse how 
various types of legislation have responded to the multiple risks involved, particularly 
 
116 A. Burrows, Principles of English Commercial Law (OUP 2015) 198. 
117 BCOBS 1.1.1R. 




unauthorised m-payment transactions, ultimately developing consumer protection in the UK 
according to a combination of neoliberal and social welfare principles. 
It is firstly discussed how contract and tort law apply to the m-payment context. Section 4.3.3 
analyses the rights and obligations of payment service providers and customers, particularly 
in respect of unauthorised m-payment transactions, under the old PSR 2009 and the new PSR 
2017, and how this has shaped the conceptualisation of consumers, i.e., either vulnerable or 
reasonably circumspect. Section 4.3.4 explores how the obligations contained in the PSR 
2009 and PSR 2017 have been further supplemented by the Financial Conduct Authority’s 
Banking Conduct of Business Sourcebook (‘BCOBS’) and the Standards of Lending 
Principles 2016.  
 
4.3.2 Contractual and tortious rights and obligations relevant to consumer 
understanding  
As with traditional banking, the relationship between m-payment providers and customers 
has been regulated by a mixture of contract law, implied terms120, consumer protection law, 
and other forms of regulation.121 Hence, while this relationship is largely based on contract, 
additional legal interventions bolster it. 122 Given that the new technologies involved in m-
payments carry an increased risk for the consumer, as discussed in chapter 2, these legal 
interventions potentially allow for significant protections as explored further below. 
 
120 CRA 2015, s49. 
121 A. Gkoutzinis, Internet Banking and the Law in Europe, Regulation, Financial Integration and Electronic 




Accordingly, the contractual agreements between the m-payment provider and 
customer do not overrule the pre-existing amalgam of tort law and contract law.123 They also 
do not overrule legislation such as the Payment Services Regulations 2009 (‘PSR 2009’) and 
the Payment Services Regulations 2017 (PSR 2017), discussed in section 4.3.3 below. 
Instead, the PSR 2009 and the PSR 2017, in fact, further define the m-payment provider’s 
duty of care and the customer’s corresponding ones. Gkoutzinis observes that the financial 
institution’s duty to exercise care and skill, including to maintain confidentiality and to 
protect data thus provide substantive bases for customer protection.124 He further adds that 
financial institutions have to maintain their networks and the available functionality 
infrastructure through strong security measures. Hence, a failure to provide a generally 
available technology, including security measures, would be tantamount to a breach of their 
duty of care. 
An important aspect of the duty of care is access control since this ensures data 
protection, banking confidentiality and prevents unauthorised transactions.125 M-payment 
providers are exposed to new liabilities arising from negligently processed payments or 
systems failures, including in respect of cybercrime, when providing m-payment services.126 
S13 of the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 (SOGSA) implies a duty to ‘carry out the 
service with reasonable care and skill’. Equally, s49 of the CRA 2015 (discussed in sections 
4.4.1 to 4.4.3 below) states the need to ‘perform the service with reasonable care and skill’.127 
Consequently, a customer can invoke this duty of reasonable care and skill based on the 
 
123 Contract and tort law, as well as equity and legislation, e.g., the CRA 2015, are equally applicable to the 
scope and application of the m-payment service agreement. 
124 Gkoutzinis n 121, 36-37. 
125 Ibid. 
126 J. O'Donovan, Lender Liability (Sweet & Maxwell 2005) 193. 
127 J. Poole, Casebook on Contract Law (13th ed, OUP 2016) Chapter 8. 
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contractual obligation derived from the agreement with the service provider (either under an 
express term or a term implied under s13 of SOGSA 1982 and s49 of the CRA 2015). 
However, given the complexity of the underlying technology, as discussed in chapter 
1, section 1.2, it is doubtful that contract law alone offers sufficient consumer protection. The 
PSR 2009 and the PSR 2017, as well as other legislation, such as, the Data Protection Act 
1998 (which was replaced by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on 25 May 
2018, discussed in section 4.5.5), have further helped to shape the duty of care in the m-
payment context. These laws put forward a particular conceptualisation of the consumer, as 
discussed in chapter 3. The analysis of the different sources of law and regulations indicates 
that a social welfare-based notion of consumer protection has been consistently embedded in 
such legislation. Such an approach helps m-payment customers overcome otherwise 
insurmountable legal obstacles, e.g., providing evidence as to why an unauthorised 
transaction has occurred. The adoption of these statutes appears to be better for realising 
consumer protection than through contract law alone as the legislation fleshes out the 
contractual duty of care, particularly what is expected of m-payment providers in order to 
mitigate the risk to customers who use m-payments. It is harder for m-payment providers to 
circumvent their obligations through exemption clauses.128 
The next section provides an overview of the old PSR 2009 and the new PSR 2017 in 
order to scrutinise the type of consumer protection frameworks that these laws stipulate and 
the way in which they conceptualise the consumer. 
 
 
128 R. Kidner, Casebook on Torts (12th ed, OUP 2012) 166. 
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4.3.3 The PSR 2009 and the PSR 2017: Liability frameworks to regulate unauthorised 
transactions and address security and technological risks, including from third-party 
collaboration  
The extension of the payment services system to mobile ICT raises some difficult questions 
in relation to the allocation of liability arising from the inherently heightened technological 
and operational risks, particularly in relation to unauthorised m-payment transactions, as 
discussed in chapter 2. In this context, the old PSR 2009 and the new PSR 2017 are 
particularly pertinent since they spell out the initial and currently applicable statutory regime 
for m-payments. As mentioned above, the PSR 2017 transposes the PSD2 into UK law. 
Whilst it would exceed the scope of the thesis to scrutinise all of the provisions of the PSR 
2017, a broad overview is given, with particular emphasis being placed on the evolution of 
the liability regime relevant to m-payments services. 
Under the PSR 2017, a register of all institutions and agents is required to be kept.129 Part 
1 of Schedule 1 of the PSR 2017 delineates which activities constitute payment services and 
Part 2 details activities that do not. Paragraph 1(a) to (h) of Schedule 1 lists the following 
seven kinds of activities which are considered payment services if they are pursued as part of 
a regular occupation or business activity: 
• Services enabling cash to be placed on a payment account. 
• Services enabling cash withdrawals from a payment account. 
• Direct debits, payment transactions through a payment card or similar device and 
credit transfers, including standing orders. 
 
129 PSR 2017, Regulation 4. 
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• Direct debits, payment transactions through a payment card or similar device and 
credit transfers where the funds are covered by a credit line. 
• Issuing payment instruments or acquiring payment transactions. 
• Money remittance. 
• Execution of payment transactions where consent has been given through a 
telecommunication, digital or IT device.  
• Account information services.  
Hence, m-payments fall within the scope of the definition for payment services. 
 
 
4.3.3.1 Technological risks and security and the role of risk management 
Authorised institutions had to demonstrate under the PSR 2009 that risk was being properly 
managed through the adoption of internal control mechanisms130 which, as noted in chapter 2, 
acknowledges that m-payments pose additional security risks.131 This led to the PSR 2017 
imposing more stringent payment security obligations than the PSR 2009. For example, 
payment service providers have to furnish a security policy, which consist of a 
comprehensive risk analysis, and they have to explain how fraud is being combated and 
personal and sensitive data kept secure.132  
 
130 PSR 2009, Regulation 6(5). 
131 S. Padmalatha and J. Paul, Management of Banking & Financial Service (2nd ed, Pearson 2010) 500. 
132 Payments UK, 'The Second Payment Services Directive (PSD2)', July 2016, 1-20, 12 
<http://www.paymentsuk.org.uk/sites/default/files/PSD2%20report%20June%202016.pdf> accessed 10 
September 2016: See, e.g., PSR 2017, Regulation 98.  
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In addition, incident management processes have to be implemented in order to detect 
and classify security and operational incidents.133 Statistical data about fraud and details 
about mitigation measures, as well as up-to-date security and operational risk assessments 
have to be provided to regulatory authorities on an annual basis.134 When a major security or 
operational security event takes place, regulators have to be promptly notified and when 
customers are affected, they have to be alerted.135 
The PSD2 mandated that the European Banking Authority ('EBA') must publish 
regulatory technical standards on strong customer authentication and secure communications 
by the beginning of 2017 and UK payment service providers had to comply with the PSR 
2017.136 When payment service providers fall short of these regulatory technical standards, 
liability does not rest with the customers (subject to the exceptions in the case of fraud or 
gross negligence by the consumer).137 Such an approach to loss allocation is reflective of an 
acknowledgement that m-payments are a technology-driven system and that losses are most 
likely best reduced by the respective operators, as discussed in chapter 3, section 3.4.138 
Further, a party, e.g., a merchant who does not provide strong customer 
authentication,139 will incur liability for any unauthorised payments.140 Accordingly, the PSR 
2017 renders payments more secure since payment service providers have to demonstrate that 
they have adopted adequate measures to protect their customers against the heightened risk of 
 
133 PSR 2017, Regulation 99.  
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid. 
136 European Banking Authority, 'EBA seeks input on strong customer authentication and secure communication 
under PSD2', 8 December 2015 <https://www.eba.europa.eu/-/eba-seeks-input-on-strong-customer-
authentication-and-secure-communication-under-psd2> accessed 10 September 2016. 
137 Payments UK n 132, 12. 
138 R.J. Mann, 'Making Sense of Payments Policy in the Information Age' (2005) Georgetown Law Journal 93, 
633-673, 638. 
139 PSR 2017, Regulation 100. 
140 Payments UK n 132, 12. 
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these new technological advances, including providing strong customer authentication, and 
those measures are also scrutinised by the regulator. 
These regulatory requirements, heightened by the PSR 2017, thus provide increased 
customer protection in this new technological milieu which seemingly adopts a social welfare 
policy model via regulatory technical standards that are more interventionist in nature than 
voluntary codes of conduct. Although it could be argued that the PSR 2017 continues to focus 
on the consumer economic interest, this interpretation fails to account for the enforced 
allocation of liability to service providers in the event of a failure to comply or the imposition 
of regulatory scrutiny and monitoring by the state. Many of the provisions serve dual 
purposes in that they strengthen the industry itself through building consumer trust and 
confidence as well as protect consumers from the worst risks of m-payment technology, such 
as, fraud.  
Indeed, Chapter 3 has confirmed that ICT standards are an important means to 
heighten consumer protection.141 The PSR 2009 was not as prescriptive in this regard and 
more neoliberal in that it was intended to develop the market. However, under the PSR 2017, 
social welfare considerations, such as, protection against fraud, are much more prevalent. 
This perhaps represents a shift based on the progress of technology and the growth in number 
of these types of transactions.142 Whilst it is not possible to cover every single aspect of a 
payment service transaction, the subsequent sections focus on issues of information 
asymmetry, unauthorised payments, whether by the m-payment provider or a third party, and 
complaints/dispute resolution and the ways in which the regulations aim to protect consumers 
and/or develop the market in terms of these issues. 
 
141 J. Winn and N. Jondet, 'A "New Approach" to Standards and Consumer Protection' (2008) Journal of 
Consumer Policy 31, 459-472, 459. 
142 A. Ashta, ‘Evolution of Mobile Banking Regulations: A Case Study on Legislator’s Behavior’ (2017) 




4.3.3.1 Issues of information asymmetry and consumer understanding 
The problem of information asymmetry between payment service providers and customers 
has been legally addressed as customers must be provided with information before they enter 
into payment service contracts and framework contracts143 and information must be 
communicated in easily understandable language.144 Under the PSR 2009, it was up to the 
payment service provider to establish that a service user had not given his authority for a 
transaction, or to show that the payment transaction was incorrect or a payment was the result 
of technical problems.145 PSR 2017 goes further by requiring the correction of the error and 
providing that consumers should be better informed of, and able to enforce, their rights.146  
Accordingly, the burden of proof fell on the payment service provider and not the customer. 
Consumer social welfare is thus being promoted since customers do not have to overcome 
insurmountable evidential issues when legally challenging payment service providers. 
Moreover, a recorded payment is not sufficient to establish the authenticity of the transaction 
or that the payer acted fraudulently or with gross negligence.147 In other words, payment 
service providers cannot easily argue that their customers were to blame. Under the PSR 
2017, customers also receive similar protection, giving consumers a greater sense of safety.148 
 
 
143 PSR 2017, Part 6. 
144 PSR 2017, Regulation 55. 
145 PSR 2017, Regulation 60. 
146 Ibid. 
147 PSR 2017, Regulation (3)(a)-(b). 
148 See, e.g., PSR 2017, Regulation 137. 
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4.3.3.2 Security and unauthorised payments, whether by the bank or a third party 
Under the now repealed Regulation 61 of the PSR 2009, payment service providers had to 
refund the unauthorised amount or restore the debited amount. Furthermore, customers were 
required to pay no more than £50 where the payment instrument had been lost or stolen, or 
they had not kept their personalised security feature safe.149 Such an approach protected 
vulnerable m-payment customers to a reasonable extent as payment service providers were 
responsible for refunding the customer the full amount,150 so long as the claim was made 
within eight weeks.151 This did not apply to cases of fraud, however, or where the customer, 
with intent or gross negligence, had not complied with Regulation 57. This Regulation 
required adherence to the terms and conditions and reporting of any loss, theft, appropriation 
or unauthorised use of the payment instrument without undue delay.152 The meaning of 
‘undue delay’ was not, however, defined by the PSR 2009, and Regulation 57 did not apply 
to payments relating to the use of a credit card.153 
A balance was, therefore, struck under the PSR 2009. On the one hand, the customer 
was required to discharge certain duties and act at least in a reasonably circumspect fashion, 
thus a neoliberal attitude to the individual was adopted. On the other hand, they had a right to 
a refund in cases of theft, loss or the failure to keep security features safe. For example, an 
error on the customer’s part in terms of safeguarding his/her personalised security feature and 
device did not bar them from seeking a refund from their bank,154 with their liability being 
capped at £50. This appeared to promote a social welfare-based model of consumer 
protection. However, a failure to adhere to terms and conditions with gross negligence 
 
149 PSR 2009, Regulation 62. 
150 PSR 2009, Regulation 63. 
151 PSR 2009, Regulation 64(1). 
152 PSR 2009, Regulation 62(2). 
153 PSR 2009, Regulation 52. 
154 PSR 2009, Regulation 58(2).  
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operated as an exemption.155 The customer’s right to a refund was thus not unlimited. 
Otherwise, business interests would not be adequately protected and, as is often the case, UK 
law aims to create a balance between neoliberal and social welfare principles.  
There is some material similarity between the PSR 2017 and the PSR 2009. For 
instance, the PSR 2017 retains the ‘gross negligence’ exemption in Regulation 77 (3) (b). The 
exclusion of the payment service provider’s liability in situations of ‘gross negligence’ by the 
payment service user raises a definitional issue. It is the researcher’s view that what may be 
considered a grossly negligent failure to adhere to terms and conditions has not been 
adequately explained. A lack of clarity in terms of the meaning of ‘gross negligence’ is 
problematic as it offers the potential for abuse, with m-payment providers reneging on their 
responsibilities.  
The PSR 2017 also provides customers with a right to an automatic refund within 
eight weeks, starting on the date when the funds were taken, even in circumstances where the 
facts giving rise to the refund are disputed.156 In addition, aside from cases of gross 
negligence or fraud, the PSR 2017 has reduced the liability of payers who are required to pay 
no more than £35.157 Hence, consumers do not stand to lose a lot when unauthorised payment 
transactions are made and the risks posed by m-payments services are legally mitigated. 
As with the PSR 2009, a customer is entitled under the PSR 2017 to bring legal action 
when s/he suffered losses due to a payment institution acting without their permission.158 A 
customer can also pursue proceedings against a payment service provider for failing to 
 
155 PSR 2009, Regulation 60(3). 
156 PSR 2017, Regulation 79; Payments UK n 132, 9. 
157 PSR 2017, Regulation 77. 
158 PSR 2017, Regulation 21. 
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comply with safeguarding requirements.159 They further have the right to bring action when a 
payment service provider fails to comply with requirements concerning single payment 
service contracts, framework contracts, common provisions or the authorisation or execution 
of payment transactions on their time and value date and this has caused them a loss.160 For 
instance, they can argue that a payment provider’s failure to credit the amount stated in a 
payment order by the end of the business day has been detrimental.161 Such an approach is 
actually quite social welfare-centred and paternalistic in its conceptualisation of the consumer 
as someone needing state protection since it is premised on the assumption that the consumer 
is either unaware of where their interests lie or unable to act independently to protect them. 
The overarching approach of the PSR 2017 nevertheless highlights a neoliberal pro-
business policy orientation. It raises the possibility of a hybrid approach whereby neoliberal 
ideals of competition and efficiency of markets requiring minimal state intervention are 
retained subject to the demands of consumer welfare considerations. This ‘mixed’ approach 
offers the flexibility to accommodate and respond to the rapid technological changes and, 
relatedly, the risks that come with mobile ICT, detailed in chapter 2, sections 2.2.1 to 2.2.3.  
The PSR 2009 did not fully shield vulnerable customers because it depended on the 
customer having to make a claim or to initiate legal proceedings which some may not be 
empowered to do. By contrast, the PSR 2017 furthers social welfare concerns more than the 
PSR 2009 since customers are granted the automatic right to a refund unless there is evidence 
of ‘gross negligence’ on the customers’ part.162 This greatly reduces the risk posed to 
customers using the new technology. Ashta welcomes the development as a natural 
development in the evolution of regulatory approach within the European Union, and regards 
 
159 PSR 2017, Regulation 23. 
160 PSR 2017, Part 6.  
161 PSR 2017, Regulation 86. 
162 PSR 2017, Regulation 79.  
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the new regulation as a first step rather than an end goal of regulation in this burgeoning area 
of technology.163 The principal reason for this view is simply that the technology itself is still 
at a relatively young stage by comparison to its potential. It is inevitable that these regulations 
will in time reveal their flaws and weaknesses and give rise to demands for reform and 
become outdated and will thus require revision in order to respond to new, as yet unknown, 
risks and challenges. Consumer attitudes will similarly develop with time.  
 
4.3.3.3 Complaints/dispute resolution  
Under the PSR 2009, there were differences in the complaints handling procedures between 
payment services providers and firms that carried out other regulated financial activities. 
While the latter had to record complaints, compile complaint statistics and publish complaint 
data, the former did not have to do this.164 However, businesses had to inform customers 
about their complaint procedures. The Financial Ombudsman Service (‘FOS’) further enabled 
customers to resolve complaints about payment services informally and out of court.165 
Consumer protection interests were thus slightly watered down due to the laxer complaints 
handling procedures for payment service providers; hence, a more neoliberal promotion 
consumer economic interests occurred. Indeed, new entrants into the market were not 
overburdened, but, in fact, treated less strictly. Nevertheless, the requirement to adopt 
complaints procedures and the ability to escalate complaints to the FOS without any legal 
fees reflects that social welfare-based consumer protection interests were not ignored. 
 
163 Ashta n 142. 
164 FSA, ‘The FSA's role under the Payment Services Regulations 2009: Our approach’, 2012, 108-109 
<http://www.fca.org.uk/static/fca/documents/fsa-psd-approach-latest.pdf? accessed 28 May 2013.  
165 Ibid 108-110. 
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Under the PSR 2017, social welfare considerations are further heightened by setting 
out a clearer set of procedures for complaints handling.166  Payment service providers now 
have to adopt dispute resolution procedures and reply to complaints within fifteen business 
days.167 Where a complaint is upheld by the FOS, the FOS can award compensation of up to 
£150,000 to a consumer who has been deprived of money or for an investment loss or 
inconvenience, distress or other non-financial loss.168 This is likely to spur payment service 
providers to act with additional vigilance and due care when delivering m-payment services 
and thus mitigates the risk to consumers. 
In addition, private persons can, by virtue of s150 of the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (‘FSMA’), bring actions for any contraventions by an authorised 
institution which result in a loss.169 A ‘private person’ is defined under s3(1) of the FSMA 
(Rights of Action) Regulations 2001 as any person, who suffers a loss and the loss does not 
occur whilst he is pursuing a regulated activity or carrying on any business or acting as a 
shareholder.170 If a private person successfully establishes that a loss is due to such a 
contravention, damages may be awarded.171 
Customers may find it more practical to informally resolve complaints via the FOS 
since civil proceedings are costly and time-consuming.172 The option of alternative dispute 
resolution through the FOS enables customers to pursue their rights and hold service 
providers to account. This promotes a social welfare-based consumer protection interest by 
 
166 Payments UK n 132, 9. 
167 Ibid. 
168 FOS, Compensation, 2013 <http://www.financial-
ombudsman.org.uk/publications/technical_notes/compensation.html> accessed 28 May 2013. 
169 BCOBS, Schedule 5. 
170 Sivagnanam v Barclays Bank Plc (2015) EWHC 3985 (Comm). 
171 FSMA 2000, s138D; cf Sivagnanam v Barclays Bank Plc (2015) EWHC 3985 (Comm); B. Donnelly and J. 
Pratt, Mis-selling claims: Court of Appeal Guidance, Macfarlanes, 2010 
<http://www.inhouselawyer.co.uk/index.php/litigation-a-dispute-resolution/8274-mis-selling-claimscourt-of-
appeal-guidance> accessed 28 May 2013. 
172 G. Slapper and D. Kelly, English Legal System 2009-2010 (8th ed, Routledge-Cavendish 2009) 183. 
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making the rights and protections available to consumers more tangible and easily accessible; 
in many cases, the mere threat that a consumer can easily enforce against the provider will be 
sufficient to ensure compliance. Indeed, consumers do not have to rely on private ordering, 
which suggests a dilution of a neoliberal approach being pursued. The majority of m-
payments are likely to be low value transactions and thus a customer is less likely to wish to 
become involved in litigation given the stress, risk, and expense associated with this route.173 
In this respect, consumer protection, arguably, may not be as effective as expected and the 
risks posed by using technology for small transactions might still remain. 
 
4.3.3.4 The role of the payment systems regulator and the furtherance of the consumer 
protection rationale  
Customers are still indirectly protected since the Payment Systems Regulator (‘PS 
Regulator’)174 is equipped with various powers to enforce these Regulations, including the 
right to order financial sanctions.175 The objective of the PSR Regulator is threefold: 
Competition; innovation; and service user.176 To this end, it has a broad range of powers 
including the power to obtain information or documents,177 to conduct investigations178, and 
to enter premises under warrant.179 The existence of this office is indicative of an underlying 
policy of consumer protection as it provides a means of enforcement independent of 
complaints by affected consumers; the consumer interest is protected even where the 
 
173 F. Teruel, 'Low and Slow' Is How the Credit Card Fraudsters Roll', ThreatMetrix, 5 April 2018 
<https://www.threatmetrix.com/digital-identity-blog/fraud-prevention/low-and-slow-is-how-the-credit-card-
fraudsters-roll/> accessed 15 April 2019. 
174 Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, s40. 
175 PSR 2017, Regulations 108-117, particularly Regulation 85; see also BCOBS, Schedule 5.  
176 Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, s49. 
177 Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, s81.  
178 Ibid, ss83-84.  
179 Ibid, s88.  
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individual takes no action whatsoever to protect themselves. Paternalistic and interventionist 
legal regulations have thus been additionally adopted and thus promote social welfare 
considerations.  
Whilst monetary sanctions may potentially involve large sums of money, it is 
questionable as to whether they might provide sufficient deterrent for m-payment providers, 
particularly if the financial gains from breaches of the Regulations exceed the penalties.180 
For example, Norwich Union was fined £1.26 million in December 2007 for not properly 
organising its risk management system, which exposed customers to an increased risk of 
fraud, showing that financial institutions are willing to put consumers’ financial well-being in 
peril to make a profit.181 Thus a neoliberal-oriented concept of regulation might still be seen 
to be at play. This is because the provider may make the economic assessment that the 
payment of the fines is less costly overall than the implementation of a proper risk 
management system. This may lead to the consumer protection objective not being realised as 
the payment of the fine does not benefit the wronged consumer.  
Nonetheless, the PSR 2017 has created legal channels to protect customers and enable 
customers to enforce their rights and facilitate the resolution of complaints and disputes. 
There are, arguably, still issues in terms of the implementation of these procedures, especially 
in terms of more vulnerable customers or those facing errors in terms of smaller transactions. 
However, codes of conduct exist to shore up consumer protection, as discussed next. 
 
 
180 I. Walter ‘Conflicts of interest and market discipline among financial service firms’ (2004) European 
Management Journal 22(4), 361-376. 
181 FSA, ‘FSA fines Norwich Union Life £1.26m for exposing its customers to the risk of fraud’, 2007 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2007/130.shtml> accessed 29 March 2013. 
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4.3.4 Codes of conduct, consumer understanding and protection against unauthorised 
payment transactions  
The PSR 2009 was supplemented by the FCA’s Banking Conduct of Business Sourcebook 
(‘BCOBS’) and the voluntary Standards of Lending Practice 2016 for personal customers 
published by the British Bankers Association (‘BBA’). Schedule 6 of the PSR 2017 provides 
that any breach of these rules of conduct might give rise to an action for damages under s150 
of the FSMA 2000, thus giving the BCOBS some clout in terms of enforcement.  
As with the PSR 2009182 and the PSR 2017183, the BCOBS addresses the issue of 
information asymmetry. The BCOBS Handbook requires that adequate information is given, 
that the right method of communication is used, as well as the utilisation of simple and easily 
understood language.184 It further emphasises the importance of treating customers fairly, 
safeguarding their interests and providing for their informational needs, including ensuring 
that the material provided is ‘clear, fair and not misleading.’185 
As mentioned above, the complexity of the technology used in m-payment systems 
means that it is vital that m-payment providers make the nature of the risk and the rules 
involved clear in order to both protect and make liable the service’s end users. Customers 
should be given enough notice when terms and conditions are changed.186 Hence, service 
agreements have to adhere to these additional requirements. The BCOBS gives the customer 
some degree of rights where there has been a failure to provide necessary information about 
the specific application of the technology and systems involved and these rights may give rise 
to action for damages under s150 of the FSMA. 
 
182 PSR 2009, Part 59. 
183 PSR 2017, Part 6. 
184 BCOBS 4.1.1R. 
185 BCOBS 2.1.1G. 




4.3.3.1 Unauthorised payment transactions and how customers may still be vulnerable 
As pointed out in chapter 3, information disclosure by itself does not sufficiently safeguard 
consumers, especially vulnerable ones. A neoliberal approach assumes that customers are 
able to adequately utilise information, an assumption which behavioural economists strongly 
refute for a number of reasons as noted in chapter 3. 
However, the regulatory rules impose conditions to mitigate against the risk of 
unauthorised payments, whether by the financial institution or a third party, in pursuit of 
consumer protection: Refunds of unauthorised payments have to be issued ‘within a 
reasonable time’.187 The BCOBS reiterates the position taken in the PSR 2017, i.e., it states a 
cap of £35 on customers’ liability when their payment instrument is stolen or lost, or is not 
kept safe.188 This reinforces a more social welfare-based approach which limits the liability of 
the individual. A financial institution may only hold a customer fully liable for unauthorised 
payments for gross negligence and fraud, so business interests are also covered.189 In this 
way, a balance is seemingly struck between allowing for economic expansion and mitigating 
the risks of consumers via a combination of the neoliberal and social welfare models. 
 
 
187 BCOBS 5.1.11R. 
188 BCOBS 5.1.12R. 
189 BCOBS 5.1.12(2)R. 
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4.3.3.2 The Standards of Lending Practice 2016 and consumer understanding 
Apart from the BCOBS, the Standards of Lending Practice 2016 (‘SLP’), a voluntary code 
sponsored by the BBA and the UK Cards Association,190 apply to personal customers. The 
Lending Standards Board are responsible for the SLP.191 The SLP provides additional 
independent guidance and governs services with consumers, but it only deals with current 
account overdrafts, credit cards and loans.192 This means that the SLP has limited application 
since it arguably applies only to payment services, including m-payments, which involve the 
use of such credit facilities.  
As a voluntary code, the SLP is only binding to the extent that its members have 
subscribed to it.193 There are, however, no financial penalties or security consequences for a 
bank that is in breach of the code, other than censure from the Lending Standards Board 
itself.194 This code, therefore, constitutes an example of private regulation by the banking 
sector that is typical of the neoliberal approach discussed in chapter 3, section 3.4, as it 
favours individual autonomy and self-regulation.  
The extent to which a customer may rely upon the SLP in the case of disputes is of 
importance as it may be argued that a bank has acted against its own self-enforced rules of 
good practice. This may perhaps help to give rise to claims of negligence or a breach of 
contract. Voluntary codes, including the SLP, are not normally treated as implied terms, and 
 
190 Lending Standards Board, 'The Standards of Lending Practice, Personal Customers, July 2016, 1-12, 1 
<https://www.lendingstandardsboard.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Standards-of-Lending-Practice-July-
16.pdf> accessed 10 November 2016. 
191 The Prudential Regulation Authority (‘PRA’) and the Financial Conduct Authority (‘FCA’) replaced the FSA 
on 1 April 2013. See FSA, Regulatory Reform- background, 2013 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/what/reg_reform/background> accessed 1 April 2013; BBC, UK financial 
regulation overhauled, 2013 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-21987829> accessed 27 May 2013. 
192 Lending Standards Board, 'The Standards of Lending Practice', 2016 
<https://www.lendingstandardsboard.org.uk/the-slp/> accessed 10 November 2016; G.M. Andrews and R. 
Millett, Law of Guarantees (6th ed, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 573. 




therefore do not form part of the contract unless specifically incorporated.195 They mainly 
form part of the background of reasonable expectation by reference to which the court would 
interpret the contract.196 However, voluntary codes, such as, the SLP, have considerably less 
strength in that a bank may, from a risk management perspective, consider any cost of 
litigation which may arise from a breach of good practice could be less costly than 
implementing it. A bank may therefore choose to simply ignore the SLP. Nevertheless, as the 
SLP is not the only available tool within a matrix of regulatory measures to protect m-
payment customers, this may not be a serious issue in terms of consumer protection. Indeed, 
another important legal measure to shield m-payment customers is the law governing unfair 
terms and conditions, which is discussed next. 
 
4.4.1 The CRA 2015: Performance of a contract, unfair terms and consumer 
understanding 
Institutions set out the applicable terms and conditions for m-payments in a written contract. 
Freedom of contract bestows private autonomy and forms one of the backbones of a market 
economy.197 M-payment providers might limit their potential liability through tightly drafted 
m-payment service agreements which may reduce protection of consumers’ rights.198 
However, such a neoliberal approach is restrained by the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (‘CRA 
2015’) and the related case law which deals with unfair terms. It is, therefore, an expression 
of the social welfare consumer construct discussed in chapter 3, section 3.4. This section 
 
195 R. Shah et al, Something to Believe In: Creating Trust and Hope in Organisations: Stories of Transparency, 
Accountability and Governance (Routledge 2003) 155-156. 
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197 S. Grundmann and Y.M. Atamer, Financial Services, Financial Crisis and General European Contract Law, 
Failure and Challenges of Contracting (Kluwer Law International 2011) 56. 
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analyses the extent to which the CRA 2015 confers additional protection on customers who 
use new technologies. 
It is examined to which extent consumers can challenge unfair terms and conditions 
contained in their m-payment service agreements under the CRA 2015. In light of the case 
law, section 4.4 highlights the ways in which UK regulation of this market has tried to 
balance neoliberal principles involving the development of consumer choice and a free 
market with notions of social welfare.  
 
4.4.2 Contract law and tort law and the exclusion of liability 
As discussed in section 4.3.2, m-payment providers must provide services with reasonable 
care and skill.199 Reasonable care has to be taken when, e.g., carrying out an electronic 
payment order200 and other functions.201 While contractual liability arises from a breach of a 
term of the contract,202 tortious liability results from non-contractual wrongdoing, such as, a 
breach of a duty of care in common law negligence.203 This distinction is illustrated by Lord 
Scarman in Tai Hing Cotton Mill v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd204 where he stated that, “the 
parties’ mutual obligations in tort can[not] be greater than those to be found expressly or by 
necessary implication in their contract.”205  
 
199 See CRA 2015, s2(3); Overy v Paypal (Europe) Ltd [2012] EWHC 2659 (QB), [2013] Bus LRD1; Domsalla 
(t/a Domsalla Building Services) v Dyason (2007) EWHC 1174 (TCC), (2007) BLR 348; see also CRA 2015 
s49; Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982, s13 also implies a statutory duty to take care and skill, but this 
only applies to business to business dealings and not to business to consumer dealings.  
200 Royal Products v Midland Bank (1981) 2 Lloyds Rep 194, 198. 
201 J.S. Ziegel and S. Lerner, New Developments in International Commercial and Consumer Law (Hart 
Publishing 1998) 111. 
202 H. Beale et al, Contract: Cases and Materials (5th ed, OUP 2007) 3. 
203 C. Von Bar and U. Drobnig, The Interaction of Contract Law and Tort Law and Property Law in Europe: A 
Comparative Study (Sellier European Law Publishers 2004) 138. 
204 (1985) 2 All ER 947. 
205 Ibid 957-958. 
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Following this case, the scope of liability in m-payment service agreements cannot be more 
extensive in tort than in contract. Put differently, the contract defines the areas in relation to 
which a duty of care arises.206  
A duty of care in tort generally arises when the following three-stage test is met207: It 
must be reasonably foreseeable that the defendant's behaviour causes damage to the claimant. 
There must exist sufficient proximity between the claimant and the defendant. It must be just, 
fair, and reasonable to impose a duty. However, m-payment providers are likely to use terms 
governing liability, access and usability of services that are subject to caveats so that they do 
not breach their duty of care by providing customers a ubiquitous right to a fail-proof system. 
For example, m-payment providers may qualify twenty-four-hour access to services in m-
payment service agreements by stating exceptions, such as, updates, maintenance, cyber-
attacks and force majeure events. The case of Hedley Byrne v Heller208 highlights that it is 
possible to prevent the imposition of liability through the inclusion of a disclaimer, despite a 
finding of the common law duty of care having been breached.  
Nonetheless, m-payment providers cannot incorporate exemption or limitation clauses 
into m-payment service agreements which contravene the CRA 2015.209 Exemption clauses 
limit liability entirely while a limitation clause tries to restrict liability to a particular 
amount.210 S65(2) of the CRA 2015 provides that negligence liability cannot be excluded by 
a person merely agreeing to or knowing about such a term, or receiving a consumer notice. 
This includes secondary contracts,211 e.g., where a consumer has received the primary 
 
206 von Bar and Drobnig n 203, 203. 
207 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman (1990) UKHL 2. 
208 (1964) AC 465. 
209 Previously consumers were protected by virtue of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (‘UCTA’) and the 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (‘UTCCR’). However, the UCTA no longer governs 
business to consumer contracts, whilst the UTCCR is replaced in its entirety by the CRA 2015. 
210 K. Kuhnel-Fitchen and T. Hough, Optimize Contract Law (Routledge 2014) 76. 
211 CRA 2015, s72. 
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internet banking service agreement and, additionally, enters into a m-payment service 
agreement.  
Also, m-payment consumers do not only have to rely on negligence liability under the 
common law.212 They can additionally rely on s49 of the CRA 2015 which implies a duty to 
supply services with reasonable care and skill. This duty is similar to one of the requirements 
under the Islamic good faith principle not to sell a thing which is defective, as discussed in 
chapter 3, section 3.6.1. When this statutory duty is breached, the CRA 2015, s54(3) provides 
the rights to demand repeat performance and a price reduction. More importantly within the 
context of m-payments, s54(7) stipulates that the remedies include, for instance, to seek 
monetary compensation. A term can thus not be used to exonerate or limit a m-payment 
provider for breaching this duty under a service contract.213 Hence, the restriction or 
exclusion of remedies or rights is blacklisted.214 Anything which has been written or said 
about the service is also considered to form part of the contract, except when conditions have 
been included.215 Equally, under the Islamic good faith principle, discussed in chapter 3, 
section 3.6.1, anything said during the pre-contractual stage is taken into account.  
In the m-payment context, UK consumers are thus assured that negligence liability 
and the duty to supply the services with reasonable care and skill 216, e.g., due to an 
operational mistake, cannot be excluded. The statutory right to have the service performed 
with reasonable care and skill, along with the tortious common law duty of care, confers on 
customers a high amount of protection in the m-payment context, which indicates a furthering 
 
212 CRA 2015, s65(4)(b). 
213 CRA 2015, s57. 
214 CRA 2015, s57; Competition & Markets Authority, 'Unfair contract terms guidance, Guidance on the unfair 
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of a social welfare-based model of consumer protection. Accordingly, a m-payment provider 
must shoulder some negligence liability.  
Moreover, m-payment providers must also ensure that their contract terms and notices 
are prominent and transparent.217 They must be worded in intelligible and plain language, as 
they can otherwise be challenged under Part 2, s62 of the CRA 2015.218 These disclosure 
provisions are reflective of a market-based disclosure approach towards consumer protection, 
as e.g. advocated in the UN Guidelines on Consumer Protection, discussed in chapter 3, 
section 3.2. Nonetheless, the adoption of a fairness test in s62 tempers the classical 
assumption that a contract is a bargain between equals.219 It results in the unfair term in the 
consumer contract or the unfair consumer notice not binding the consumer,220 except if the 
consumer decides to rely on it.221  
The fairness test goes some way to protect vulnerable parties and to a certain extent 
helps to realise fair outcomes.222 The Law Commission explains that the main role of unfair 
terms laws is to avert that consumers face unfair surprises.223 However, such legislation is not 
meant to resolve all issues which arise from a market place, including those which are the 
result of the consequences of consumer's poor decision making.224 
As a result, the fairness test is not applied to all contract terms and notices and a term 
which is prominent and transparent225 and “specifies the main subject matter of the contract” 
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or to assess “the appropriateness of the price payable...by comparison with the services 
supplied...” is excluded.226 A prominent term is one which has been brought to an average 
“consumer's attention”227, namely one “who is reasonably well-informed, observant and 
circumspect.”228 The term or notice is transparent if it is written in plain and intelligible 
language and is legible.229   
Unfairness is found to exist when a term or notice is contrary to the notion of good 
faith and causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations under the 
contract to the detriment of the consumer.230 Courts consider “the nature of the subject matter 
of the contract”, “all the circumstances existing when the term was agreed” and “all of the 
other terms”231 and the non-exhaustive examples contained in Schedule 2.232  However, the 
CRA 2015 does not define good faith because this is a flexible concept.233 The UK approach 
reflects that English legislation has moved from the good faith principle to the principle of 
fairness when it comes to consumer protection, unlike the Islamic approach. 
In Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc,234 Lord Bingham 
observed that ‘good faith’ necessitates, ‘fair and open dealing’.235 He explained that ‘good 
faith’ requires terms to be stated in their entirety and in a legible and clear manner, without 
any traps.236 Onerous terms ought to be more prominent.237 A consumer who is in need, has 
no experience, is unfamiliar or has insufficient leverage to bargain should, furthermore, not 
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be exploited.238 However, subsequent cases have construed ‘good faith’ more narrowly and 
this might undermine consumer protection in the risk-filled world of m-payment 
transactions.239 Nonetheless, whilst under the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1999 it fell on the consumer to prove unreasonableness,240 it appears that it now 
falls on the court to determine whether a term should be considered fair, despite a consumer 
not having pleaded this.241 Such judicial oversight appears to be a proactive approach towards 
consumer protection. When comparing the Islamic good faith principle, discussed in chapter 
3, section 3.6.1, it becomes apparent that the CRA 2015 and the therein contained fairness 
test are much more sophisticated and effective in regulating exclusion of liability clauses.  
 
4.4.3 Possible issues with information disclosure and transparency and consumer 
understanding 
Vulnerable consumers may be insufficiently protected because information disclosure and 
transparency may be inadequate protection mechanisms. As discussed in chapter 3, 
behavioural science research confirms that providing information is not enough, as customers 
often agree to standard contract terms without reading the contract.242 However, as apparent 
from the analysis in the previous section, there are aspects of the CRA 2015 that go beyond a 
disclosure and transparency requirement which show some regard of social welfare 
considerations.243 In particular, the CRA 2015 provides dispute resolution mechanisms 
(which will be compulsory in the financial services sector) to make rights more easily 
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enforceable and therefore more meaningful for consumers.244 It has tightened the approach to 
unfair terms in service agreements where the consumer has little opportunity to negotiate to 
prevent abuse of this advantage by service providers.245  In contrast, the analysis of the 
Islamic consumer protection jurisprudence in chapter 3, section 3.6, has demonstrated that no 
effective rights and remedies have been developed for consumers to challenge unfair clauses 
in service contracts, including m-payment service contracts. 
 
4.4.4 Unauthorised payment transactions and ambiguous and unfair contract terms 
The CRA 2015 provides safeguards for consumers by construing any ambiguous terms in a 
way which favours the consumer,246 thereby retaining the approach taken in regulation 7(2) 
of the repealed Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (‘UTCCR’). The 
CRA 2015 lists various terms which may be deemed unfair247 and consumers may try to 
argue that some of these can be found in their m-payment service agreements. 
For instance, m-payment providers cannot include terms which effectively limit or 
exclude the legal rights of the consumer in an inappropriate manner, i.e., they cannot contract 
out of their statutory obligations, including those under the PSR 2017.248 However, the list of 
examples is not exhaustive. When such a term is found, it is not automatically deemed 
unfair.249 Instead, this is best conceived as a grey, rather than black, list of unfair clauses, 
which is very similar to that contained in the UTCCR, except that additional examples have 
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been included.250 Consequently, the examples indicate what may constitute prima facie cases 
of ‘significant imbalance’, though the courts may not necessarily consider any such term as 
causing a significant imbalance of information communication.251  
As observed by Jackson LJ, the scope of the duty of good faith is heavily dependent 
on the context and this may effectively undermine consumer protection and policy attempts 
to further social welfare in this area.252 For example, in West v Ian Finlay & Associates,253 
albeit a case that predates the CRA 2015, the court assessed whether a net contribution clause 
in a construction contract was fair. The Court of Appeal explained that, for a term to be 
deemed unfair and lacking in bad faith, mere imbalance was insufficient; there had to be a 
significant imbalance. O’Sullivan and Hilliard label this decision as ‘surprisingly hard-
nosed’.254 Given that a consumer generally has little, if any, opportunity for negotiation and 
has to accept contractual terms on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis, the court’s decision broadens 
the scope for service providers to take advantage of their position of power.255 Accordingly, 
consumers may find it challenging to argue that a term in a m-payment service agreement is 
unenforceable which gives power to businesses, promoting a neoliberal conception of the 
law. 
In respect of penalty clauses, i.e., a term ‘which has the object or effect of requiring a 
consumer who fails to fulfil his obligations under the contract to pay a disproportionately 
high sum in compensation’,256 the position is different.257 A term is a penalty clause when a 
secondary duty results in a detriment for the party who breaks the contract which is in excess 
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of what the innocent party legitimately expects to enforce its primary duty.258 This requires 
assessing whether any legitimate business interests are furthered and safeguarded by the term 
and whether the term is unconscionable, exorbitant and profligate.259 In the context of m-
payments, however, customers who fail to adhere to their secondary duties, e.g., failing to 
maintain up-to-date antivirus software, should not be penalised excessively. This furthers a 
social welfare-based conceptualisation of the consumer as vulnerable, rather than circumspect 
in accordance with neoliberal philosophy. It is also consistent with the limitation of liability 
imposed on the consumer to £35 except in a case of gross negligence under the PSR 2017.260 
Both provisions prevent liability being transferred to the consumer even in circumstances 
where the consumer may have agreed (albeit possibly unwittingly) to assume this.  
More extensive consumer protection is provided by the statutory obligations imposed 
on banks and payment institutions under the PSR 2017 than the common law. Under the 
common law, the consumer bears the burden of establishing the component elements of the 
tort of negligence in such situations, presenting evidential difficulties which would tend to 
undermine customer protection when using the new fiscal technologies.261 Statutory 
interventions, such as, the PSR 2017 reverse this position.262 Where the regulator finds a m-
payment provider liable for failing to comply with the PSR 2017 (for example because of 
insufficient security procedures as discussed above), that finding can be relied on by the 
consumer in mounting a challenge to ambiguous or unfair terms. 
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However, it may be argued that a term which permits m-payment providers to make 
subsequent changes to the ‘characteristics of the subject matter’ is an unfair term.263 For 
example, the terms and conditions for the Pingit app provided that Barclays can make ‘other 
small changes to the terms and conditions’ and that users, ‘who are not happy with these 
changes, [...] can cancel [their] registration or delete the app’.264 It is conceivable that a 
similarly worded term which permits not just minor but also more substantive changes may 
be challenged. Equally, a term which permits the unilateral alteration of the provision of m-
payment services without any good reason could be challenged by consumers.265 For 
example, changes which affect the free-standing rights of the consumer, such as, the right to a 
refund, may not be validly altered by the m-payment provider’s unilateral action. Similarly, a 
m-payment provider may not restrict or impose conditions upon its liability for either its own 
breaches or those of third parties which the m-payment provider relies upon to perform 
elements of the service promised to the consumer.266 These examples indicate that the CRA 
2015 provides customers with some protection from the risks of the new fiscal technologies, 
which promotes the social welfare model.267 
 
4.4.3.1 Potential problems with the CRA 2015: Permitting m-payment providers to exclude 
liability 
M-payment providers may counter-argue that none of the examples in Part 1 of Schedule 2 of 
the CRA 2015 are clearly laid out. If they can show that their terms specify the price or ‘the 
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main subject matter of the contract’, which are previously understood to be the contract’s 
core terms,268 consumers will not be able to challenge those terms. The underlying rationale 
for excluding the price and main subject matter of the contract from the purview of the CRA 
2015 is to prevent price and quality control.269 Burrows, however, comments that the ‘main 
subject’ exclusion is problematic as past case law highlights that it is difficult to determine 
what the substance of the contract is and this lessens consumer protection and social 
welfare.270 Equally, Lord Steyn commented in Director General of Fair Trading v First 
National Bank271 that, in the context of the UTCCR, there is a risk that ‘endless formalistic 
arguments’ may be pursued regarding whether a term is, in fact, a core term.272  
The same argument may be made about the CRA 2015, particularly in relation to 
what constitutes the subject matter of a contract. This effectively increases the legal risks for 
customers using m-payment technologies. It may be necessary to reconsider the traditional 
conception of ‘core terms’ to reflect the realities of the m-payment market and the concerns 
which may compel consumers to choose to take advantage of this technology. For example, a 
consumer may rely on representations made as to the security provisions put in place by the 
provider when choosing either to use the service or selecting between providers. From the 
consumer perspective, these terms may be more significant than those traditionally conceived 
as ‘core’ terms, such as, pricing and performance of the core obligation. It is important that 
consumers’ priorities and expectations when using m-payment services are taken into account 
in determining whether terms ought to be construed as core terms. Additionally, the strength 
of such arguments depends on previously decided cases where the courts have had to debate 
whether a term should be struck down because of perceived unfairness. Whilst the older cases 
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were decided under the repealed UTCCR, they are, nonetheless, indicative of the stance 
which courts may adopt in respect of the CRA 2015.273  
In this connection, the case of Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National plc and Others 
(‘Abbey National’)274 is particularly instructive. It dealt with the issue of the reasonable 
charges that banks might impose for providing banking services and, more particularly, when 
the customer overdraws on an account without a pre-arranged overdraft facility. The Office 
of Fair Trading (OFT)275 sought to challenge the imposition of charges on customers for 
using an unauthorised overdraft on the basis that the fees were disproportionate to the costs 
incurred by the banks and amounted to a penalty and were thus unlawful. The court at first 
instance held that the charges, while not penalties, could be challenged under the UTCCR. 
The Court of Appeal then affirmed that it had jurisdiction to determine whether or not the 
charges were fair. However, the Supreme Court held that neither the courts nor the OFT 
could consider whether the fairness of the term as it related to charges for provision of a 
service by the banks. The term thus fell within Regulation 6(2)(b) of the UTCCR and was a 
core term which could not be subject to scrutiny under the UTCCR. Lord Walker 
acknowledged that the ‘First National Bank shows that not every term that is in some way 
linked to monetary consideration falls within Regulation 6(2)(b). Paras (d), (e), (f) and (l) of 
the “greylist” in Schedule 2 to the 1999 Regulations are illustration of that’.276  
In the m-payment context, the same issue may arise when a customer seeks protection 
against unfair terms by relying on the CRA 2015. One may argue that certain terms cannot be 
challenged since they are not listed as examples in Schedule 2, Part 1 of the CRA 2015 and/or 
concern the price or govern the subject matter of the contract. The lack of clarity regarding 
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whether terms, particularly terms dealing with charges, are or are not core terms will pose a 
threat to consumer protection in the m-payment area.277 To this extent, the discussion below 
relating to cases involving terms which impose charges on one of the contracting parties will 
show how the CRA 2015 may assist in resolving disputes over such terms, particularly in the 
context of m-payment services, when these had not been satisfactorily addressed under the 
UTCCR.  
 
4.4.3.2 The Abbey National case: A liberal approach towards consumer welfare 
In Abbey National, the Supreme Court found that core terms were generally restricted to 
matters, e.g., the loan amount, overdraft and/or the interest. Other additional terms imposing 
charges were not necessarily core terms and could thus be scrutinised.278 However, it may 
prove more challenging to argue that terms dealing with, e.g., security of ICT systems, do not 
form part of the subject matter of a m-payment service agreement. It also appears more 
difficult to distinguish which terms fall within the purview of the subject matter and to 
distinguish core terms from non-core terms and terms concerning price. In this context, ‘core 
terms’ are restricted to setting out the essence of the consideration to be provided by each 
party to the contract, i.e., the service to be provided by the provider, and the price to be paid 
for it by the consumer. It is true that the consumers’ rights would be compromised if courts 
were to construe what can be considered the concept of the ‘subject matter’ of the contract 
too broadly; the objective of the law would be evidently stymied.279 Nevertheless, as 
discussed below, a narrow conception of ‘core terms’ can be problematic in the context of the 
m-payment sector. This is particularly so given that consumers may place great reliance on 
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promises and representations made by the provider in relation to (for example) their security 
and authorisation procedures, even to the extent that they would not have used the service 
provider in the absence of these safeguards, only to find that they are not considered ‘core’ 
terms in law.  
Indeed, Abbey National suggests that a robust approach towards consumer protection 
has not actually been endorsed. The fact that unauthorised overdraft charges added up to one 
third of the bank’s’ total income from current accounts possibly explains why, during the 
2008 banking crisis, the court was disinclined to allow the matter to proceed to the European 
Court of Justice.280 This decision appears to be a discretionary exercise, as opposed to a strict 
interpretation and application, of the law.281 
The main issue with this decision for m-payments is that it may marginalise the 
CRA’s usefulness in terms of consumer protection due to the Supreme Court’s failure to 
narrowly construe what constitutes a core exemption. A similar construction of the ‘main 
subject matter of the contract’ will not benefit consumers. Instead, it serves business interests 
and is reflective of a neoliberal paradigm.  
 
4.4.3.3 Bairstow Eves London Central Ltd v Smith: A paternalistic approach towards consumer 
protection 
The difficulty of determining whether a term in a m-payment service agreement can be 
challenged as being unfair is further illustrated by Bairstow Eves London Central Ltd v 
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Smith.282 In this case, it was found that a term which resulted in a doubling of the commission 
if a payment was not made within a ten-day period did not constitute a core term, i.e., a price 
term. The contract involved an estate agency agreement. The parties only contemplated the 
doubling of commission as a default option if payment was not made, as opposed to being 
obligated to pay the doubled rate per se. The term was held to be ancillary and fairness thus 
could be assessed. Core terms concerning price were distinguished from ancillary terms.283 
Yet, ‘core terms’ are not conceptually very different from terms that are ‘characteristic’ 
and/or form the ‘main subject matter’ of a contract. Whilst the wording of terms may be 
different, it is unclear how a difference may be drawn in practical terms  which may in turn 
have different impacts on consumer protection.284 In the m-payment sector, judges may be 
unfamiliar with the nature of the services provided and have a less intuitive understanding of 
what consumers’ expectations might be, thereby compounding these challenges. Further, the 
restrictive approach to interpreting terms which are open to review limits the powers of the 
courts to use contract or tort law to regulate contracts between m-payment providers and 
consumers. This in turn increases the pressure on legislative provisions.  
 
4.4.3.4 Bond v British Telecommunications plc: A liberal approach towards consumer welfare 
In Bond v British Telecommunications plc,285 it was held that a ‘charge for operating the total 
telecommunications service [...] [was] a charge for services rendered’. The term formed a 
core element for the service and could not be reviewed.286 The determination of whether the 
provision deals with the issue of adequacy or price or remuneration can thus be difficult, 
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particularly in the m-payment context and this possibly undermines consumer protection in 
this context. As was noted in relation to Bairstow Eves, the restrictive approach to construing 
terms which are open to review limits the powers of the courts to use common law tools to 
regulate contracts and provide a remedy where the imbalance of power between provider and 
consumer has been exploited.   
Nonetheless, not all terms in the m-payment agreement will be considered as relating 
to the ‘subject matter of the contract’ as courts have not adopted such an approach towards 
core terms in the past.287 Instead, core terms have been construed narrowly so that m-payment 
providers cannot simply label all of them as core terms.288 M-payment providers may find it 
hard to label a term as relating to the subject matter of the contract, which may make it easier 
for consumers to challenge certain terms and promote social welfare interests. 
Furthermore, under European law, consumer protection has to be guaranteed, even 
without consumers complaining about unfair terms,289 but, as discussed, English law has 
adopted a more formalistic approach.290 Accordingly, clauses that are necessary, and 
commonplace, to protect the interests of m-payment providers, and where it is not 
unreasonable for imposing such clauses, are likely to be considered fair.291 The fact that a 
term may be more convenient for one party does not necessarily suggest unfairness.292 
Consequently, vulnerable m-payment customers may not be sufficiently protected as they are 
unlikely to challenge terms. In fact, even average or reasonably circumspect customers may 
not bring legal proceedings due to the difficulties which exist in establishing that a term is 
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unfair. This erodes consumer protection across the board in this inherently risky new fiscal 
milieu and effectively promotes a neoliberal model where big business’ interests prevail. 
Hence, whilst the CRA 2015 certainly is embedded with social welfare considerations, they 
may not actually provide a high degree of consumer protection. 
However, very harsh clauses are likely to be found unfair293 and even less harsh terms 
have sometimes been considered unfair so some consumer protection may still be seen to be 
provided. For example, an insurance agreement which required consumers to immediately 
communicate in writing all the particulars of their claims was found to be an unfair term, 
despite the insurance company being prejudiced if not provided with such information.294 The 
full written disclosure requirement caused a significant imbalance in the parties’ obligations 
to the insured’s detriment. Following this authority, providers might be conscious to ensure 
that the demands they place on consumer are reasonable, in that they are not prohibitively 
onerous, and that a reasonable period of time is offered to comply with any requirements 
imposed.  
Provided that contract terms comply with the substantive restrictions of the PSR 2017, 
particularly its extensive safeguarding requirements, it may not be unreasonable to impose 
obligations on customers, e.g., to inform their banks about the loss of their mobile phone or 
PIN without unreasonable delay. However, the unresolved question is whether a term which 
defines gross negligence strictly and prejudices a consumer would be considered contrary to 
the CRA 2015. In other words, the danger in respect of unauthorised m-payment transactions 
is that gross negligence and fraud are contractually defined in ways which undermine 
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consumer protection and which consumers cannot challenge as the question of liability may 
be ruled a core term. 
Whilst the PSR 2017 ensures that risk is borne predominantly by m-payment 
providers, it does not require them to completely insure consumers against loss which is 
caused by their own negligence or fault, nor does it require customers to be absolved entirely 
of responsibility for their own welfare. The UK legal regime thus displays balance and 
concern for consumer welfare. This is not an inadequacy in the provisions of the PSR 2017, 
but rather a deliberate decision that the freedom of market players should not be entirely 
subjugated to consumer protection.  
Moreover, as noted, the CRA 2015 requires transparency and consumers may, 
therefore, try to challenge terms which are not transparent and prominent,295 and unfair.296 
Hence, m-payment service agreements must be transparent and not difficult for consumers to 
understand. Cases such as those considered in this chapter indicate how the concept of 
‘unfairness’, particularly various manifestations of procedural and substantive unfairness, are 
being developed by the courts.297 Even so, it is not clear what the transparency threshold is 
that has to be discharged in order for contract terms to be fair. Islamic jurists should also 
further develop the good faith principle in respect of exclusion clauses contained in m-
payment service agreements. 
For instance, clause 5.3 of the terms and conditions of Barclays’ mobile app 
‘Pingit’298 states that: ‘If you want to cancel, recall, change or trace a payment, we can charge 
you a fee for this service as explained in our General Terms’. The question arises as to 
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whether a term would fall foul of the CRA 2015 if the clause which imposes a fee is hidden 
in small print or held in a separate document where the link is not clearly signposted or 
provided. Obscuring access in terms of finding applicable charges, arguably, violates the 
concept of transparency. This answer would depend on whether or not the court embraces a 
more purposive approach towards consumer protection than seen in Abbey National,299 in 
addition to well-established common law rules as to the incorporation of terms.300  In this 
context, this approach entails that the court pays greater heed to the underlying objectives 
which the law seeks to achieve rather than the natural meaning of the language in which it is 
framed. This has the advantage of encouraging compliance with the spirit, not merely the 
letter, of the law.   
However, courts have struck down terms for being unintelligible where the words 
resulted in uncertainty.301 As was held in Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking, the requirements for 
incorporation of terms are particularly exacting where the term is highly adverse to the party 
against whom it is relied upon.302 This approach is premised on the distinction between ‘core’ 
terms of the contract which are to be construed based primarily on the objective intentions of 
the parties and terms, such as, exclusion clauses which may be construed according to the 
principle of contra preferentem.303 The distinction may seem at first glance to enhance 
consumer protection. Nonetheless, following Abbey National, freedom of contract will 
continue to be prioritised.304 This reflects the emphasis placed by judges on this legal 
principle with which they were careful not to interfere. Such a stance towards the CRA 2015 
may, therefore, make it difficult for consumers to successfully challenge unfair terms in m-
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payment agreements and the risks posed to them when using such services, arguably, 
remains, thus undermining a more social welfare-based policy model. 
Consumers do not necessarily have to bring their own proceedings as the FCA, as 
regulator, can also scrutinise terms.305 Where proceedings are brought, the courts may 
consider the fairness of terms without the point being specifically pleaded by the parties.306 
Accordingly, there are elements of social welfare-oriented consumer protection underpinning 
the CRA 2015, as well as related case law. Notwithstanding that, the statutory provisions and 
relevant case law are driven by market considerations and neoliberal policy concerns. Indeed, 
another example of this business-focused approach which embeds social welfare needs is the 
approach towards data protection, which shall be discussed next. 
 
4.5.1 Data and privacy protection of m-payment customers' data 
In the m-payment context, consumer protection means safeguarding not only the funds, but 
also personal data of customers. Distinctions, however, should be drawn between data 
protection, confidentiality and privacy. Data protection is concerned with an individual’s 
ability to control how data is collected, processed and/or used, rather than giving rights to 
privacy or confidentiality.307 Institutions must protect their customers’ data and this requires 
adhering to particular rules in relation to the processing of personal data and sensitive 
personal data.308 The Data Protection Act 1998 (‘DPA 1998’) implements Directive 
95/46/EC309 and gives individuals rights over the control of their own personal data, as 
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defined in s1(1) of the DPA 1998.310 The definition adopted in the DPA 1998 mirrors the one 
in Art. 2 of the 1995 Directive. Personal data is broadly defined and requires the individual to 
be identifiable from the data and to be alive.311 (Though the GDPR entered into force in the 
UK by virtue of the doctrine of direct effect on 25 May 2018, the scope of this work is largely 
restricted to the law in the UK as at 1 May 2018 and discussion of the GDPR is limited in the 
thesis).  
In Durant v Financial Services Authority,312 the Court of Appeal adopted a narrow 
construction of personal data. A two-fold test was adopted which establishes data as being, 
firstly, ‘biographical in a significant sense’ and, secondly, information that has ‘the putative 
data subject as its focus’.313 Such an approach is not in the interests of m-payment users as 
the qualification makes it more difficult to protect a broad range of personal data; thus such 
consumer’ data may still be at risk. 
Whilst the DPA 1998 applied to m-payments, the Act was arguably insufficient to 
address the new privacy-related risks which could arise as a result of m-payment transactions. 
For instance, if banks team up with device manufacturers or mobile phone operators and 
customers become accustomed to using their mobile phones to pay for all their outgoings, 
these operators will collect extremely sensitive information, detailing comprehensively the 
preferences and profile information of the customer. This generates what has been labelled 
‘Big Data in payments.’314 This information is likely to be of a high monetary value which, if 
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sold, might be utilised by marketing companies, insurance providers and other entities, thus 
promoting a neoliberal prioritisation of big business over individual welfare.315 
 
4.5.2 Complexities concerning the definition of ‘personal data’ 
Further complications may arise as not all data is considered ‘personal data’ within the 
definition of Directive 95/46/EC or the DPA 1998 but, which when taken together with other 
categories of individually ‘non-personal’ data, may form data from which an individual may 
become identifiable.316 Any organisation that holds such data would then be categorised as a 
data controller under the law. M-payment service providers are likely to be operating systems 
along a long chain of technology which enables them to gather large amounts of data that 
they become responsible for as data controllers. 
 
4.5.3 International data collection 
The DPA 1998 applies to persons who process data or whose equipment is in the UK.317 This 
may be problematic since personal data of a customer using m-payment services is passed 
along a chain of technology which is built from a range of systems and service providers. 
Due to the nature of packet-switching and routing technology, data may pass through 
jurisdictions with weaker or no data protection regulation.318 Data may be transferred across 
borders with network traffic algorithms, e.g., through clouds, as discussed in chapter 1. This 
may mean that a m-payment transaction that takes place entirely within the UK may send 
 
315 Ibid. 
316 DPA 1998, s1. 
317 Michael Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No. 2) (2003) EWCA Civ 139. 
318 P.J. Springer, Encyclopedia of Cyber Warfare (ABC-Clio LLC 2017) 17. 
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personal data outside of it.319 Directive 95/46/EC restricted the transfer of personal data to a 
third country outside of the European Economic Area (‘EEA’) if that country lacked 
sufficient data protection. To that end, the European Commission published a list of approved 
third countries which included Canada and Switzerland.320 However, the US-EU Safe 
Harbour Framework was ruled inadequate since US law enforcement, national security and 
public interest requirements trump the safe harbour scheme, resulting in undertakings, such 
as, Facebook, not complying with the protective safeguards stipulated by it.321 
Furthermore, data processing could only take place if at least one of the conditions in 
Schedule 2 was met, i.e., the data subject gave his/her consent, processing was required to 
contract for legal compliance or necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject for 
governmental or judicial purposes or other legitimate purposes. In the case of m-payments, it 
would not be difficult to establish the existence of data processing by virtue of, e.g., the 
customer’s consent. Payment service providers may make it a standard procedure to obtain 
their customers’ express consent, although consent may be implied by the actions of the 
customer as the data subject.322 Indeed, where sensitive personal data323 is processed, 
Schedule 3 stated the conditions relevant to its processing, including the need for explicit 
consent to be given and that such data processing was of vital interest to the subject for legal 
compliance and the administration of justice. However, as pointed out in chapter 3, a legal 
 
319 Ibid. 
320 Directive 95/46/EC, Article 25(6); European Commission, 'Commission decisions on the adequacy of the 
protection of personal data in third countries.' 2016 <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/international-
transfers/adequacy/index_en.htm> accessed 15 September 2016. 
321 Case C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner. 
322 DPA 1998, Schedule 3, para8. 
323 Under s2 of the DPA 1998, sensitive personal data includes information, such as an individual's political 
opinions or his racial or ethnic origin. 
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focus on obtaining consent represents a more neo liberal approach towards consumer 
protection, especially in light of ineffective participation alternatives in the economy.324  
 
4.5.4 The DPA 1998 and data protection principles 
Under the DPA 1998, data controllers had to adhere to eight data protection principles.325 
Data had to be processed fairly and lawfully and could only be obtained for one or more 
specified lawful purposes. It had to be adequate, relevant and not excessive, as well as 
accurate and up-to-date. The data could not be kept for longer than necessary and had to be 
processed in accordance with the data subject’s rights. It had to be kept secure through 
technical and organisational measures and could not be sent outside the EEA if the data 
subjects were inadequately protected beyond this zone. Part II of the DPA 1998 set out the 
rights of data subjects and others326 which included the following: Access to data; averting 
processing that causes damage or distress; correcting and destroying inaccurate data; and 
compensation.327 The relevant exemptions to the DPA 1998 which m-payment providers 
could rely on were national security, crime and taxation, regulatory activities and disclosures 
required by law.328 
M-payment providers also had to inform the Information Commissioner’s Office 
(‘ICO’) that they were processing personal data.329 Individuals could ask the ICO to assess 
whether the DPA 1998 had been breached.330 An information notice could be served by the 
 
324 M. Rhoen, 'Big Data and Consumer Participation in Privacy Contracts: Deciding who Decides on Privacy' 
(2015) Utrecht Journal of International and European Law 31(80), 51–71, 65. 
325 DPA 1998, Schedule 1, Part I; D. Rowland and E. MacDonald, Information Technology Law (3rd ed, 
Routledge-Cavendish 2005) 347. 
326 E.g., credit reference agencies: DPA 1998, s8. 
327 DPA 1998, ss7-15. 
328 DPA 1998, Part IV. 
329 DPA 1998, s17. 
330 DPA 1998, s42. 
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ICO requesting all relevant data.331 A breach of the DPA 1998 could result in damages being 
awarded if the data controller had not taken reasonable care.332 Yet, the 1998 Act only 
penalised a failure to comply with an information notice.333 Most penalties varied between 
£200 and £300 per contravention, which were equivalent to the amount of damages generally 
awarded to individuals.334 These penalties appeared entirely inadequate as a deterrent for m-
payment providers to protect data better. This, arguably, meant that consumer protection was 
limited in favour of big business. 
However, following Vidal-Hall v Google Inc,335 customers could invoke s13 of the 
DPA 1998 in order to seek damages when misuse of their personal information had caused 
them distress. Furthermore, since 2011, the ICO has required that data breaches are notified 
by service and network providers, thereby strengthening security for m-payment users and 
promoting a social welfare policy model.336 
 
4.5.5 EU General Data Protection Regulation 
The new EU legislation on data protection, the General Data Protection Regulation (‘GDPR’) 
(Regulation (EU) 2016/679), came into effect on 25 May 2018. The changes brought by the 
GDPR apply to m-payments. Fundamentally, the GDPR recognises the new risks which arise 
 
331 DPA 1998, s43. 
332 DPA 1998, s13. 
333 DPA 1998, s47. 
334 E.g. see Information Commissioner's Office, Annual Report 2006/2007, Information Guidance, 2007, 1-96, 
58 <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/231262/0646.pdf> accessed 
29 March 2013; Information Commissioner's Office, ‘Information Commissioner's Annual Report and Financial 
Statements 2011/12, in the Rights space- at the right time’, 2012, 1-84, 32-33 <https://ico.org.uk/media/about-
the-ico/documents/1042187/annual_report_2012.pdf > accessed 29 March 2013. 
335 (2015) EWCA Civ 311. 
336 Information Commissioner's Office, 'Guidance on data security breach management.' 2012, 1-8, 4 
<https://ico.org.uk/media/1562/guidance_on_data_security_breach_management.pdf> accessed 15 September 
2016; Information Commissioner's Office, 'Security of services', 2016 <https://ico.org.uk/for-
organisations/guide-to-pecr/communications-networks-and-services/security-of-services/#securityobligations> 
accessed 15 September 2016. 
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in the big data era by spelling out new obligations for data processors, including the need to 
notify data controllers promptly about a breach, usually within a time limit of 72 hours, e.g., 
in the cases of identity theft, fraud and financial loss.337  
More stringent rules are imposed with regard to the sharing of personal data, which is 
particularly important in the financial context. For example, the new regulation requires that 
the subject is not only informed of but gives informed and, importantly, continued consent to 
the sharing of personal information.338 In light of the fact that transactions which take place 
within the UK may result in data being sent to servers located in third countries, it is 
important that data protection is also realised.339 The GDPR addresses this particular issue by 
requiring data processors and controllers which are not located in the EU, but which offer 
services and goods in the EU, to adhere to these obligations.340 The GDPR thus has an 
extraterritorial reach.341 
It also introduces more stringent penalties including fines of up to 4% of global 
revenues or €20 million (whichever is the greater) for breaches of the Regulation.342 This 
provides a stronger deterrent against breaches and does not require any action on the part of 
the consumer to enforce the service provider’s obligations. Correspondingly, the GDPR also 
imposes additional safeguards, such as, requiring companies which collect and process 
personal data on a large scale (as will be the case for the majority of m-payment service 
providers) to hire a data protection officer.343 Consequently, the GDPR adopts a social 
welfare approach that heightens consumer protection and mitigates the data risks posed to 
 
337 GDPR, Recitals 81&85. 
338 GDPR, Articles 4(11), 6-9. 
339 P.J. Springer, Encyclopedia of Cyber Warfare (ABC-Clio LLC 2017) 17. 
340 GDPR, Recital 23. 
341 GDPR, Article 115.  
342 GDPR, Article 83.  
343 GDPR, Article 97.  
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consumers as more onerous legal provisions are imposed. It is easier for customers as data 
subjects to withdraw their consent to processing following this and, in respect of sensitive 
data, consent must be explicit.344 Nonetheless, it is unclear how effectively such requirements 
are in practice since m-payment users may have limited option but to consent if they wish to 
use the m-payment services.  
The eight data protection principles contained in the DPA 1998 are mainly unaffected 
by the changes introduced by the GDPR.345 Indeed, the exemptions to data protection 
obligations which m-payment providers can invoke have been further expanded. These 
include monitoring, inspection or regulatory functions connected to issues, such as, national 
security.346 One could argue that this offers a potential loophole whereby consumers’ data 
and their general protections may be legally undermined as it is difficult for a consumer to 
challenge a purported reliance on the ‘national security’ exemption by a m-payment provider. 
This is particularly so given that, even in the event of a legal challenge, the consumer may 
not be entitled to review documents and evidence supporting the provider’s contention, as 
these companies are effectively given similar tools as domestic security agencies and the 
police.347 This undermines the enforceability of the obligations imposed and may render the 
rights of the consumer academic.  
The GDPR does not change the prohibition contained in the DPA 1998, which 
proscribes data being transferred to third countries with inadequate data protection 
 
344 GDPR, Recital 39. 
345 Information Commissioner's Office, 'Overview of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).' 2016, 1-
40, 5 <https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/data-protection-reform/overview-of-the-gdpr-1-0.pdf> 
accessed 15 September 2016. 
346 GDPR, Article 23(1)(h). 
347 M. Rhoen, 'Beyond consent: improving data protection through consumer protection law' (2016) Internet 
Policy Review 5(1) <https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/beyond-consent-improving-data-protection-
through-consumer-protection-law> accessed 15 April 2019. 
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legislation.348 However, it spells out various methods to overcome problems with 
international data transfers. M-payment service providers can, e.g., enter into model clauses, 
i.e., standard contractual provisions endorsed by the EU Commission, or adopt binding 
corporate rules, such as, codes of conduct.349 These internal codes of conduct would then 
have to be followed by those within the m-payment ecosystem. Private, neoliberal measures, 
while favoured, are less intrusive.  These solutions are important, particularly in light of the 
defunct US-EU Safe Harbour Framework, since they facilitate relatively safe cross-border 
sharing and transfer of data.350 This chosen approach is likely to benefit the economic 
development of the m-payments industry. The GDPR could have better provided for the 
regulation of international data transfers; it would be better to regulate through legal 
consumer protection measures, instead of private options, consisting of government-approved 
model clauses and codes of conduct, as discussed in chapter 3, section 3.3 above. In this way, 
the principles of social welfare could be better embedded in lieu of a mainly neoliberal 
market focus.  
Also, it is perhaps regrettable that the GDPR does not mandate that consumer 
advocacy groups be consulted before such codes of conducts or model clauses are devised.351 
The involvement of advocacy groups could, for instance, ensure that providers adopt strict 
cryptographic techniques in light of ever-increasing state surveillance, including spying on 
the most popular cloud services.352 Consumer advocacy groups may also influence the shape 
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of regulations, e.g., advocating the inclusion of meta-data (i.e., ‘data about data’ such as the 
time and location at which the data relating to a transaction came into existence, or the 
number of transaction data files held in respect of a particular consumer) as personal data.353 
There are sound reasons for a broader definition since meta-data can reveal personal 
information about an individual’s lifestyle and habits.354 The lack of consumer influence is 
also arguably apparent from the fact that the term consumer protection is only mentioned 
once in the GDPR.355  
One may conclude that the GDPR has at its heart the objective of engendering trust 
and confidence in markets by reassuring the public of stringent measures to protect the 
collection, processing, and use of data, as opposed to the consumer protection values which 
might at first blush appear to be its core objective.  
 
 
4.5.6 The MLRs 2017 and FTR 2015 and the issue of protecting customers' data 
Compliance with AML laws is a necessary prerequisite for most providers of m-payment 
services. On 26 June 2017, the Money Laundering Regulations (‘MLRs’) 2017 entered into 
force. The MLRs replace the Money Laundering Regulations 2007356 and transpose the EU’s 
Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive 2015/849.357 These Regulations apply to banks, 
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payment service providers, e-money institutions, e-money issuers358 and others. However, 
this is subject to the caveat that a person engages in a financial activity which is not just 
‘occasional’ or conducted on a ‘very limited basis’.359 
Payment service providers should specifically take note of Regulation 63 which 
imposes a duty to consider the guidelines given by the European Supervisory Authorities, 
pursuant to Article 25 of the EU Funds Transfer Regulation 2015360 (‘FTR 2015’). The FTR 
2015 came into force on 26 June 2016361 and ensures that Recommendation 16 of the 
Financial Action Task Force (‘FATF’) 362 is transposed.363 Its objective is to ensure that all 
payments which are sent or received within the European Economic Area are fully 
traceable.364 Under the FTR 2015, beneficiary and intermediary payment service providers 
must adopt effective measures to identify and collect the legally mandated information. That 
information consists of the names of the payer and payee, their respective bank accounts, as 
well as the payer’s address,365 and must be verified by the payer’s payment service 
provider.366 There are certain exceptions to these information requirements, e.g., in e-money 
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transfers below €1000367 or reloadable e-money goods which are not in excess of €2,500 per 
year.368 
Under the MLRs 2017, supervisory authorities in charge of the transfer of funds must 
monitor payment service providers to ensure adherence to the FTR 2015 and to urge them to 
notify violations as well as take measures to cooperate with other bodies, including overseas 
and coordinating activities.369 Regulations 18 and 19 are particularly relevant in the context 
of m-payments as Regulation 18 requires risk assessments to be conducted by relevant 
persons and Regulation 19 requires ‘policies, controls and procedures’ to be adopted. These 
encompass a range of measures including due diligence, record keeping, amongst others. In 
addition, banks and payment service providers must regularly review and update these 
measures.370 Written records must be kept of policies, controls and procedures and any 
changes made, as well as how relevant persons have been informed.371 The MLRs 2017 and 
FTR 2015 are arguably aimed at institutions, e.g., m-payment providers, to ensure 
compliance with AML requirements rather than protection of consumers against money 
laundering.  
As discussed in chapter 1, m-payment services are facilitated through several different 
stakeholders. It is, therefore, necessary that m-payments policies, controls and procedures are 
not inward-focused. Communications, including those relating to updates and changes, 
should be duly notified along the m-payment services chain and written records that are kept 
must be comprehensive. The different stakeholders ought to cooperate and coordinate so as to 
avoid gaps within policies, controls and procedures.  
 
367 So long as smaller transactions do not seem linked: FTR 2015, Article 5(4). 
368 Swanney n 363, 6. 
369 MLRs 2017, Regulation 63(1)(a)-(d)(i)-(iii). 
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Technological advancement, whilst offering many opportunities for improved 
services for consumers, also creates greater scope for generating, collecting, processing and 
use of data in m-payments. This, coupled with the increased obligation on financial 
institutions to conduct CDD, keep records, report beneficial ownership information will 
affect customers in their day-to-day use of banking services including payment services.  The 
attempts of UK regulators to keep pace with these changes (albeit not always successfully) 
may be contrasted with the approach in SA outlined in chapter 5. There is also a more 
fundamental risk that the greater obligations imposed on financial institutions by the MLRs 
may have the unintended consequence of eroding customers’ data protection rights by 
requiring greater transparency to combat the increased risks of money laundering. 
An analysis of the MLRs shows that the underlying policy objective is business-
friendly. This is illustrated by the inclusion of a proportionality requirement which can be 
found in Regulation 19(2)(a) which states that policies, controls and procedures should be 
commensurate with the type of business and its size. This business-friendly slant on 
traditional consumer protection principles ensures the compliance costs associated with 
providing consumer protection are not prohibitive, particularly for small or young entrants to 
the market, by adjusting its requirements to reflect what can realistically be expected of such 
a company. It is also in line with the economic interests of the consumer. The overall effect 
of the provisions is that providers are required to have in place a proactive system for the 
monitoring and reporting of suspicious activities which is as effective as can reasonably be 
achieved in view of the resources and capabilities of a company of that size and stature in 
question. On the other hand, it follows that a consumer may be entitled to different protection 
when dealing with different providers based upon criteria which are not obvious to them 
when making their initial selection. Unless the consumer is aware of legislative protections 
applicable when dealing with the company concerned (knowledge which cannot be 
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reasonably assumed), it will be exceptionally difficult to rely on legal protection when 
making decisions and assessing risk. Even if consumers were to have extensive knowledge 
about businesses, competition in the market may restrict consumer trust to a small number of 
well-known companies.  
The AML requirements have been heightened by the MLRs 2017, which together 
with the FTR 2015, may deter certain newcomers from entering the market.372 While the aim 
of the AML regime is to prevent, e.g., the payment system, from being used for money 
laundering purposes which may be prima facie beneficial to consumers,  this comes with a 
cost; consumers may be concerned with the protection of their data and preservation of their 
privacy, which may in turn deter them from making use of new technologies. Consumers who 
are accustomed to using traditional banking systems are likely to be more reluctant to switch, 
even when the new technology offers significantly greater convenience because of these 
privacy concerns. 373 The provisions of the MLR were insufficient to entirely assuage these 
privacy concerns, though the new GDPR appears likely to go some way towards resolving its 
shortcomings, in particular through the requirement for meaningful and continuing consent 
which gives consumers greater confidence that they understand the implications of the terms 
they agree to, as discussed in section 4.5.5 above. It may be hoped that the heightened 
penalties of the GDPR will also increase consumer confidence in the deterrent effect of 
regulation. This is an important distinction: The GDPR is aimed at ensuring the proper 
collection, processing and use of data, and the obligations imposed by it may therefore be 
trumped by the need for disclosure of a customer’s financial information when there is 
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suspicion of money laundering taking place by a customer’s use of his account and transfer of 
funds. By contrast, the MLRs cannot be ‘trumped’ in this way.  
Nevertheless, there remains the obstacle that consumers have no negotiating power 
and therefore have little choice but to agree to the terms offered to them if they wish to make 
use of the service; consent may be a somewhat empty protection in these circumstances. This 
challenge is particularly acute given that, as considered above, consumer protection is not the 
sole objective; indeed, the increased transparency and enhanced reporting obligations 
demanded by the MLR 2017 in an attempt to combat the increased risk of money laundering 
created by technological advancement may narrow the scope of protection available to 
consumers in respect of personal data and privacy.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
In the future, it is foreseeable that the separation between banks and other non-bank entities 
in providing m-payment services will become less and less real, particularly when market 
consolidation takes place. The strongest players will undoubtedly want to offer the most 
extensive range of financial services and this ultimately means becoming credit institutions. 
In the short-term, the regulatory regime in the UK enables new entrants to enter the market, 
thereby fostering innovation and competition.  
The EMR 2011 opens the door to a wide range of institutions to issue e-money, some 
of which might now enter what was traditionally the realm of the banks or regulated credit 
institutions. Hence, consumer economic interest is being furthered in neoliberal terms and 
that in turn, raises issues regarding the convergence of disparate industries. It further 
introduces a range of new legal challenges, including the regulation of communication 
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companies which wish to enter the payment services market. Introduction of e-money in the 
UK is likely to be of great importance in shifting the balance in terms of how the traditional 
banker-customer relationship operates as consumers can choose their financial services based 
on convenience, notwithstanding the possible risks involved. This fits with the neoliberal 
sense of customers as circumspect and responsible individuals, capable of making choices 
and understanding information. 
Nevertheless, many different legal consumer protection measures exist for m-payment 
customers which promote social welfare-based policies. For instance, broader legal 
provisions foster substantive fairness through governing unfair contract terms and providing 
refunds to customers for unauthorised transactions. These types of measures encourage m-
payment service providers to adopt strong technological and organisational procedures to 
mitigate risk and protect customer funds. However, as to whether the right policy balance has 
been struck, only time will tell. 
The legislative landscape in the UK is still changing. The PSR 2017 creates a base 
level for the regulation of payments, including m-payments and service providers. Customers 
are protected while market expansion for new entrants is promoted. The adoption of 
regulatory security requirements mitigates against any risk which arises from providing 
account access to new market entrants, e.g., TPPs. While consumers are likely to benefit from 
additional competition, social welfare considerations are arguably also being promoted. 
The GDPR serves to establish a more robust data protection regime than the DPA 
1998. In particular, the requirement for consumer consent is made more meaningful by the 
positive acceptance and opt-in provisions. This enhances autonomy-based consumer 
protection, without restricting the freedom of activities available to market players (which 
remain free to use data as they have historically, subject to the consent of the individual 
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consumer).  To some extent, the GDPR preserves the tailored approach formulated by the 
MLRs; obligations and penalties are linked to the size of the company in question, and 
proportionality between the costs and benefits of consumer protection is preserved.   
Overall, a carefully thought-out consumer protection regime has been adopted which 
balances market interests with those of the consumer and which is still being incrementally 
developed. The next chapter analyses the legislative framework in SA, with a view of 
ascertaining how it compares with that of the UK and how the policy principles enshrined in 




CHAPTER 5           
 
THE M-PAYMENT PROVIDER-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP IN THE M-PAYMENT 
ENVIRONMENT WITHIN SAUDI ARABIA 
 
5.1 Introduction 
SA’s smartphone use is one of the highest in the world.1 In 2017, it was estimated that the 
value of Saudi m-payment transactions was US$349m.2 This figure is likely to grow by 
52.3% to US$1,877m by 2021.3 In terms of  managing this growing part of the financial 
industry, recourse is made to Saudi laws, rules, regulations and the guidance provided by the 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (‘SAMA’), particularly the 2012 Regulatory Rules for 
Prepaid Payment Services, which are relevant to m-payments and the particular consumer 
protection rationales which come into play. 
Chapter 4 explored how UK law is framed and the sources that regulate the rights and 
obligations of the m-payment provider and customer in m-payment transactions. In this 
chapter, the Saudi approach is compared with such UK laws and policy. As discussed before, 
in the UK, the consumer protection rationale has been carefully balanced with other 
priorities, e.g., promoting innovation, market growth and the potential expansion of the 
market to non-bank payment service providers. It is therefore argued that SA can draw 
inspiration from the balance which the UK has struck between pro-market reforms which 
 
1 European Travel Commission Digital Portal, ‘Mobile/Smartphones, Rise of Mobile Internet Use in Middle 
East Region’, 2014 <http://etc-digital.org/digital-trends/mobile-devices/mobile-smartphones/regional-
overview/middle-east/> accessed 18 October 2014. 
2 Statista, 'Mobile Payments, Saudi Arabia', 2017 <https://www.statista.com/outlook/331/110/mobile-




encourage financial innovation and pro-consumer regulations protecting users of m-payment 
services. 
As with chapter 4, this chapter identifies the consumer protection rationale that Saudi 
legislation has adopted or attempted to adopt in order to mitigate the risk to consumers. As 
discussed in chapter 3, the Sharia mandates that a social welfare policy must underpin the 
statutory and regulatory framework, but that framework should, nonetheless, still be business-
friendly in light of Prophet Mohammed being a businessman. It should mean that losses from 
unauthorised m-payment transactions are allocated fairly and in accordance with the Islamic 
profit and loss sharing principle, discussed in chapter 3, section 3.6.3. Hence, Saudi Arabian 
law should prioritise social justice in line with the Islamic objective of ‘establishing what is 
right and forbidding what is wrong’.4 Fundamentally, SA m-payment customers should not 
bear the full cost of any loss that follows from an unauthorised transaction, as is currently the 
case. Consumers' data must also be protected in order to maintain privacy, as well as to 
protect consumers against breaches of their privacy. 
Put differently, Islamic ‘ethics, morality and behavioural admonitions’ must not be 
deviated from.5 In this context, it is particularly crucial for Islamic scholars to develop a 
consumer protection discourse, as discussed in chapter 3. They should utilise not only the 
broad social justice commands contained in the Sharia, but also the Islamic good faith 
principle currently applied in the context of contract law and which mandates that 
transactions are fair and honest. An Islamic test of fairness and honesty should be developed 
for the treatment of exclusion of liability exclusion and limitation clauses and the good faith 
principle could be utilised to achieve such a pro-consumer approach. As is apparent from the 
 
4 Quran 3:103, 109, 113; 9:71, 22:41; 31:17; cited from M.A. Khan, 'The Role of Islamic State in Consumer 
Protection' (2011) Pakistan Journal of Islamic Research 8, 31-44, 31. 
5 M.J.T. McMillen, ‘Islamic Law Forum’ (2008) International Law 42, 1017-1032, 1018. 
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analysis in chapter 4, English legislation has moved from the good faith principle to the 
principle of fairness when it comes to consumer protection, as illustrated by the CRA 2015. 
The Islamic good faith principle could thus fulfil a similar role to the UK Consumer Rights 
Act 2015 which promotes fairness. Hence, the Islamic good faith principle could be utilised 
to temper the classical notion of freedom of contract by ensuring that unfair terms are 
unenforceable. 
Islamic scholars must also clarify the circumstances in which a m-payment 
transaction should be deemed haram. Furthermore, consumer rights and dispute resolution 
mechanisms should be developed, so that consumers can seek redress for unauthorised m-
payment transactions and for failures to protect consumers' data, as well as breaches of their 
privacy. Only such an approach ensures that the Sharia is recognised as the most important 
source of law, 6 as well as being compatible with Article 6(a) of the Charter of the Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (‘SAMA’) 1957. SAMA is required to act in a manner which does 
not conflict with the teachings of Islamic law, 7 which means adhering to the Hanbali version 
of Sharia law.8 In other words, the Saudi central bank must regulate financial institutions in a 




6 M. Ariff and M. Iqbal, The Foundations of Islamic Banking: Theory, Practice and Education (Edward Elgar 
Publishing Ltd 2011) 11; B. Maurer, Mutual Life, Limited: Islamic Banking, Alternative Currencies, Lateral 
Reason (Princeton University Press 2011) 32. 
7 Charter of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 1957, Article 1(a)-(c); International Business Publications, 
Saudi Arabia Central Bank & Financial Policy Handbook (International Business Publications 2005) 150. 
8 S. Zuhur, Saudi Arabia (ABC-CLIO LLC, 2011) 176. 
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5.1.1 The structure of this chapter 
This chapter firstly discusses how the emergence of technological innovation within the 
financial services sector has not resulted in the creation of new authorisation regimes, unlike 
in the UK where effectively ‘limited banks’,9 i.e., payment institutions and e-money 
institutions have been created. It is emphasised that SA has failed to facilitate a m-payment 
third-party collaboration environment. This is also attributable to the failure to distinguish m-
payment providers from banks in the old Banking Control Law 1966. The Electronic 
Transaction Law 2007 is analysed and highlights that it is insufficient to regulate third-party 
payment service providers. 
The next section examines relevant sources of law which govern the rights and 
obligations of m-payment providers and customers in SA: The 2012 Regulatory Rules for 
Prepaid Payment Services are analysed, and it is highlighted how they fail to address the 
thorny issue of unauthorised m-payment transactions. The e-Banking Rules 2010 are 
scrutinised, and it is stressed that they reflect a neo-liberal consumer understanding and have 
also not been updated to account for new technological risks, including unauthorised m-
payment transactions. Recourse is also made to the Manual of Combating Embezzlement & 
Financial Fraud & Control Guidelines 2008. It is identified that customers and, particularly 
their funds, are not adequately protected through these rules and guidelines when using these 
new technological forms of fiscal transactions. 
The penultimate section assesses how consumers are protected against unfair terms by 
virtue of the 2013 Banking Consumer Protection Principles and Banking Consumers' Guide. 
 
9 A. Scupola, Innovative Mobile Platform Developments for Electronic Services Design and Delivery (Business 
Science Reference, 2012) 181. 
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The problem of utilising the principles and guide to seek compensation for unauthorised 
payments is stressed. 
The final section looks at the issues of data protection and privacy, which are of 
particular importance as highly sensitive big data is collected during the provision of m-
payment services, as discussed in chapter 2. It is identified that the Credit Information Law 
2008 and the Consumer Credit Regulations 2006 fail to protect m-payment customers' data 
and do not protect consumers against breaches of their privacy. The section also provides a 
brief analysis of how the risk of money laundering is combated via the AML requirements 
(contained in the Anti-Money Laundering Law 2003) and the impact that these provisions 
may have on the balance between the prevention of money laundering and consumers’ rights, 
or offer potential legal loopholes which may allow data to be accessed without consent, 
giving rise to related data protection issues. 
All of this material provides a basis for the conclusion, of, firstly, whether SA’s 
approach to m-payments should rightly adopt a social welfare approach in order to be 
compliant with Sharia law and principles and, secondly, whether Saudi legislation could 
usefully mirror the UK approach of combining neoliberal and more paternalistic models of 
consumer protection. 
 
5.2.1 Background to m-payment regulation in Saudi Arabia 
One would expect that the legal protection measures for customers in SA would exceed those 
of the UK on the grounds that a social welfare approach enables the law to be compliant with 
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Sharia more readily than a neoliberal consumer economic interest approach.10 However, at 
present, Saudi Arabian laws are outdated and do not go as far as UK law in terms of adopting 
a social welfare approach for protecting consumers’ interests. This is partly due to Saudi’s 
law being currently related to Web 1.0 than Web 2.0 (as in the UK). Failing to keep up with 
technological change means that no protection is offered in respect of newly emerging risks, 
and service providers are easily able to evade regulation simply by updating the technological 
basis of their offering. The Saudi consumer protection rationale is also underdeveloped due to 
the religious-based legal system. As identified in chapter 3, this has limited the development 
of consumer rights due to Islam’s focus on duties.11 For instance, SA has not enacted a statute 
similar to the UK Consumer Rights Act 2015 (‘CRA 2015’), tort law principles or a data 
protection law. 
Islamic social welfare concepts that are enshrined in the Islamic business principles, 
such as the principle of good faith, have not been sufficiently transposed into the Saudi laws 
to challenge unfair contract terms which violate the consumer protection rationale. It is also 
unclear to what extent these Sharia law concepts are relied on by judges due to a lack of 
published cases. Even if these principles are being employed, without statutory clarification, 
these judgments will remain vague due to the lack of a doctrine of precedent, as established 
in the UK. 
Fundamentally, the various legislation fails to adequately respond to the risk of 
unauthorised m-payment transactions and the protection of consumers' data in order to 
maintain privacy, as well as to protect consumers against breaches of their privacy, as 
detailed in chapter 2. As a result, the advantages for customers which flow from 
 
10 J.Q. Whitman, 'Consumerism Versus Producerism: A Study in Comparative Law' (2007) Yale Law Journal 
117, 340-406, 356. 
11 G. Rice, 'Islamic ethics and the implications for business' (1999) Journal of Business Ethics 18, 345-358, 345. 
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technological innovation discussed in chapter 1 may be lost. The failure to update the 
legislative framework to promote innovation may also stifle economic growth in the rapidly 
advancing m-payment market. The potential for Fintech innovation to radically modernise the 
way in which m-payments can be conducted in SA may thus be hampered. SA’s global 
position in 2012 as a ‘leader nation in e-readiness’ may, in addition, fail to be maintained 
without legislative reform.12 
 
5.2.2 The m-payment third-party collaboration environment and the legal distinction 
concerning bank status and the problem with the Banking Control Law 1966  
The Banking Control Law 1966 is the main banking law in SA. No other law has been 
enacted for new market entrants, as has been done in the UK. This is despite the fact that it is 
difficult to apply the 1966 Law to m-payment providers which are not banks. Article 1(a) 
defines banks as, ‘any natural or juristic person practicing basically any of the banking 
business in the Kingdom’. It may be incorrect to label all m-payment service providers 
‘banks’, since the services they provide are narrower than typical banking services. 
Simultaneously, the fact that m-payment service providers do not fall within existing 
statutory definitions of ‘bank’ (e.g., the definition in the Banking Control Law 1996),13 
means that they are effectively overlooked by the existing regime. The challenge is 
compounded by the lack of a conceptually clear definition of ‘bank’ or ‘banking service’, 
such as, the one provided by s2 of the UK Banking Act 2009.14  
 
12 Al Arabiya, ‘Saudi Arabia leader nation in e-readiness: U.N. report’, 3 August 2012. 
<http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/08/03/230116.html> accessed 24 October 2014. 
13 Banking Control Law 1966, Articles 1(b) and 2(b).  
14 Banking Act 2009 (UK), s2. 
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As discussed in chapter 1, the multifarious nature of m-payment services 
infrastructures involves operations by various partners, even if a predominantly bank-led 
model emerged in the future. We saw in chapter 4 that English law distinguishes banks from 
payment service providers and e-money institutions, and imposes distinct requirements to 
protect customers from heightened technological risk. The PSR 2017 even goes further by 
providing that TPPs fall within the scope of these legislative provisions. 
At present, the Banking Control Law 1966 fails to make any such distinctions and 
thus the statute appears outdated. A strict interpretation of the Banking Control Law 1966 
highlights that the statute confers on SAMA extensive supervisory authority over institutions 
that are deemed ‘banks’ but not non-bank m-payment service providers and other associated 
parties that fall outside that definition.15 Consumer economic interests are thus not promoted 
in neoliberal terms as the market remains closed to other entrants. While consumers may be 
better protected if m-payment services were only offered by banks (which is in any event 
largely the case at present in SA), this approach may stifle Fintech innovation in SA. 
In addition, given that the holy Prophet Mohammed was a businessman and SAMA 
generally endorses conventional, as opposed to strict, Islamic banking,16 the legislator ought 
to extend the Banking Control Law to payment and e-money institutions. In other words, it 
should define them and make it clear that these parties are also subject to the Banking Control 
Law, just like licensed moneychangers. Ideally though, SA should create distinct 
authorisation regimes for payment services as the UK has done, as discussed in chapter 4, 
sections 4.2.7 and 4.3.3.  Without this, one of the central tenets of the Hanbali School, 
 
15 M.A. Ramady, The Saudi Arabian Economy (Springer 2010) 78. 
16 L. Etheredge, Saudi Arabia and Yemen (Britannica Educational Publishing 2011) 19. 
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namely to be ‘liberal on economic and business issues’, will not be realised.17 This is 
preferable to merely extending the Banking Control Law, as its limited scope prevents it from 
accommodating innovations in the delivery of m-payment services. Attempts to base new 
regulation on the Banking Control Law would render the meaning of ‘banking business’ for 
the purposes of that legislation less meaningful and conceptually clear.   
 
5.2.3 The Electronic Transaction Law 2007 and the non-regulation of third-party providers 
and related security and technological risks 
Due to the lack of overarching coherence in Saudi regulation (by comparison with the UK, 
for example), it is necessary to consider a broader range of legislative provisions in order to 
gain a full understanding of the regulatory picture. In the absence of a purpose-designed 
regime, m-payment transactions may fall within any one (or more) of a disparate collection of 
statutes. As a result of the broad definition of ‘electronic transactions’ under Saudi 
legislation, one such statute is the Electronic Transaction Law 2007 (‘ETL 2007’). The 
legislative intention of this law was to control, regulate and set out a legal framework in 
respect of electronic signatures and electronic transactions.18 The objective was to facilitate e-
commerce and the law is, therefore, not just directed at m-payment providers.  
The ETL 2007 defines electronic transactions as ‘any exchange, communication, 
contracting or other procedure, performed or executed, wholly or partially, by electronic 
means’.19 The wording of the definition appears sufficiently inclusive as a m-payment 
 
17 A. Al Rajhi, A. Al Salamah, M. Malik, R. Wilson, Economic Development in Saudi Arabia (Routledge 
Curzon 2004) 14. 
18 Electronic Transaction Law 2007 (‘ETL 2007’), Article 2; A.H. Boss and W. Kilian, The United Nations 
Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts, An In-Depth Guide and 
Sourcebook (Kluwer Law International 2008) 253. 
19 ETL 2007, Article 1(10). 
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transaction can be described as an exchange between a consumer and a merchant, or a 
communication between electronic devices, e.g., the mobile handset and the merchant 
platform, and a transaction can also be evidence that a contract has been concluded. 
This law thus facilitates the advent of m-payments. It imposes various general 
conditions, even though m-payment providers can adopt additional measures so long as they 
do not contravene this law.20 This law states that an electronic record is only considered 
original and integer when certain technical conditions and stipulated means are complied 
with.21 The Implementing Regulations to the ETL 2007 explain that these conditions are met 
when documents are preserved in their original state, the electronic document has a digital 
certificate from an authorised service provider and the authorship of the data is secured.22 
These are general conditions for all types of electronic transactions and signatures. However, 
for m-payment transactions, sophisticated technical standards are required to enhance 
consumer protection against payment incidents, fraud and other abuse, particularly a strong 
form of customer authentication.23 Authentication means adopting processes to verify and 
confirm that a device complies with certain features which make up its m-payment identity, 
as only this can result in the electronic record being original and integer.24 
As noted in chapter 2, m-payment transactions are made possible through various 
stakeholders (banks/financial institutions, retailers/merchants, mobile network operators, 
 
20 ETL 2007, Article 4(3). 
21 ETL 2007, Article 8. 
22 Saudilegal, 'Electronic Transactions', 2016 <http://www.saudilegal.com/saudilaw/09_law.html> accessed 1 
November 2016. 
23 European Banking Authority, 'Discussion Paper on future Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on strong 
customer authentication and secure communication under the revised Payment Services Directive (PSD2)', 
2016, 1-31, 7 <https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1303936/EBA-DP-2015-
03+%28RTS+on+SCA+and+CSC+under+PSD2%29.pdf> accessed 1 November 2016. 
24 Smart Card Alliance, 'Security of Proximity Mobile Payments', A Smart Card Alliance Contactless and 
Mobile Payments Council White Paper, May 2009, 1-39, 25 




trusted service managers, mobile handset manufacturers and third-party payment service 
providers -‘TPPs’). As explained in chapter 1, it is not enough to adopt just one 
authentication mechanism. Risk-based authentication, i.e., the adoption of multi-layered 
security, is important due to the complexities of this financial ecosystem.25 A multi-factor 
authentication process (a multi-factor security protocol) ought to be adopted but without these 
security layers affecting interoperability and user-friendliness.26 
In this context, it will be useful if ICT guidance was published in order mitigate 
consumer risk and promote social welfare.27 This can take place at a range of different levels: 
At the most basic, e.g., providers may be required to simply inform consumers of the nature 
and extent of any risk to which they are exposed; at the most stringent, the provider may be 
required to limit or assume at least a portion of this risk themselves. The former approach 
reflects neoliberal values and may be insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Sharia in the 
context of the Saudi market. Nevertheless, it would represent an improvement on the current 
position.   
The legislator could then make recourse to standards developed by specification 
organisations (e.g., the PCI Security Standards Council, EMVCo, the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute, GSMA, OMA, the Near Field Communication 
Forum, and CDG).28 Alternatively, they could use the EBA’s regulatory technical standards 
on strong customer authentication and secure communications as a base from which to 
 
25 BBCA, 'How does PSD2 affect bank customers' digital identity?', BBVAOpen 4U, 1 August 2016 
<https://bbvaopen4u.com/en/actualidad/how-does-psd2-affect-bank-customers-digital-identity> accessed 1 
November 2016. 
26 A. Tiwari et al, 'A Multi-Factor Security Protocol for Wireless Payment - Secure Web Authentication Using 
Mobile Devices' (2011) IADIS International Conference, Applied Computing 2007, Salamanca, Spain, 160-167, 
160; Smart Card Alliance n 24, 22; N. Vonthron, 'A2A interoperability: Understanding bank to mobile money 
transaction flows and technical solutions', GSMA, 10 December 2015 
<http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/programme/mobile-money/a2a-interoperability-understanding-
bank-to-mobile-money-transaction-flows-and-technical-solutions> accessed 1 November 2016. 
27 Ibid (Smart Card Alliance) 9. 
28 Ibid 9-10. 
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develop its own guidance for the Saudi m-payment sector. However, as noted in chapter 3, 
effective consumer protection based on social welfare principles requires that laws are 
properly embedded.29 Otherwise, the social welfare objectives of the Sharia are unlikely to be 
realised. 
Moreover, under the ETL 2007, the task of authentication falls on certification service 
providers30, namely, ‘[a] person licensed to issue digital certificates or perform any other 
service or task related thereto and to electronic signatures’.31 Certification agents constitute 
‘the backbone of [digital] transactional activity’, as these services deal with ‘authentication, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation’.32 For this reason, certification providers are regulated 
through a licensing scheme operated by the Communications and Information Technology 
Commission.33 Various conditions are imposed, e.g., to adopt secure means for issuance, 
delivery and storage.34 These certification providers are regulated by the National Centre for 
Digital Certification within the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology.35 
This Centre supervises the adherence to applicable regulations and certification standards and 
criteria in line with international standards, for instance, the Information Technology – 
Technology – System Security Engineering – Capability Maturity Model ISO/IEC 
21827/2002 and the Code of Practice for Information Security Management ISO/IEC 17799-
2000.36   
 
29 J. Winn and N. Jondet, 'A "New Approach" to Standards and Consumer Protection' (2008) Journal of 
Consumer Policy 31, 459-472, 459. 
30 S. Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law (3rd ed, CUP 2012) 126. 
31 ETL 2007, Article 1(21). 
32 T.C. Glaessner et al, Electronic Security: Risk Mitigation in Financial Transactions: Public Policy Issues 
(World Bank 2002) 40. 
33 ETL 2007, Article 1(5). 
34 ETL 2007, Article 18. 
35 ETL 2007, Articles 16-17. 
36 H.R. Rao et al, Managing Information Assurance in Financial Services (IGI Publishing 2007) 99. 
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TPPs, namely Payment Initiation Service Providers (‘PISPs’) and Account 
Information Service Providers (‘AISPs’), play a similarly important role to certification 
providers in the context of m-payments as they identify the consumer, authenticate the 
consumer's credentials (i.e., their username, password, one-time password and certificate) and 
authorise the m-payment transaction or, in the case of AISPs, give access to the retrieval of 
information.37 It, therefore, appears prudent that they too should require licensing.38 This is 
important to foster trust and guarantee the integrity of the m-payment system, especially since 
consumers provide log-in details to them and access to their accounts, which, in turn, gives 
rise to the risk of digital fraud and identity theft.39 TPPs thus play a critical role since they 
own the digital identities of customers.40 It is, therefore, essential that clear rules are devised 
which impose liability when TPPs are responsible for fraud and errors.41 It is also essential 
that a contract is entered into between the PISPs and the AISPs and the consumer and that 
this is a transparent and clear agreement in order that the consumer be properly protected 
against the risks posed by the new technology and Sharia principles of social welfare are thus 
properly promoted.42 
 
In view of the fact that the ETL 2007 cannot be evoked, it is necessary to introduce 
limitations on consumer liability in SA comparable to those which have been enforced in the 
UK, in order to prevent companies simply shifting their responsibilities to consumers through 
contract terms where the reality is that the consumer has little choice but to consent or lose 
 
37 BBCA n 25; European Banking Federation, 'European Banking Federation (EBF) Position Paper on the 
European Commission Proposal for a Revised Payment Services Directive (PSD2), Brussels, 8 November 2013, 
1-16, 1-2 <http://www.ebf-fbe.eu/uploads/EBF_004743%20-%20EBF_004025%20-
%20EBF%20position%20on%20PSD2_08Nov2013.pdf> accessed 1 November 2016. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 BBCA n 25. 




access to the service. At present, the statute provides that certification service providers are 
held responsible for the accuracy of the information when delivered; that they have to pay 
damages when this is not the case and persons have relied on this information as being bona 
fide.43 However, at the time of writing there is no record of any consumer having sued a 
certification service provider. It is therefore difficult to speculate how effective a deterrent the 
provision provides. The lack of any existing case may indicate the absence of either a breach 
or enforcement, and it is hard to distinguish between these two scenarios.  
The ETL 2007 also provides that certificate holders have to safeguard the 
confidentiality and integrity of the electronic signature system, adhere to particular 
conditions, furnish accurate information, inform the certification service provider of any 
changes and not use parts of a revoked or suspended certificate.44 This provision is difficult to 
apply to the m-payment context since the role of customers in that context is different from 
that of certificate holders. Yet, TPPs ought to protect the confidentiality of a customer’s 
digital identity and AIPs ought to retrieve accurate information, whilst customers ought to 
safeguard the security of their mobile devices and access to their m-payment apps. 
The ETL 2007 lists ten offences,45 which applies only to certification service 
providers; new offences would thus have to be formulated. Penalties are also spelled out. 
However, the current maximum fine of Riyals 5 million and a prison sentence of five years 
appear too low for the m-payment context, especially when serious violations have been 
committed and customers have suffered significant losses. Nicoletti, therefore, argues that 
 
43 ETL 2007, Article 20. 
44 ETL 2007, Article 22. 
45 ETL 2007, Article 23(1)-(10). 
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more specific and clearer regulations are desirable.46 However, instead of amending the ETL 
2007, it appears better to regulate third-party providers in a specific law for m-payments. 
 
 
5.3.1 The sources of law which govern the rights and obligations of m-payment 
providers and their customers, including in respect of unauthorised m-payment 
transactions: 
This section examines the sources of law which govern the rights and obligations of m-
payment providers and customers in SA: The 2012 Regulatory Rules for Prepaid Payment 
Services, the e-Banking Rules 2010 and the Manual of Combating Embezzlement & 
Financial Fraud & Control Guidelines 2008. This is done to assess the current legal situation 
and the basis for future change. It is highlighted that m-payment customers and, particularly 
their funds, are not adequately protected through these different sources of rights when using 
these new technological forms of fiscal transactions.  
 
5.3.2 The 2012 Regulatory Rules for Prepaid Payment Services and a failure to address the 
thorny issue of unauthorised payments  
Before the adoption of the Regulatory Rules for Prepaid Payment Services 2012 (‘RRPPS 
2012’), there was no regulatory framework for prepaid cards. The intention was to promote 
payment services, which allow customers to buy services and commodities with different 
 
46 B. Nicoletti, Mobile Banking: Evolution Or Revolution? (Palgrave MacMillan 2014) 107.  
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types of electronic cash cards.47 The rules enable customers to make use of prepaid services 
after opening an account and crediting it, thus clients can purchase services and goods or 
withdraw money or check their prepaid card account balances at ATMs.48 The objective was 
also to promote smart e-governance, since the prepaid cards are utilised by the government to 
pay benefits and ensure that workers receive their wages.49 For instance, in 2012, the 
Ministry of Labour created the Wage Protection System and many large businesses were 
required to adopt the so-called ‘easypay system’, a high-tech payroll, and use Saudi 
Investment Bank’s electronic prepaid cards for their workers by late 2014.50 The latter can 
use these cards to receive their wages, conduct financial transactions, send remittances, 
withdraw money at ATMs and top up mobile phones.51 
The RRPPS 2012 define prepaid payment services as ‘the holding of monetary value 
in a prepaid account/electronic record that can be utilised to purchase goods or services from 
one or more business who agrees to participate in the prepaid program’.52 This is a narrow 
definition since emphasis is placed on money being prepaid. Consequently, the definition is 
insufficient to facilitate the emerging m-payment revolution which, in countries like the UK, 
empower customers also to conduct traditional banking services in a more convenient manner 
through their mobile phones. For instance, the Saudi rules do not cover situations where bank 
 
47 ‘SAMA issues prepaid card services rules’, Saudi Gazette, 22 July 2012 
<http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentid=20120722130670> accessed 26 
October 2014. 
48 Euromonitor International, ‘Pre-Paid Cards in Saudi Arabia, Market Research’, 22 August 2013 
<http://www.marketresearch.com/Euromonitor-International-v746/Pre-Paid-Cards-Saudi-Arabia-7583184/> 
accessed 25 October 2014.  
49 N. Lloyd, 'The Wages Protection Program in Saudi Arabia - how will this affect your company', Simmons & 
Simmons LLP, 4 January 2016 <http://www.elexica.com/en/legal-topics/employment-and-benefits/04-the-
wages-protection-system-in-saudi-arabia-how-will-this-affect-your-company> accessed 1 November 2016; The 
Saudi Investment Bank, 'Payroll Service', 2016 <https://www.saib.com.sa/en/content/payroll-service-0> 
accessed 1 November 2016. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Council of Ministers' Decision No.59 dated 28.3.1420H; Saudi Investment Bank, ‘easypay, Your pay...your 
way’, 2012, 1-10, 3-4 <https://www.saib.com.sa/sites/default/files/easypay-Brochure-English.pdf> accessed 28 
October 2014. 




customers use their overdraft to make m-payments, leaving consumers open to risk in 
circumstances where the account used is not in credit (particularly problematic given that 
consumers in this category are arguably the most vulnerable in the first place).  
Such an approach does not promote Fintech innovation and, therefore, appears 
unwise, especially when one of the benefits of the technology is that it can replace traditional 
debit and credit cards.53 As discussed in chapter 4, section 4.2.1, financial services innovation 
is primarily taking place in the area of remote and proximity m-payments facilitated through 
apps, rather than in the prepaid card sector. One potential solution to this shortcoming would 
be to expand the definitions within the RRPPS 2012. However, this is non-ideal as the Rules 
were drafted to specifically address issues associated with prepaid cards and would not cover 
m-payments which do not involve the use of prepaid cards stored on mobiles. Prepaid cards 
need not necessarily include m-payments, and vice versa; redefinition of the Rules would 
therefore carry the risk of being a simply cosmetic rather than substantive change, making the 
regulatory gap more difficult to identify but failing to resolve it. Thus, Saudi Arabian 
legislators may need to draft a new set of rules that have wider application to payments 
services, including m-payment services, not merely in name but also in substance. 
Moreover, the rules currently apply automatically to prepaid payment services 
providers and licensed banks, so long as SAMA does not issue a formal objection on the 
basis that application of the rules would be inappropriate or counterproductive in the context 
of a specific provider.54 The current position is anomalous because, as discussed above, the 
Banking Control Law 1966 makes no mention of other institutions, apart from banks and 
money transmitters. The extension of the jurisdiction of the rules would arguably be based on 
a strained interpretation of the Banking Control Law. This is because the exchange of money 
 
53 C. Scardovi, Restructuring and Innovation in Banking (Springer 2016) 33. 
54 SAMA n 52, ibid 21. 
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for a prepaid card is not comparable to accepting deposits, and is not a core banking business, 
thus falling outside the scope of the Banking Control Law. It is, therefore, important to ensure 
that SAMA’s mandate to supervise prepaid payment service providers, and even m-payment 
service providers and all associated stakeholders, is put on a statutory footing. 
A distinction is made between open loop, restricted loop and closed loop payment 
services, i.e., multiple unrelated businesses which accept the same payment, a particular or 
more restricted set of businesses or just one business respectively.55 Payment cards with a 
microprocessor, contactless payments equipped with NFC technology, mobile payments, 
internet wallets or magnetic stripe cards are considered prepaid instruments.56 This definition 
is slightly restrictive since m-payments are increasingly conducted through Bluetooth, as 
opposed to NFC technology, as discussed in chapter 1. The rules do provide that the list of 
instruments is not exhaustive, so that does not constitute a problem. Nevertheless, the 
reference to ‘internet wallets’ is slightly clumsy and misleading as customers can have, e.g., 
client-side wallets which are stored on their computers, even when their computers are not 
connected to the internet.57 As technology moves rapidly, it seems better to adopt a broad 
definition to describe the technology which can be used to make m-payment transactions. 
Again, the emphasis on prepaid instruments ought to be avoided.  
The rules outline different acceptance models for the various types of loop services, 
such as, gift cards for closed loop prepaid payment services, public transport cards for 
restricted loop prepaid payment services and any other prepaid goods for open loop prepaid 
payment services.58 By incorporating different prepaid cards, it was intended that the data of 
 
55 Ibid 8-9. 
56 Ibid 9-10. 
57 E. Griffor, Handbook of System Safety and Security: Cyber Risk and Risk Management, Cyber Security, 
Threat Analysis, Functional Safety, Software Systems, and Cyber Physical Systems (Elsevier 2017) 161. 
58 SAMA n 52.  
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Saudis who currently do not have bank accounts would be captured and it was likely that 
student, salary, expenses, gift and other cards would be appealing to a broad range of 
consumers.59 However, such an approach did not promote what has been labelled ‘mobile 
banking 2.0’60 or ‘Digital bank 2.0’.61 The neoliberal consumer economic interest is not 
promoted through such an approach and Fintech innovation cannot fully promote consumer 
choice either due to its preoccupation with closed, restricted and open loop prepaid payment 
services. 
By contrast, in the UK, customers can increasingly choose many different m-payment 
providers. They can pay remotely or in close proximity with their mobiles. This is very 
different to loading money on a card and then being able to either pay at one particular 
merchant or at various different ones. 
Another weakness is that, whilst the rules cover all elements in respect of prepaid 
payments, they do not cover services which utilise the Saudi Arabian Payments Network62 
(‘SPAN’). This is despite the fact that SPAN deals with a diverse range of transactions.63 
Banks which use SPAN are additionally required to comply with the SPAN Business Books, 
Operating Rules and Procedures.64 However, the International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’) 
observes that SPAN cannot at present process transactions which have been directly 
 
59 Bank for International Settlements, ‘Payment, clearing and settlement systems in Saudi Arabia’, CPSS Red 
Book, 2012, 349-372, 356 <http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d105_sa.pdf> accessed 25 October 2014. 
60 M. Cliffe, 'Mobile Banking 2.0: Six Ways The Experience Must Evolve', The Financial Brand, 9 February 
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submitted through mobile phones or the internet.65 As such, the system’s capability has to be 
enhanced. SPAN also has no mechanism to report fraudulent transactions.66 Instead, this data 
is held with the issuer and it is important to require issuers to notify all fraudulent 
transactions, so that SPAN can then identify those merchants who engage in fraud or 
suspicious transactions. 67 As mentioned in chapter 4, the PSR 2017 mandates that statistical 
data about fraud and details about mitigation measures are provided annually to regulatory 
authorities.68 Such a requirement may be useful to improve SPAN and protect customers in 
accordance with social welfare principles and Sharia law. 
Under the rules, a licensed bank can also act as so-called ‘prepaid payment service 
issuing programme manager’ and is responsible for reimbursing acquirers and various issuing 
activities, such as fraud investigation.69 Banks can outsource these activities so long as the 
Rules on Outsourcing are complied with.70 It is stipulated that banks may hire a programme 
manager, an issuing processor, a seller/distributor and a reload/load network.71 However, 
banks have to assume full liability for outsourcing and, if considered appropriate, adopt 
additional methods to monitor compliance.72 This is because issuers are required to 
continuously monitor prepaid payment service activities.73 
Like the e-banking rules, the Regulatory Rules for Prepaid Payment Services adopt a 
bank-centric approach which, arguably, does not open up the m-payment market sufficiently 
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to promote neoliberal consumer economic interests. This approach is also in marked contrast 
to the UK, where competition is statutorily promoted by virtue of the Communications Act 
2003, as discussed in chapter 4, section 4.2.3. Hence, no true collaboration model is 
permitted, despite this being the most likely avenue to realise ubiquitous m-payment services. 
Furthermore, the rules define a licensed bank as an acquirer which has to either follow 
the SPAN Scheme Regulation or the Point-of-Sale scheme.74 SPAN accepts prepaid 
payments.75 Under the SPAN Scheme, an acquirer/bank has to have an agreement with 
SAMA in respect of ATM transactions.76 Under the Point-of-Sale scheme, an acquirer/bank 
has to have an agreement with a merchant and SAMA.77 Merchants are those linked to an 
acquirer/bank and are entitled to accept payments in accordance with their contracts with the 
acquirer/bank.78 They also have merchant accounts with the acquirer/bank.79 However, the 
requirement to follow either the SPAN Scheme Regulation or the Point-of-Sale scheme 
hinders technological innovation. In turn, the neoliberal consumer economic interest suffers. 
As discussed in chapter 1, technology makes it possible to directly connect the 
debtor’s bank, where a customer holds an account, with the merchant's creditor bank since 
consumer identification, authentication, as well as the transaction authorisation, can be 
carried out by other companies called TPPs under the PSR 2017 (UK). These TPPs then act 
as payment initiation service providers (‘PISPs’) and account information service providers 
(‘AISPs’). Notwithstanding that opening up the market to new entrants may heighten 
consumer risk, this ultimately creates competition and market progression and SA, like the 
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UK, needs to find a suitable balance between neoliberal economic principles and social 
welfare ideas which protect the consumer. 
In addition, as SPAN is incapable of processing transactions directly submitted 
through mobile phones or the internet,80 this appears to be an ineffective tool to protect 
customers from risk. There is presently a lacuna in Saudi Arabian regulation in respect of m-
payment transactions, giving rise to a risk which is perhaps inevitable given the piecemeal 
approach taken by the authorities.  It is questionable whether the use of contractual methods 
to risk management as between a bank and a merchant is sufficient to shield consumers in 
social welfare terms as required under Sharia law. It would be better if a strong customer 
authentication requirement similar to that provided under the PSR 2017 is imposed on banks, 
payment service providers and TPPs. 
The rules define retail and corporate payment products and give as examples, student 
cards, payroll cards, customer incentive cards, government entities payment products (e.g., 
social insurance accounts), and corporate payment products (e.g., employee benefits cards).81 
These products have to be disclosed to SAMA.82 Yet, as explained in chapter 1, m-payments 
open the door to the replacement of cash, debit and credit cards, and the introduction of a host 
of new functionalities which are likely to substantially innovate banking products and are 
more far-reaching than the examples provided. It is important for SAMA to study the 
innovations which m-payment services make possible and revise their examples accordingly. 
This also necessitates a less restrictive, neoliberal approach towards m-payment services 
being adopted, as discussed above, in order to allow for innovation. In this context, SAMA 
must particularly recognise that consumer data, e.g. generated from m-payments, is 
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developing into something very valuable for companies, comparable to a new form of 
“currency.”83 
The rules also stipulate various restrictions for the different types of prepaid payment 
systems. For example, cash cannot be withdrawn at ATMs when closed loop prepaid 
payment products and restricted loop prepaid payment services are used. 84 By contrast, in 
respect of open loop prepaid payment services, cash withdrawals and transfers, including 
cross-border transfers, may be made, even though these functions do not have to be 
provided.85 It appears unnecessary to distinguish between closed, restricted and open loop 
prepaid payment services since the underlying idea behind m-payment transactions should be 
to empower customers to pay with their mobiles. Closed, restricted and open loop prepaid 
payment concepts belong to the era of prepaid telephone cards and gift vouchers, whilst open 
loop systems confer control, e.g., for employers who use it with their employees.86 This does 
not mean that closed and open loop payment solutions have no role to play within m-
payments. However, the prepaid limitation appears misplaced in light of the innovation which 
m-payments make possible.87 
As discussed above and in chapter 1, payment intermediaries (‘TPPs’), such as, digital 
wallet providers, establish a direct relationship between customers and the merchant’s bank.88 
The way in which closed loop systems have been defined by the rules does not permit use of 
a typical closed loop system, such as, PayPal.89 Customers can hold funds in a PayPal 
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account and then use these funds for in-store or online payments through their digital PayPal 
wallet.90 It would be better if the terminology in respect of closed, restricted and open loop 
payment services was better aligned with industry trends. Otherwise, the analytical 
capabilities which m-payment technology make possible due to their ability to generate big 
data will be lost by the financial services industry in SA. 
However, a distinction between closed, restricted and open loop prepaid payment 
services is useful in terms of combating money laundering and terrorist financing. This may 
be one of the reasons why the rules mandate that further information has to be obtained when 
funds can be transferred domestically or internationally.91 However, less stringent 
requirements apply to closed loop prepaid payment products,92 but face-to-face verification 
should take place when money laundering or terrorist financing is suspected.93 Hence, a 
distinction is made between conducting a face-to-face verification and a simpler process 
which applies to more limited products, e.g., m-payment services, not tied to particular bank 
accounts or existing credit/debit cards issued by the bank.94 Moreover, all products should 
adhere to the general rules governing AML and CTF.95  
However, the analysis of the UK’s AML law reveals that a more comprehensive 
approach has been adopted towards combating money laundering and terrorist financing. The 
reason is that the objective is not only to discharge CDD, but to ensure that all payments are 
fully traceable. SA should, therefore, either amend its AML Law. Alternatively, there should 
be a duty to collect information96 via payment service providers, including banks, in the 
Regulatory Rules for Payment Services, a distinct regime covering prepaid payment services. 
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Transparency would be significantly heightened if the name of the payer and payee, their 
respective bank account details, as well as the payer’s address, were collected. Such an 
approach would also help to ensure that SA’s law complies with FATF Recommendation 
1697 which deals with wire transfers.98 This Recommendation urges countries to make sure 
that financial institutions obtain originator information and beneficiary information when 
wire transfers are made, as well as the related messages. 
Another shortcoming which leaves Saudi m-payment customers unprotected is that 
the current RRPPS 2012 only contain provisions concerning data protection in respect of 
AML and the opening of bank accounts and related guidelines.99 This appears wholly 
insufficient to shield m-payment customers in terms of ‘big data’ (i.e., information 
characterised by volume, velocity, and variety)100 which m-payment transactions facilitate,101 
especially when no general data protection law exists in SA.102 SA should enact a data 
protection law, or at least consider enacting rules for m-payment transactions similar to those 
which exist in respect of credit information (discussed below in section 5.5.2), in order to 
enact the social welfare provisions of Sharia law. 
Another problem, albeit not one which undermines social welfare-based consumer 
protection, is that the RRPPS 2012 relate to distance selling contracts although m-payment 
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transactions should not be construed as distance sales contracts.103 This is because a distance 
selling contract is between the customer and the merchant who do not contract on a face-to-
face basis but through remote means (e.g., online, telephone or post) for the purchase of 
goods/services whereas m-payment represents the use of, e.g., e-money, prepaid cards, 
credit/debit cards and/or electronic funds transfer,  through a mobile with which the customer 
pays for goods/services. Issues in relation to distance selling ought rightly to be addressed in 
a specific law. However, equivalence in treatment between distance selling and m-payment 
services may be misplaced since the former deals with a very different type of contract. 
Furthermore, the RRPPS 2012 provide that SAMA can investigate transactions, 
compliance problems, affiliates, books and accounts and impose sanctions for non-
compliance with the rules.104 However, overseeing m-payment systems is no easy task and 
the rules do not spell out the powers and policies of SAMA. It is important for SAMA to 
further develop its oversight arrangements, particularly with the view to strengthening social 
welfare-based consumer protection. Khiaonarong argues that this means adopting policies so 
that standards and requirements are clarified, and international standards are adopted.105  In 
doing so, the regulator is equipped with sufficient powers to discharge its oversight duties, 
systematically and fairly enforcing oversight standards and working in close cooperation with 
other foreign regulators and authorities.106 The IMF, therefore, proposes that ideally a 
specialised oversight unit or body should be created, as well as a payment system operations 
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unit.107 Equally, the G20 High-Level Principles on Financial Consumer Protection require 
that specific oversight bodies are created to ensure financial consumer protection.108 
For instance, in the UK, an independent Payment Systems Regulator was established 
by virtue of the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, which, amongst other 
objectives, is responsible for ensuring that service-users’ interests are safeguarded.109 
Financial consumer protection is further promoted through the FOS and the UK Competition 
and Markets Authority.110 Equally, SA must create such bodies in order to protect consumers 
in terms of social welfare and Sharia law. 
The rules also contain provisions so that customers can resolve disputes about billing 
errors.111 Customers must challenge billing errors within 180 days.112 When providing 
prepaid payment services, banks are given eighteen days to investigate any billing errors 
relating to a prepaid payment instrument.113 Customers can also request documentary 
evidence from their bank.114 Customers must be refunded where the bank determines that 
there was a billing error.115 In the case of disputes, customers can escalate their complaint to 
SAMA.116 If the customer is still not satisfied with SAMA’s decision, it can request the 
Committee for Banking Disputes to review the case.117 Both SAMA and the Committee have 
the power to enforce the bank’s obligation to refund the customer for errors. Decisions by the 
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Committee for Banking Disputes can be appealed in front of the Committee of Appeal for 
Banking Disputes and Violations. These appeal decisions are then final. A clear process has 
been created to challenge disputes and this offers some consumer protection. However, it 
may be noted that the scope of protection is less than in the PSR 2017 (UK), in which 
consumers are safeguarded against loss not only where there is a ‘billing error’ but also in all 
other circumstances which do not involve fraud or gross negligence. By contrast, the 
remedies provided by SAMA are restricted to errors on the part of the bank; there is therefore 
a ‘gap’ where the loss may have been caused by a third-party error, or by a fault for which 
responsibility cannot be attributed.  
It is important to extend the dispute settlement process to cases where the prepaid 
payment instrument is lost or stolen, or the customer has failed to keep his/her personalised 
security features secure. It is essential that the rules address the thorny issue of negligence 
liability, which they fail to do at present. Instead, they only state that customers should be 
informed about any liability or limit if the payment device is misused, stolen or lost and that 
liability for any further amounts ceases after notifying the issuer.118 Whilst the rules provide 
that unfair contracts terms are void, it is unclear how this point might be interpreted and 
whether, for instance, recourse might be made to the e-Banking Rules 2010, which require 
consumers to, e.g., install up-to-date antivirus software (as discussed in section 5.3.3 below). 
Legal uncertainty is thus created, and customers are hence not adequately protected against 
unauthorised m-payment transactions, but only against a much narrower operational risk 
which causes billing errors. This suggests a more neoliberal way of dealing with issues of 
legal responsibility which apparently views the consumer as circumspect individuals, thus not 
protecting the vulnerable or, arguably, adhering to Sharia law. 
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There thus exist many issues with the RRPPS 2012. They fail to adhere to the Islamic 
business principle of allowing sellers and buyers to trade freely. The reason for this is that 
banks are being favoured and new entrants are being prevented from entering the emerging 
m-payment market. Social welfare is not promoted. Nor is consumers’ economic interest 
being sufficiently facilitated, unlike in the UK where promotion of competition has been high 
on the policy agenda of the UK legislators, as discussed in chapter 4, section 4.2.3.  
This analysis shows how the consumer protection interest is underdeveloped in many 
areas as SPAN fails to include m-payments and does not screen against fraud. AML 
requirements further require improvement. Customers have no guarantee that their financial 
information, including personal data, is adequately protected. No specialised payment system 
bodies have been created to protect consumers and a process for customers to challenge 
billing errors is the only form of legal recourse that has been created. However, the one of the 
most pressing topic of negligence liability has yet to be addressed. Consequently, the law 
needs to be further improved and the IMF recently strongly recommended that a 
‘comprehensive payment system law’ be passed. This is needed in order to promote the 
principles of social welfare enshrined in Sharia law.119 
 
 
119 International Monetary Fund n 65, 4. 
286 
 
5.3.3 The e-Banking Rules 2010 and a neo-liberal consumer understanding and failure to 
update them to account for new technological risks, unauthorised m-payment transactions, 
and third-party providers 
In April 2010, the banking technology department of SAMA issued e-banking rules.120 These 
rules replaced the earlier Internet Banking Security Guidelines 2001.121 The rules define e-
banking, spelling out the evolution of e-banking and explaining the rules and their objectives, 
scope of application and date of application. SAMA defines e-banking as: 
Remote banking services provided by authorized banks, or their representatives through 
devices operated either under the bank’s direct control and management or under the 
outsourcing agreement. In other words, e-banking is an umbrella term for the process by 
which a customer performs banking transactions electronically, without visiting a branch and 
it includes the systems that enable customers of banks, individuals or businesses, to access 
accounts, transact business or obtain information on financial products and services through a 
public or private network, including the Internet.122 
M-payment transactions provided by banks and their agents thus fall within this definition 
as they enable customers to conduct their financial affairs without visiting a branch and 
through a system, which also relies on the internet. For the avoidance of doubt, it would be 
better if the rules expressly stated that they also applied to m-payments. The definition of e-
banking, however, is sufficiently wide to accommodate m-payment offered by banks to 
customers, though not m-payment services offered by non-banks.123  
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The providers of m-payment services are not confined to banks as part of banking 
services under traditional statutory definitions and can extend to non-banks. Moreover, the 
definition provides that Automated Teller Machines (‘ATMs’) and phone banking services 
are not included within the definition. As discussed in chapter 1, m-phones may be used in 
future at ATMs and some prepaid electronic cards can already be used to settle transactions 
and withdraw money from them. It may even be possible, as in the UK, to use ‘virtual’ credit 
and debit cards to make payments via m-apps without the need for a physical card.124 Hence, 
the definition of e-banking may have to be extended because the boundary will become 
further blurred in light of technological advances and Fintech innovations embedding credit 
card features within electronic payment cards held on portable devices.125 
Currently, the rules apply to all banks licensed by SAMA, including subsidiaries and 
branches located abroad.126 Banks can choose to provide e-banking directly or appoint 
representatives, provided that they adhere to SAMA's Rules on Outsourcing.127 Such an 
approach makes it harder for a collaboration or operator-centric model to emerge since a 
bank-centric approach is endorsed.128 However, a bank-centric approach may reduce 
competition which, in neoliberal terms, may not be in the interests of customers: It can lead 
to, e.g., poor, outdated and lower quality services.129 Consequently, the consumer economic 
interest is not being promoted in free market terms. 
Furthermore, the rules provide that senior management and the board of directors are 
accountable, customers must be educated and protected, their privacy secured, international 
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security standards adhered to, incidents managed and reported to SAMA, management be 
fully available and capacity must be built with regard to continuity planning.130 However, no 
requisite legal procedures to enforce these rather broad assurances have been stipulated, thus 
leaving the risks to consumers unmitigated. For example, in the absence of a data protection 
law, it will be challenging for customers to seek remedies from banks for failing to protect 
their data. The rules are further unclear about the scope and extent to which customers may 
hold senior management and the board of directors accountable. In other words, no rights 
have really been conferred but, as noted in chapter 3, this may in part be due to Islam 
generally achieving adherence through imposition of duties rather than rights.131 
By contrast, s150 of the FSMA 2000 (UK) stipulates that a breach of the rules of conduct 
may give rise to an action for damages, as discussed in chapter 4, section 4.3.3. Equally, 
customers can pursue proceedings when there is a failure to comply with any of the 
safeguarding requirements in the PSR 2017 (UK).132 Real consumer protection based on 
Sharia principles of social welfare will only be realised if similar laws are enacted in SA 
which add weight to these e-banking rules. Otherwise, customers are unlikely to be able to 
invoke their rights and for these objectives to be achieved. 
Another problem with the e-banking rules is that they fail to list the risks pertaining to 
apps, digital wallets (i.e. client-based and server-side wallets) and clouds, through which 
financial services are increasingly offered. The rules are very general and only mention 
different risk levels,133 as well as the risks associated with fully transactional websites, 
information-only websites and information transfer websites.134 This seems an outdated 
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approach to take since m-payments are primarily conducted through apps. The rules should, 
therefore, be updated in order to ensure that the specific risks associated with m-payments are 
detailed in order to adequately protect the consumer. 
Under these rules, the board of directors of a bank has a duty to identify and manage 
the different risks, adopt adequate risk management processes and policies, and conduct 
audits and internal checks.135 This necessitates a risk analysis and quantification of risks.136 
When a particular risk materialises, the bank must consider how best to deal with the loss. It 
further means constantly monitoring and reviewing risks as they can change.137 
However, as noted above, not all risks have been detailed. Whilst a complete list of 
risks is unrealistic, it is important that at least the more obvious risks are mentioned. Without 
this, banks may argue that they have discharged their duties when they have clearly failed to 
do so, leaving consumers potentially exposed to fraud, mischief and losses, all of which are 
forbidden under Sharia law. 
It is also problematic to rely solely on banks to combat risks effectively. Although 
there is a strong argument that they should, banks are not necessarily information and 
communications technology experts. Hence, it may be better if the rules make clear that the 
respective partners of the bank are also obligated to identify and manage certain risks and 
adopt adequate risk management processes in order for the public to be properly protected. 
In addition, the e-banking rules adopt fourteen principles, which are based on the 
Basel Risk Management Principles for Electronic Banking.138 However, as highlighted by the 
2013 G20 recommendations, and in the context of m-payments, SA should indicate how 
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banks comply with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s ‘principles for the sound 
management of operational risk 2011’.139 The Basel Committee recommendation imposes a 
number requirements based on the ‘fundamental principles’ of risk management, particularly 
an emphasis on the board of directors’ essential role in establishing a ‘strong risk 
management culture’ throughout the whole organisation and the need for banks to develop, 
implement and maintain a fully integrated framework within their overall risk management 
processes which reflects the nature, size, complexity and risk profile of the company in 
question. Otherwise, it will be difficult to adequately protect customers from the heightened 
operational risks which arise from m-payment transactions, as discussed in chapter 2. At 
present, the fourteen principles are divided into the following three broad topics. The first 
three principles deal with board and management oversight while principles four to ten set 
out minimum security controls. Principles 11-14 address legal and reputational risk 
management.140 SAMA should at a minimum add one more section specifically dedicated to 
operational and technological risk. 
The e-banking rules could impose higher security thresholds in order to heighten 
customer protection. Presently, they provide that banks should adopt a strategic policy and 
clear processes for their internal audits and the testing of vulnerabilities, including ethical 
hacking of all applications, systems and networks.141 Hence, banks should conduct 
penetration tests – also called white hat or ethical hacking – in order to identify security 
issues within the different components which facilitate e-banking.142 
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As discussed in chapter 4, section 4.3.2, under the PSR 2017 (UK), however, a 
security policy must be provided which consists of a comprehensive risk analysis.143 It must 
be explained how fraud is being combated and the way in which personal and sensitive data 
is being kept secure.144 In addition, incident management processes must be adopted, so that 
security and operational incidents can be detected and classified.145 Statistical data about 
fraud, details about mitigation measures, security and operational risk assessments must also 
be provided to the regulator.146 Regulatory technical standards on strong customer 
authentication and secure communication must also be complied with.147 When these criteria 
are not met, customers cannot be held responsible for any losses, except when they commit 
fraud and this provides high levels of consumer protection.148 
Like the PSR 2017, the Saudi e-banking rules require that banks report all high or 
medium risk security incidents.149 Moreover, the Saudi e-banking rules state that banks must 
state the measures which will be taken to avoid the recurrence of such a problem. By contrast, 
the PSR 2017 mandates that affected customers must be informed.150 This is a more social 
welfare-based and consumer-friendly approach than the one currently utilised in SA. Also, as 
argued before, it is important to extend these security duties to the different stakeholders 
within the ecosystem in order to maximise the use of their different forms of expertise. 
Furthermore, the e-banking rules make clear that it falls on SAMA to assess whether 
risk management processes and security protocols are sufficiently thorough.151 However, the 
task of scrutinising whether this is the case is not an easy one to discharge. Hence, the UK 
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has specifically created the office of the Payment Systems Regulator to do so.152 SA should 
consider creating a similar body or, at least, a specialised department within SAMA. Initially, 
officers could receive support from third-party security auditors153 until more capacity is 
developed. This may help with identifying whether banks’ risk management plans have been 
implemented. 
The e-banking rules do address the topic of consumer protection and the rights and 
liabilities of banks and customers are spelled out.154 For instance, the e-banking rules require 
that banks: provide intelligible contracts to their customers; give advance notice of any 
disruption; explain the level of service clearly; and educate customers about the importance 
of adopting robust authentication mechanisms (e.g., choosing strong passwords).155 However, 
these measures resemble the neoliberal paradigm which generally advocates disclosure. 
Chapter 3 highlighted that such an approach is premised on customers being reasonably 
circumspect although such a conceptualisation is strongly contested by behavioural 
economics. The social welfare objectives of the Sharia are, therefore, insufficiently realised. 
Hence, SAMA should formulate more far-reaching rights for customers in order to discharge 
its Sharia duty under Article 6(a) of the Charter of SAMA 1957.156 
In that respect, it is important that SAMA requires banks to specify their obligations 
in the terms and conditions which they provide to their customers.157 This should be done in a 
way which is easy to understand, so that customers are aware that they can hold banks liable 
in instances where the banks are in breach of their obligations as stipulated by SAMA, unless 
 
152 Payment Systems Regulator, 2017 <https://www.psr.org.uk/> accessed 1 October 2017. 
153 J. Linkous, 'Security Audit: The Pitfalls of Third-Party Assessments', RSA Conference, 9 September 2014 
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154 SAMA, E-Banking Rules, April 2010, 1-36, 9. 
155 Ibid 9. 
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157 SAMA, E-Banking Rules, April 2010, 1-36, 10-11. 
293 
 
there has been a failure or omission by the customer in safeguarding their personal 
information or fraud by the customer.158 
The fourteen general obligations which banks owe to customers, such as potential 
liability for spreading viruses, can easily be extended to m-payments. SAMA should, 
however, clarify that these principles also apply to m-payments. However, some Saudi banks, 
e.g., Saudi Hollandi Bank, have adopted a set of terms and conditions which apply to their 
internet and m-banking services.159 Although these do not mirror exactly the SAMA rules, 
they generally provide rights that are comparable (e.g., the circumstances in which service 
may be interrupted are broader). Terms and conditions provide a clear indication of the rights 
of the consumer but there is variance between various providers which may cause confusion 
and misunderstanding; a customer, who has previously dealt with one provider on the basis of 
their set of terms and conditions, may find that their rights are different when they switch to a 
different provider. This illustrates the importance of ensuring that consumers are adequately 
informed and educated so that they can make informed choices when deciding whether to 
switch service providers.  
To some extent, education of customers is already required by the e-banking rules 
which states that banks must educate customers about, e.g., awareness and avoidance of 
online fraud.160 However, the rules establishing the requirement for banks to bring these 
issues to the attention of customers are drafted with traditional internet banking, based on an 
old-fashioned web browser, in mind. No mention is made of apps, which are now 
predominantly used to provide m-payment services.161 Hence, the e-banking rules fail to 
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159 Saudi Hollandi Bank, 'Terms and Conditions', 2016 
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address the question of where customers download such apps from and how to install them 
safely on their smartphones. This omission is in part due to the failure of Saudi regulators to 
update the law to reflect advances in technology. In the absence of satisfactory regulation, 
this is an issue which banks might take positive action to address individually through, e.g., 
formulation of their terms and conditions which go beyond SAMA’s limited requirements. 
However, this approach heightens the need to make consumers aware of distinctions between 
the terms offered by different providers.   
The existing e-banking rules are thus not adequate for m-payments. Moreover, the 
rules provide that banks are not responsible for customers failing to safeguard their 
passwords or other personal information.162 The requirement to educate customers (e.g., 
advising them not to disclose personal information when they receive unsolicited emails or to 
unauthorised individuals,163 or not using shared or public computers for banking, plus the 
importance of installing up-to-date antivirus software and a personal firewall)164 means that 
customers are conceptualised as regulatory, circumspect subjects in a neoliberal sense.165 By 
corollary, they are deemed capable rather than vulnerable, i.e., that they are capable of acting, 
or learning to act, responsibly. Thus, the protection model is drawn from elements of both 
neoliberal and social welfare conceptions of the consumer. 
It may be argued that this is an inappropriate conception of the consumer in view that 
the e-banking rules do not require banks to make a refund to customers immediately in cases 
where there is a breach of their obligations to safeguard customers’ funds and personal 
details. The lack of remedy afforded to customers in such circumstances reinforces the 
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underlying notion that customers make a choice and bear the risk of banks’ non-compliance. 
The reason for this is that customers have not been equipped with any legal redress 
mechanism. Instead, they are simply assigned the duty to learn how to best protect 
themselves. Whilst such a learning duty is generally acceptable, the regulations should also 
entitle customers to seek a refund when they have discharged their duty to act responsibly. 
As discussed in chapter 4, in the UK, an unauthorised transaction must be refunded in 
full.166 Customers’ liability is limited to £35 where the payment instrument has been lost or 
stolen or they have not kept secure their personalised security feature.167 This right arises 
automatically so long as customers make a complaint within eight weeks168 and they have not 
been grossly negligent or fraudulent. A review of the e-banking rules in SA demonstrates that 
a similar procedure of limiting customers’ liability in cases of unauthorised transactions (e.g., 
when cyber criminals have appropriated money from their accounts) has been omitted. 
Consequently, vulnerable customers are not protected as it is extremely difficult to hold 
banks accountable and consumer protection and the social welfare aspects of Sharia law are 
not being met. Whilst customers can complain to SAMA, they cannot evoke any right to a 
refund like in the UK. Furthermore, it is unclear how SAMA would resolve such disputes, so 
it may mean that the evidential burden falls on customers. However, it is difficult for 
customers to demonstrate that they have adequately safeguarded their passwords and banks 
may also be reluctant to publicise that their systems have been hacked. This would make it 
difficult for customers to prove that they were victims of cyber criminals who have exploited 
weaknesses within the m-payment infrastructure. 
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Other questions also remain in terms of attributing responsibility. For example, the 
banking rules do not address whether customers should be held entirely liable or 
proportionately liable, together with banks, when they have not switched on their antivirus 
programmes or their firewall is not up-to-date or they have used public computers, despite the 
advice of their banks. Cyber criminals may then gain unauthorised access because of such 
oversights. It is also unclear whether the SAMA rules are duly incorporated into the terms 
and conditions of the contract between bank and customer. The rules do not state that banks 
cannot exclude any of their stipulated obligations. This leaves a degree of uncertainty as to 
whether the rules are incorporated as contract terms by implication unless excluded, or must 
be actively incorporated in the same manner as self-regulatory and voluntary codes of 
conduct. The Islamic good faith and profit and loss sharing principles may be evoked to strike 
down unfair terms, yet, as discussed above, SAMA does not fulfil the role of a Sharia court 
and adopts instead a modern, neoliberal approach towards banking. 
The e-banking rules, therefore, provide general guidance, but do not address the 
thorny questions noted above. This creates uncertainty for customers who have to resort to 
challenging their banks when problems occur, and this undermines consumer protection. 
Moreover, the e-banking rules do not explain how disputes can be resolved. The issue of 
customers resolving disputes was criticised by the G20 in 2013.169 In response, SA confirmed 
the importance of ‘financial inclusion working committees’ to further strengthen consumer 
protection, and a Consumer Protection Department was established within SAMA.170 
However, no consumer protection law exists to date, though a draft bill for a law was 
prepared in 2014, which would create an independent body responsible for monitoring 
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unethical practices.171 By 2017, this bill had still not yet been adopted, thus weakening the 
case that SA is going to adopt a social welfare-based approach to consumer protection which 
accords with Sharia law.172 
It would, therefore, be useful if the rules required banks to make customers aware in 
their terms and conditions that they can escalate complaints to SAMA’s Consumer Protection 
Department. Ideally, an easy process should be outlined by banks which customers could 
follow when they feel that their rights as set out in the e-banking rules have not been upheld. 
In this context, it may be important to require banks to alert customers that their rights and 
obligations are spelled out in the e-banking rules. Without these changes, customers appear to 
be insufficiently protected and the social welfare objective of the Sharia is unlikely to be met. 
 
5.3.4 The Manual of Combating Embezzlement & Financial Fraud & Control Guidelines 2008 
and the failure to address risks arising from third-party collaboration, particularly 
unauthorised m-payment transactions   
In 2008, SAMA issued the important ‘Combating Embezzlement Manual.’173 The manual 
defines fraud as, ‘any act involving deceit to obtain a direct or indirect financial benefit by 
the perpetrator or by others with his help, causing a loss to the deceived party’.174 This broad 
definition can be applied to the m-payment context to mitigate the risk posed to consumers. 
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However, the manual could be further updated since, at present, the section about the 
role of technology is rather terse175 and technological risk which causes unauthorised m-
payment transactions is heightened in the context of m-payments, as discussed in chapter 2. 
Currently, the manual requires banks to adopt a plan to combat and prevent fraud and 
imposes eight specific conditions, e.g., to develop and implement a strategy to combat fraud, 
as well as a control policy.176 A similar approach has been adopted in the UK where 
authorised companies have to demonstrate that risk is properly managed through internal 
control mechanisms.177 
Social welfare-based consumer protection could be further strengthened if other 
parties involved in the provision of m-payment services, such as, merchants and mobile 
network operators, were also required to adopt similar plans to combat fraud, even bank- or 
operator-centric systems,178 as discussed in chapter 1. Cyber fraudsters can attack banks, 
merchants/agents, mobile network operators and TPPs, or use weaknesses within a mobile 
handset or the application programming interface (‘API’). In other words, security risks 
emanating from third parties may cause losses to customers. The scope of the manual should, 
therefore, be extended in order to fully meet the social welfare principles of Sharia law. 
Otherwise, customers are insufficiently protected if only banks must combat and 
prevent fraud, especially in a collaborative financial model.179 As a bank is only responsible 
for a small aspect of the m-payment ecosystem, it is important that other parties which are 
responsible for the mobile handset, payment applications or other ecosystem functions180 take 
steps to combat and prevent fraud. These steps could be commensurate with their respective 
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177 PSR 2017, Regulation 6(6). 
178 Al Agha et al n 128, 235. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Smart Card Alliance n 24, 9.  
299 
 
roles by including a proportionality requirement in order to promote consumer protection that 
fits with Sharia law. Alternatively, banks could formulate strategies which allocate 
responsibility amongst different stakeholders and this would represent a more neoliberal, 
business-friendly approach.181 However, it may be challenging to carry out effectively the 
task of explaining risks, as well as the mitigation strategies of various sources in an inclusive 
manner.182 
Irrespective of whether the information is presented by banks or other stakeholders, 
specific types of risk (e.g., DoS attacks, server impersonation attacks, eavesdropping, data 
alteration and stolen devices) within the m-payment ecosystem should be identified in order 
to allocate responsibility to the party best placed to prevent and combat that risk.183 For 
instance, those responsible for the app or device security should consider where risks emanate 
from184 and then develop and implement appropriate strategies and policies accordingly.185 
Due to the collaborative nature of this form of commerce, it is also important that their 
individual plans complement each other. Each party has to know which particular type of risk 
it is assuming responsibility for and SAMA should be informed. It is questionable whether 
the role of SAMA should be more involved, e.g. by taking the lead in setting rules and 
guidelines to identify which of the parties should have responsibility and oversight of 
managing particular types of risk. This could offer one means of providing the type of risk 
handling envisaged by Saha and Sanyal below. 
 
181 A. Saha and S. Sanyal, ‘Review of Considerations for Mobile Device based Secure Access to Financial 
Services and Risk Handling Strategy for CIOs, CISOs and CTOs’ (2015) International Journal of Advanced 
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Group 2011) 148. 
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Specific anti-fraud policies should be developed so that security weaknesses do not 
arise; consumer risk will thus be lessened, and Sharia law adhered to. Saha and Sanyal opine 
that a risk-handling strategy for financial services provided via mobile devices requires that 
stakeholders within the m-payment structure identify particular fraud risks, detailing the 
approach towards dealing with these risks, setting out the degree of risk acceptance and ways 
to mitigate risks and developing and implementing strategies to address these different 
risks.186 Hence, clear risk handling procedures must be adopted for different vulnerabilities 
and threats if consumers are to be properly protected.187 
Even if the 2008 Manual is not extended to all stakeholders, it should at a minimum 
require banks to formulate comprehensive strategies which corresponding stakeholders have 
to adopt so that there is a joined-up approach to combat and prevent fraud in m-payments 
transactions. However, given the complex nature of an m-payments services network, it is 
argued that such a task is better discharged by the respective stakeholders than banks 
alone.188 Alternatively, SAMA could issue regulatory technical standards to prevent and 
combat fraud, similar to those published by the EBA, as discussed in sections 4.3-4.4 of 
chapter 4. Respective parties could also be required to show that they have obtained certain 
trustmarks.189 As noted in chapter 3, trustmarks prove that certain technical standards have 
been met. More responsible norms of business behaviour would thus be created which, in 
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5.4.1 The 2013 Banking Consumer Protection Principles and Banking Consumers' 
Guide and the problem of utilising the principles and guide to seek compensation for 
unauthorised payments and data breaches 
In June 2013, SAMA adopted banking consumer protection principles, as well as a financial 
consumer protection implementation model. These principles entered into force on 1 
September 2013 and are mandatory for all banks supervised by SAMA.190 Eight principles 
have been adopted for internet and ATM banking services and four principles deal with 
errors.191 These principles are further supplemented by key commitments.192 The 2013 
principles provide a complaints process whereby complaints can be brought by consumers to 
SAMA’s Consumer Protection Department.193 Broadly, these principles seek to ensure that 
consumers who have dealings with licensed financial institutions “receive the expected level 
of fair treatment, honesty, and ease of access to financial products and services’.194 This is 
achieved through a complimentary framework of non-binding policy principles which 
financial institutions are encouraged to achieve, and directives/regulations with which they 
are required to comply. However, because the definitions used in the Principles and Guide 
often lags behind developments in technology, it is unclear whether the principles apply to m-
payment services, in which case the usefulness of the complaints process to deal with m-
payment disputes may be limited. SAMA should therefore provide clarification. This is 
particularly important due to the limited level of consumer protection provided by the 2012 
Regulatory Rules for Prepaid Payment Services. Given that the 2012 Regulatory Rules limit 
disputes to billing errors, customers are likely to find it difficult to rely on these principles in 
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cases where they are victims of online fraud or when other rules have been breached. For this 
reason, it should be made clear whether complaints relating to m-payment disputes can be 
made to the Consumer Protection Department. Moreover, in light of the terms and conditions 
of banks, such as, SABB195, as discussed above, it is important for SAMA to enforce these 
consumer protection principles. At present, these principles do not clarify whether fines will 
be imposed for non-compliance. SAMA’s Consumer Protection Department should publish 
information about the rates of non-compliance by banks and the sanctions imposed. 
The banking consumer’s guide was ‘designed to ensure that banks meet SAMA’s 
strategic objectives in promoting transparency, fairness and ease of access to financial 
products and services for consumers, especially in the resolution of consumer complaints.’196 
The guide’s ten principles are modelled on the G20 High Level Principles on Financial 
Consumer Protection 2011:197 Equitable and fair treatment; disclosure and transparency; 
financial education and awareness; behaviour and work ethics; protection against fraud; 
protection of privacy; complaints handling; competition; third parties and conflict of 
interest.198 
However, as discussed in chapter 3, the G20 High Level Principles on Financial 
Consumer Protection 2011 focuses on providing consumers with important information rather 
than substantive rights (e.g., to a minimum standard of protection, or to access to dedicated 
dispute resolution mechanisms to enforce obligations against the service provider). Hence, 
they are best viewed as a neoliberal version of consumer protection as the market is free to 
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dictate the terms on which consumers interact with service providers, and the role of the state 
is limited to ensuring that the consumer is sufficiently informed to act rationally in their own 
interests. They, therefore, would not achieve genuine Sharia compliance in terms of 
providing social welfare to consumers. 
The banking consumer’s guide reflects the typical Islamic approach to moral issues. It 
outlines consumers’ responsibilities, e.g., notifying banks of unauthorised transactions, and 
the corresponding obligations of the banking service provider (e.g., reversing the value of the 
transaction or to limit the potential loss of the consumer, save in a case of fraud).199 In other 
words, the focus of the guide is on the duties rather than rights of consumers. As these 
responsibilities are worded in very general terms, they could be applied to m-payment 
transactions. Equally, the consumer protection principles which banks have to follow are very 
broad and could easily be extended to the m-payment context. 
Various banks have published their own banking consumers’ guides, which detail 
their customers’ financial rights and responsibilities.200 Although to some extent these 
individual bank guides mirror the 2013 principles published by SAMA, they do not uniformly 
do so and there are, therefore, also some disparities between them. Despite the assurances in 
these guides, some banks exclude liability from fraud to the greatest extent possible and it is 
uncertain whether the SAMA principles render these wide exclusion clauses void. SAMA 
should, therefore, clarify whether their banking consumer protection principles and banking 
consumer’s guide take precedence and are implied in the terms and conditions of the 
contracts of banks as this would provide more robust protection for consumers. 
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5.5.1 Data and privacy protection of m-payment customers' data 
SA currently only protects credit information but not data in general201 and recourse is made 
to the Credit Information Law 2008 and thereafter the Consumer Credit Regulations 2006 in 
order to ascertain its approach. In the final section, it is analysed how money laundering is 
addressed and whether the objective of money laundering undermines consumers' rights in 
relation to data protection. 
 
 
5.5.2 The Credit Information Law 2008 and the failure to protect m-payment customers' data 
The Credit Information Law 2008 (‘CIL 2008’) protects credit information and its 
enforcement is overseen by SAMA.202 This law is rooted in Islamic principles, as the Prophet 
Mohammed was clear that debts have to be repaid and it is permissible to speak about those 
who fail to do this.203 Equally, when false information is being reported, the Saudi Hanbali 
School considers that damages may be sought.204 This law regulates the manner in which 
credit information can be collected and exchanged, and establishes that credit information has 
to be protected, especially to prevent unauthorised disclosure or usage.205 The law sets out the 
principles which govern the gathering of credit information, their exchange and establishes 
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protective safeguards for consumers.206 Credit information encompasses details of the amount 
and nature of loans made, outstanding balances, the nature of security or guarantees taken, 
and the borrower’s creditworthiness, amongst other things.207 Though broad, this definition 
may not capture the data generated by a m-payment transaction.  
The law helps businesses and consumers to obtain finance too, since the asymmetrical 
information structure between borrowers and lenders becomes reduced, thereby helping to 
create a more efficient credit market.208 This statute further deals with credit information 
rather than information (e.g., automated data) more generally. Consequently, the law covers a 
very specific type of information, i.e., credit transactions and the repayment history of 
consumers in relation to leases, credit cards, instalment purchases, loans and credit sales.209 It 
does not extend to m-payment transactions unless these use credit information, such as, credit 
card details.210 
In light of the failure to adopt a data protection law, such as the GDPR, discussed in 
chapter 4, section 4.5.4, m-payment consumers’ data, privacy and security are thus at great 
risk. Data protection is only guaranteed to a limited extent by virtue of Article 17 of the Basic 
Law of Governance 1992 and some other sectoral laws.211 As discussed in chapter 1, the 
advent of m-payment transactions enables the capture of big data,212 which makes it possible 
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to understand customers’ behaviour.213 When such data is misused, it can affect the privacy 
and security of consumers.214 The collection of large quantities of personal consumer data for 
financial gains by m-payment providers ought to be, therefore, regulated, just like credit 
information. 
The Islamic basis for extending protection from credit information to personal data is 
that the Quran clearly forbids fraud and mischief. For example, Sura Shu’ara 26, verses 181 
to 183 state: ‘Give just measure, and cause no loss (to others by fraud)/And weigh with scales 
true and upright/And withhold not things justly due to men, nor do evil in the land, working 
mischief’. The lack of personal data protection is indicative of a weaker social welfare 
approach to consumer protection as it increases the likelihood of fraud and other mischief for 
consumers. For this reason, Islamic scholars and legislators could utilise this fundamental 
holy command to create data protection laws, including for m-payment transactions. 
The other option would be to widen the scope of Article 1 of the CIL 2008, so that m-
payment transactions are included. However, in light of the scope of this law, which clearly 
suggests that it only applies to credit information, it is better to address this in a new statute 
altogether with similar provisions to those contained in the CIL 2008 being imposed on those 
providing m-payment services. The collection and exchange of m-payment transaction 
information would also generate a more complete picture about the financial status of 
customers and this may enable SA to maintain its World Bank Credit Depth of Information 
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Index’s results in the future, which were eight out of eight in 2013 to 2014, with eight being 
the highest.215 
In 2004, the Saudi Credit Bureau (‘SIMAH’) was set up to provide commercial and 
consumer information services and its Research and Advisory Centre utilises data to address 
issues and develop products.216 SIMAH is responsible for maintaining and collecting credit 
information about corporate entities and consumers.217 It functions as a data aggregator as it 
collects credit information from banks and issues official credit reports when requested.218 
However, credit information companies can provide credit information services in addition to 
SIMAH, so long as they have been awarded a licence.219 Both act like credit reference 
agencies and help banks, retailers and mobile companies to quickly assess the 
creditworthiness of a potential borrower. 
In the future, businesses which collect data about m-payment transactions can also 
offer important insights about customer behaviour.220 Whilst this data is not concerned with 
the ability to repay, it is arguably more far-reaching and can be utilised in different ways. For 
example, retail offers can be individualised based on personal data.221 In light of the fact that 
the Prophet Mohammed clearly favoured trade, this new data market needs to be regulated in 
an Islamic way, but, as discussed in chapter 3, adherence to the principles of good faith, 
honesty and fairness must be ensured. One way to achieve this is to supervise all those 
entities which collect and handle such information, possibly through a new body similar to 
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the SIMAH. The adoption of a data protection law, including m-payment transaction data, 
together with the creation of an office like the ICO in the UK would heighten consumer 
protection in line with a social welfare approach. SA should ensure that it takes steps to 
transpose the OECD’s G20 High-Level Principles on Financial Consumer Protection, as 
discussed in chapter 3. These principles strike a balance which would be appropriate in SA by 
calling on governments to create financial consumer protection frameworks, yet at the same 
time acknowledge that customers must have obligations.  
The Islamic haram doctrine is also, arguably, violated without such a law being in 
place as data protection breaches heighten the risk of customers losing funds. Sensitive big 
data which is generated through m-payment transactions is currently insufficiently protected 
and businesses are not legally incentivised to exercise due diligence and care to prevent 
customer data being lost. However, many Quranic verses emphasise that individuals must be 
protected, especially against undue interference.222 Consequently, Islamic scholars should 
require customer data generated from m-payment transactions to be afforded similar 
protection to credit information. For instance, the CIL 2008 requires that credit information 
must be kept confidential,223 that complaint mechanisms are created224 and customers must 
consent to the creation of credit records.225 Customers are also permitted to complain to a 
committee for a failure to correct their report.226 Article 12 of the CIL 2008 provides that 
there will be a violation in eight instances, e.g., when credit information is used for 
unauthorised purposes. Any violation can result in a fine and/or a temporary licence 
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revocation or suspension.227 However, unlike under UK law considered in chapter 4, section 
4.5, the CIL 2008 is silent on providing any remedies to the consumer whose information has 
been subject to unauthorised use; the penalty is paid to the regulator as a punishment rather 
than to the consumer as compensation.228 This gives rise to a lacuna in the Saudi regime of 
consumer protection, as enforcement actions brought through the Committee provide no 
remedy to the wronged party.  
The Minister of Finance forms committees in order to determine disputes between 
consumers and credit information companies, banks and other public and private entities 
which have collected and handled credit information in order to assess whether the law has 
been violated.229 These committees also determine the appropriate sanctions and their 
decisions can be appealed in the courts.230 Once a decision has been reached, those who have 
suffered loss because of a breach may seek damages.231 
A similar set-up for m-payment transaction information is crucial to protect the 
personal data of customers which is, arguably, as sensitive as their credit information. The 
UK approach towards data protection, particularly the GDPR, could serve as a blueprint. 
Such legal intervention from the state is essential to further the social welfare objectives of 
the Sharia. Without this, the Saudi stance on information from m-payment transactions 
resembles the neoliberal paradigm and lacks the needed social welfare aspect to support the 
country’s Islamic ethics. 
Furthermore, in the future, it is necessary that data obtained from m-payment systems 
is fed into SIMAH’s national data pool. At present, corporate credit information from most 
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commercial banks is fed into this.232 Through this pool, SIMAH assesses the risk of default 
exposure and whether the capital adequacy requirements of Basel II and III are met. In 2009, 
the Saudi Credit Information Company was created by Saudi banks and SAMA to further 
help banks to determine credit risk.233 M-payment data integration may help to promote 
financial stability which is essential for mitigating the risks posed to m-payment customers. It 
may help create new big data business opportunities and help to assess consumer’s 
trustworthiness far beyond their credit score.234 Businesses can advertise more tailored offers 
to consumers, increasing their attractiveness and avoiding a situation where the consumer is 
shown content they are uninterested in.235 However, it may be necessary to ensure regulatory 
safeguards are in place so that these potential consumer benefits are realised and not simply 
taken advantage of by service providers.236  
 
5.5.3 The Consumer Credit Regulations 2006 and the failure to protect m-payment 
customers' data 
In 2006, SAMA adopted Consumer Credit Regulations (‘CCR 2006’) which require 
consumer information to be kept private and confidential.237 They also spell out what 
information has to be furnished as part of consumer credit or related agreements, and set the 
annual percentage, profit and borrowing rates.238 It explains what constitutes unfair terms in 
 
232 Saudi Credit Bureau n 216.  
233 Oxford Business Group, The Report, Saudi Arabia 2010 (Oxford Business Group 2011) 71. 
234 B. Marr, 'Chinese Social Credit Score: Utopian Big Data Bliss or Black Mirror on Steroids?' Forbes, 21 
January 2019 <https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2019/01/21/chinese-social-credit-score-utopian-big-
data-bliss-or-black-mirror-on-steroids/#5962880048b8> accessed 25 April 2019. 
235 T.M. Le and S.-Y. Liaw, 'Effects of Pros and Cons of Applying Big Data Analytics to Consumers' Responses 
in an E-Commerce Context' (2017) Sustainability 9, 1-19, 1. 
236 Ibid. 
237 CCR 2006, Article 2. 
238 CCR 2006, Article 4. 
311 
 
the context of consumer credit agreements.239 The Regulations further provide for joint and 
several liabilities, as well as the assignments of rights and early repayments.240 The 
Regulations also applies to consumer credit and related agreements that are offered online. 
As it is likely that, in future, m-payment services may extend to consumer credit and 
not just prepaid payments (as is currently the position), these provisions will remain relevant. 
However, at present, they do not offer protection to customers who make m-payments and so 
the social welfare aspects of Sharia law are not being met in this respect. 
 
 
5.5.4 The Anti-Money Laundering Law 2003 and the issue of protecting customers' data 
Following 9/11 in the United States, SA passed the Anti-Money Laundering Law 2003 
('AML') in order to criminalise money laundering, terrorist financing, terrorist organisations 
and terrorist acts.241 Under this law, banks are required to establish mechanisms to identify 
and report suspicious transactions and freeze accounts.242 Moreover, record-keeping and 
reporting requirements were enhanced and the hawala system, which is an informal trust-
based funds transfer system, has been subjected to compulsory licensing.243 A financial 
intelligence unit (‘FIU’) was also created to analyse suspicious transaction reports and banks 
are now required to submit as part of their AML and counter-terrorist financing initiatives 
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(‘CTF’) any suspicious transaction reports to this unit.244 Money laundering offences are tried 
in Sharia courts and there have been successful prosecutions.245 The AML Law 2003 was 
further supplemented by: the Rules governing AML and Combating Terrorist Financing of 
2003, 2008 and 2012; the AML and Counter-Terrorism Financing Rules for Financing 
Companies 2012; and the 2013 Implementing Regulations of the AML Law. 
SA’s AML and CTF laws are largely in line with the FATF standards.246 A Mutual 
Evaluation Report by the FATF describes the legal AML regime as ‘quite robust’, but 
observes that the legal regime for combating the financing of terrorism is ‘not as 
developed.’247 The AML Law also applies to m-payment systems, as made clear by various 
FATF reports.248 An analysis of the AML Law 2003 shows that the law is wide enough to 
accommodate suspicion-based reporting relating to m-payments since anyone who commits 
money laundering, for instance, or who conducts any transaction involving funds or proceeds 
with the knowledge that they are the result of a criminal activity or have an illegitimate or 
illegal source or who assists, facilitates, colludes or covers up such transactions, is 
culpable.249 The AML Law further clarifies this, stating that ‘anyone who carries out or 
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participates commits money laundering and that this also extends to chairmen of institutions, 
employees and others, including hired hands’.250 
Reference to non-financial institutions ensures that the scope is broad enough to cover 
payments and e-money institutions. The term ‘hired hands’ can also extend to other parties 
within the m-payment infrastructure. Obligations can thus be imposed on m-payment 
providers to make suspicious activity reports ('SARs') if a customer uses m-payment services 
and instructs a bank to transfer funds. However, these are insufficiently robust in comparison 
with international standards, e.g., the UK’s AML law combating money laundering and 
terrorist financing. SA should either amend its AML Law or insert into the Regulatory Rules 
for Payment Services (discussed at section 5.3.2) a duty to collect information251 via payment 
service providers. The AML law and the interlinked Regulatory Rules should be revised to 
incorporate a coherent system of definitions to ensure that there are not gaps created by 
technicalities in the language of the legislation. Further, in order to give the regime teeth, real 
and accessible remedies must be available to consumers who are harmed by the regulatory 
breaches of service providers. This might encompass issues from breaches of privacy and 
data protection to failure to provide the requisite protections against fraud.  
Furthermore, it would be useful for SAMA to issue specific guidance for m-payment 
service providers. At present, even an individual service provider might have difficulty in 
identifying whether and to what extent they fall within the scope of the regulation. This is 
because m-payment transactions create novel AML situations, as explained by the FATF in 
its 'Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach, Prepaid Cards, Mobile Payments and Internet-
Based Payment Services.'252 For instance, criminals may use stolen mobile phones to 
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perpetrate money laundering and terrorist financing. Cyber criminals may also hack the 
accounts of other customers in order to launder money or finance terrorism, thus putting 
consumers at considerable risk. Accordingly, consumer protection based on social welfare 
principles would be heightened if SAMA was to issue more specific guidance for m-payment 
services.  
In the UK, guidelines have been issued for payment service providers by the 
European Supervisory Authorities, so that payments are fully traceable. One significant 
improvement of SA’s AML framework which may be advanced based on international 
comparison would, therefore, be to mandate that payment service providers collect the name 
of the payer and payee and their respective bank account details, as well as the payer's 
address, when more than 4,000 SAR are transferred, or more than 11,000 SAR worth of 
goods are purchased per year through reloadable payment cards. This should be in addition to 
the existing CDD requirements outlined in section 5.3.2.  To date, SA has disappointingly not 
implemented many of the sound recommendations made by the FATF.253 The AML 
framework could be enhanced if provision is made requiring AML risk assessments to be 
conducted to determine whether a transaction is suspicious and may require an SAR, and that 
subsequently written policies, controls and procedures would be put in place to mitigate 
identified risks. In addition, it should be required that these policies, controls and procedures 
were regularly reviewed and updated. Staff should also be provided with these policies, 
controls and procedures and receive training in how to follow them. Implementation of these 
changes would provide a starting point for ensuring that some of the inherent risks of m-
payments to ordinary consumers would be assuaged and adherence to the Sharia principles of 
social welfare would be improved. Placing additional requirements, such as, collection of the 
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name, address, and details of consumers making m-payment transactions above certain 
thresholds limits the risk to which both payer and payee are potentially exposed at the 
expense of the service provider, and carrying out CDD if necessary. Although it may be 
argued that this would in fact represent the reinforcing of a neoliberal position of improving 
market efficiency by building public confidence in such markets through stricter AML laws, 
this would only be the case as a means to achieve the ultimate end of improving consumer 
protection, a potential resolution to the policy conflict which was identified in chapter 4, 
section 4.6.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the law governing the use of m-payment applications in SA. SA’s 
approach towards m-payments has not been as liberal as that in the UK. The reason for this is 
that the Banking Control Law 1966 has not been updated, making it impossible for new 
parties to enter the emerging m-payment market. Equally, the 2012 Regulatory Rules for 
Prepaid Payment Services are bank-centric so that Fintech innovation is being stifled. The 
2012 Rules adopt a very restrictive business model, more akin to gift cards than the varied 
forms that m-payment services can take. The Rules are, arguably, close to the UK regime for 
e-money institutions in that both address the carrying of e-money business. However, the 
2012 Rules do not properly liberalise the m-payment market, thereby curtailing consumer 
choice in a neoliberal sense since only prepaid payment services can be offered. As a result, 
many of the advantages which m-payment services bring for customers are being squandered. 
SA is presently pursuing a producerist stance which protects banks. Producerism, as 
chapter 3 argues, does not promote the consumers’ interests in the economic realm. It should 
be borne in mind that Prophet Mohammed was a great supporter of trade, which has led the 
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Hanbali School to take a normally liberal stance in respect of business matters. There thus 
exist fundamental reasons for legislators to abandon this trade-hindering approach. 
One way to achieve this is to amend the Banking Control Law 1966 and to clarify that 
SAMA is responsible for regulating institutions which offer m-payment services, including 
TPPs and e-money institutions. In addition, there should be a new authorisation regime for 
these institutions, as in the UK. Steps should be taken to facilitate consumerism by allowing 
interested businesses to make use of telecommunications networks in order to make available 
m-payment services. Technology is a great driver of progress and economic growth, which, 
in turn, would promote social welfare in line with Sharia demands. 
The Electronic Transaction Law also only facilitates e-commerce but does not confer 
protection on customers who use m-payment services. The underlying basis of this Web 1.0 
law (which regulates the relationship between certification service providers and certificate 
holders) is ill-equipped to govern the new relationships created through the m-payment 
ecosystem. In other words, a new payment services law is required which defines m-payment 
transactions and addresses how such transactions are original and integer. 
Consequently, SA’s laws, regulations, rules and guidance are currently based on the 
Web 1.0 version. The legal responses to many issues that arise are outdated and have not 
evolved, as appropriate, to the Web 2.0 version, like in the UK. In the near future, new 
technological innovation will further facilitate Web 3.0, an even more dynamic and 
interactive World Wide Web.254 It is essential for SA to substantially reform its banking laws 
to keep abreast with such developments. Otherwise, the risk is that businesses will offer new 
 




services without an appropriate regulatory framework being put in place to protect 
consumers. 
The analysis reveals that there is currently little to no law, rules, regulations or 
guidance that specifically address m-payment in SA, particularly unauthorised m-payment 
transactions and protection of consumer data and their privacy, including against privacy 
breaches. Banks are using wide exclusion clauses when they offer m-payment services and 
their scope is not curtailed by unfair terms legislation, such as the CRA 2015 in the UK. This 
appears to be because the Islamic jurisprudence governing unfair contractual terms is 
insufficiently developed, as discussed in chapter 3, section 3.6. Customers have therefore 
been granted very few rights which is unsurprising due to Islamic scholars typically focusing 
on duties, as opposed to rights. Consequently, the appropriate channels and procedures for 
resolving consumer disputes are still largely underdeveloped and the social welfare aspect of 
Sharia law is not being adhered to in this area.  
The failure to pursue a liberal policy orientation towards the opening up of the m-
payment sector has not resulted in additional protection for m-payment customers. Instead, it 
is more accurate to state that a non-interventionist legal consumer protection approach has 
been adopted. No specialised body similar to the UK Payment Systems Regulator has been 
created. Customers cannot settle disputes easily through an ombudsman service, as in the UK. 
No efforts have been made to make up for failures through private ordering, e.g., by setting 
up voluntary codes, such as, the UK Standards of Lending Practice 2016. 
Whilst the Regulatory Rules for Prepaid Payment Services are a sound first step, they 
are insufficient to facilitate the emerging m-payment revolution and are unlikely to greatly 
benefit customer choice. They do not adequately protect customers against heightened 
technological risk as the most pressing topic of negligence liability has not been addressed. 
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No right to a refund has been granted except in the case of billing errors, which massively 
undermines consumer protection and the social welfare principles of Sharia law. The disputes 
settlement procedure is also unduly limited to those cases which fall within the narrow scope 
of billing errors. The Banking Consumer Protection Principles and Banking Consumers’ 
Guide may also be difficult to evoke in the context of m-payment transactions without further 
clarification. The reason is that they are most likely to be treated as soft law which does not 
override unfair exclusion clauses. Ideally, these principles and guide should be rooted in the 
Sharia, such as the good faith principle, the haram and halal concepts and the profit and loss 
sharing principle, in order to confer meaningful protection to m-payment consumers. 
However, as discussed in chapter 3, the requisite Islamic pro-consumer protection 
jurisprudence must firstly be promulgated. 
Furthermore, banks’ terms and conditions do not seem to accord with the principles. It 
is unclear whether the banking consumer guides and banking consumer protection principles 
take priority over the exclusion clauses in the terms and conditions of banks. The other issue 
with these principles is that they are modelled on the G20 High Level Principles on Financial 
Consumer Protection 2011, which are reflective of a neoliberal approach. For this reason, the 
Banking Consumer Protection Principles and Banking Consumers’ Guide are not fully 
compatible with the social welfare objective of the Sharia.  
Moreover, consumer protection has been significantly marginalised because 
customers’ data is inadequately protected by m-payment providers in the big data era. The 
Credit Information Law only protects credit but not m-payment information as no data 
protection law exist which customers can evoke. This is despite the fact that the advent of m-
payments generates large datasets which profile customers much more precisely than ever 
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before.255 As a result, the security of this far-reaching personal data is much more at risk. 
There are no legislative provisions which customers can evoke to compel m-payment 
providers to not misutilise or safeguard their data or compensate them for losses suffered due 
to security or third-party failures. 
All these issues highlight that reforms to existing laws in SA are needed and more 
particularly, the adoption of an improved payment system law is urgently needed in order to 
honour the primary source of law, the Sharia which is supreme over civil law. This 
particularly requires that m-payment customers are conceptualised as vulnerable individuals, 
though capable of learning, as further discussed in the Conclusion.
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CHAPTER 6           
 
CONCLUSION  
6.1 Concluding comments 
 
This work has employed a positivist ontology to explore the ways in which the law protects 
banking customers from the risks of m-payments in SA, particularly unauthorised m-payment 
transactions and data protection of such transactions, through the lens of comparisons 
between Saudi and UK approaches to this challenge.  
The opening chapter of this work elaborated on the nature and potential of this new 
technology, highlighting its unique benefits to consumers in terms of convenience and 
accessibility, and its potential to open up a new market which brings great benefits to those 
economies which are able to embrace it. 
The challenge presented by m-payments is often underestimated and poorly 
understood by regulators. Chapter 2 thus set out in greater detail the complex risks associated 
with Fintech innovation, in particular the heightened risk of fraud, theft, money laundering, 
and breaches of data security. It was emphasised that the legal questions of how to protect 
consumers when it comes to unauthorised m-payment transactions and how to safeguard 
consumers' data in order to maintain privacy and protect against breaches of their privacy are 





It is well-established and widely accepted that regulators have a responsibility to 
protect consumers from exploitation by potentially malign market forces. The literature 
review in chapter 3 set out the theoretical bases and justifications for this responsibility, as 
well as the countervailing policy considerations such as the general economic advantages of 
encouraging free trade, competition, and innovation. That these principles apply in the 
context of m-payment is self-evident, but how they should be balanced and realised is a more 
controversial question. The complexity of contractual relationships and the wide array of 
stakeholders with competing interests makes this a particularly thorny field for regulators. 
The picture is further complicated in the context of the Saudi Arabian market, where Sharia 
principles are also considered an imperative element of market and financial service 
regulation. Sharia law requires that consumers are safeguarded in a variety of ways, including 
by adhering to the good faith principle, the concepts of halal and haram, and the profit and 
loss sharing principle. The writings of Islamic scholars on the subject of consumer protection, 
both broadly and specifically in the context of m-payments, were referred to in this analysis 
to illustrate what the implications of these principles might be for the regulation of the 
Fintech sector. 
In this context, chapter 4 analysed the regulation of m-payment services firstly in the 
UK and secondly in chapter 5 in SA. The UK regulatory environment generally favours the 
neoliberal values of innovation and market competition, whilst at the same time offering 
significant protection to consumers.  
On the other hand, the regulatory picture in SA is less promising. The Saudi approach 





However, this has not brought the strong consumer protection which it might be hoped could 
accompany a restrictive regulatory approach. Not only does it fail to serve the interests of the 
economy by enabling the growth of a sector with huge potential, and failed consumers by 
depriving them of the practical benefits which m-payment services offer, but perhaps more 
seriously it has failed to meet the requirements of Sharia law in a number of respects. Most 
importantly, it presently falls short in providing consumers protection against unauthorised 
m-payment transactions by permitting that customers bear the full cost of any loss that 
follows from an unauthorised transaction and by failing to protect consumers’ data and their 
privacy.  
 
6.2 Key findings 
 
The next sections present the key findings, firstly in section 6.2.1 about the (in)adequacy of 
existing Saudi regulation of m-payments discussed in chapter 5, particularly its defects in 
compliance with Sharia law and its failure to keep pace with technological change. 
Thereafter, section 6.2.2 discusses the extent to which the UK approach might provide a 
useful model in seeking to improve the regulation of m-payment services that is Sharia 
compliant and discusses its advantages and disadvantages, as well as the challenges of 






6.2.1 Shortfalls in the current Saudi Arabia regulatory regime for m-payments 
A key purpose of this work has been to consider the areas which the Saudi legislator will 
need to address in order to provide a more robust legal framework in which Saudi m-payment 
providers can deliver m-payment services to consumers in a way which adequately deals with 
the risks in a Sharia compliant manner. Chapter 5 set out the substance of the key provisions 
in Saudi law, and measured these against the Sharia requirements which the law sought to 
attain. Chapter 5 further demonstrated the areas of the existing Saudi legal regime that fell 
short of the ideal social welfare approach by a significant margin.  
The Sharia requires that social welfare policy should provide the lynchpin of any 
statutory and regulatory framework.1 At the same time, these policy imperatives should be 
balanced with encouraging business, enterprise, and economic growth, as Islam is pro-
commerce.2 Saudi Arabian law should, therefore, prioritise social justice in line with the 
Islamic objective of ‘establishing what is right and forbidding what is wrong’;3 Islamic 
‘ethics, morality and behavioural admonitions’ must not be deviated from.4  This reflects the 
fact that the Sharia is the most important source of law,5 and shapes both the broad concepts 
applicable in this field (such as the good faith principle), and specific legislative enactments 
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such as Article 6(a) of the Charter of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (‘SAMA’) 1957. 6 
In SA, this means adhering to the Hanbali version of Sharia law.7  
For the detailed reasons identified in the preceding chapter, Saudi legislation has 
fundamentally failed to respond to the various risks and challenges identified in chapter 2, 
particularly unauthorised m-payment transactions and data protection, that are associated 
with m-payment and in a manner which complies with these Islamic concepts. A stark 
illustration of this defect is the failure of the 2010 e-Banking Rules in SA to provide 
consumers with recourse for redress in the event that they are targeted by cyber criminals 
who have appropriated money from their accounts. The rights of the consumers are limited to 
raising a complaint with SAMA (the resolution of which remains uncertain) and do not 
extend to any right to a refund or compensation from the payment service provider 
responsible. 
Even where protections do exist, chapter 5 demonstrates that banks can easily evade 
these simply by invoking an exclusion clause when offering m-payment services. In the 
absence of any specific rules, regulations, or even voluntary guidance to address the 
challenges and risks of m-payment, the effect is that the sector is almost entirely unregulated 
and the level of protection available to consumers is below even what they might expect to 
receive when using traditional banking services. This is compounded by a false sense of 
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security amongst consumers, which results from the usually stringent approach of Islamic 
jurisprudence to banking.8  
Moreover, it is highly arguable that the restrictive market conditions which are 
created by existing regulations are inconsistent with overarching Islamic principles. As noted 
in chapter 3, Islam and particularly the Hanbali School normally take a liberal approach to 
business matters. There are thus good reasons for legislators to abandon a trade-hindering 
approach, particularly in relation to a service, such as, m-payment, which has inherent 
benefits for consumers. The provision of m-payment services offers freedom and 
convenience to customers. That also supports the advancement of the Fintech sector as a 
whole which offers much more widespread benefits.  
How can Saudi regulators resolve these challenges? Perhaps the greatest challenge 
facing Saudi regulators is that the law is heavily outdated and legislative processes have 
struggled to keep up with the rate of change in the m-payment sector. Unlike UK law, Saudi 
laws have not kept abreast with technological advances. The Saudi consumer protection 
rationale is underdeveloped due to the religious-based legal system. As identified in chapter 
3, this has limited the development of consumer rights due to Islam’s focus on duties.9 A 
comprehensive reform therefore offers the most realistic prospect of bringing Saudi 
regulation into line with Sharia requirements. The following two sections discuss the utility 
of the UK as a model in undertaking such an extensive reform. This analysis is undertaken 
with the caveat that the UK is able to offer a framework which encourages trade, flexibility, 
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and market growth, whereas the Saudi Arabian legislator should pursue different values of 
social welfare and consumer protection.  
 
6.2.2 The value of the UK as a model for regulating m-payment systems 
Chapter 4 offered a doctrinal analysis of the UK legal framework concerning m-payment 
services. As indicated at the outset of chapter 4, this legal evaluation helps to provide a basis 
for a comparative analysis with the Saudi legal framework and to interrogate the thesis’ 
central research question of whether SA could be positively influenced by the UK model.  
The UK approach to regulating m-payments has various advantages. Fundamentally, 
it promotes the neoliberal values of innovation and market competition, but also 
simultaneously offers significant protection to consumers. Moreover, the UK approach has 
proven highly adaptable in response to changing market conditions; legislation has evolved as 
the sector has matured. This places the UK in a strong position to meet the next generation of 
Fintech advances.10 The overall assessment of UK regulation is therefore positive; a carefully 
considered regime is provided which finely balances market interests with those of the 
consumer and is sufficiently flexible to accommodate incremental development.  
However, there are certain disadvantages with the UK approach which can serve as a 
useful warning to other legislators, such as, the Saudi Arabian government, regarding the 
 
10 Capgemini and BNP Paribas, ‘World Payment Report’, 14th ed, 2018, 1-56, 31 
<https://worldpaymentsreport.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2018/10/World-Payments-Report-2018.pdf> 
accessed 10 February 2019; K.-C. Claus, 'How convergence is transforming payment services', Ernst & Young, 
24 May 2018 <https://www.ey.com/en_gl/digital/how-convergence-is-transforming-payment-services> accessed 





potential pitfalls of m-payment regulation. For example, chapter 4, section 4.5.6, outlined the 
ongoing debate about the effectiveness of the AML requirements contained in the MLRs 
2017. Given the increasing demand for transparency, the MLRs 2017 raises a tension 
between AML and consumer protection, particularly in terms of data protection. It has even 
been suggested that the AML provisions could be actively detrimental to consumer interests 
by providing legal uncertainties which permit companies to access customer data without 
consent or even the knowledge of the individuals concerned.11 This illustrates the risk of 
unintended consequences when regulating a complex and fast-moving market, such as, m-
payment services, which in turn can create uncertainty for companies as to the legal position, 
and undermine the ability of consumers to act rationally in their own best interests. The UK 
approach is to a certain extent premised on the assumption of consumer rationality which is 
not necessarily realistic in m-payment where many consumers lack understanding of how 
technology operates and what their legal rights may be. The law alone cannot resolve this 
challenge as it is a societal issue which reflects both the pace of change of technology and the 
degree of attention which consumers give, or is willing to give, in deciding which types of 
financial services to use. However, what the law can do is proceed on the basis of an accurate 
and realistic impression of consumer rationality, rather than designing a regulatory regime 
with the ‘perfect’ consumer in mind.  
Moreover, the use of voluntary codes of conduct in preference to compulsory 
standards is inconsistent with Sharia principles in so far as it reflects the prioritisation of 
 
11 See e.g., T. Zalan and E. Toufaily, ‘The Promise of Fintech in Emerging Markets: Not as Disruptive’ (2017) 





commercial and economic incentives to shield this new sector from the full force of the law 
until it becomes better established. Voluntary codes may have the benefit of reducing the risk 
of stifling innovation. An obvious issue with voluntary codes, however, is that even 
enterprises which subscribe to the code can flout their commitments with little or no 
consequence. In other words, the implication of soft law/bank guides into the contract with 
the consumer is that they therein contained rights and duties are not enforceable. This leaves 
consumers with the ‘worst of both worlds’ as the code provides the appearance of protection 
and subscription gives the enterprise the impression of legitimacy, leading the consumer be 
more trusting than they otherwise might, whilst in reality there is no or little substantive 
protection. It also creates the impression that regulators are not ‘serious’ about consumer 
protection, as voluntary codes may lack any teeth. Companies may take advantage of their 
reticence and be emboldened to push the boundaries of acceptable behaviour. For this reason, 
it is essential that statutory obligations are at least imposed on general purpose networks in 
order to protect customers and financial stability. Users of general purpose networks are more 
vulnerable as they are generally less likely to have specialist knowledge of the services they 
choose to use and of the legal protections available in respect of any transactions they choose 
to enter into. 
It must be also emphasised that a regulatory transplantation of the UK model poses 
various challenges. The considerations which drive UK politics namely, to strike a balance 
between pro-consumer regulations protecting users of m-payment services and pro-market 
reforms encouraging financial innovation are not necessarily the same considerations which 





it is to be implemented.12 However effectively the approach might work in the UK, it does 
not mean that a direct transplantation of provisions is likely to offer similarly positive results 
in SA. The challenges of translation are particularly acute given the vastly different social, 
economic, and political contexts of the UK and SA. The UK operates as a liberal democracy 
and generally favours a capitalist approach to market regulation.13 By contrast, SA is a 
religious state and policy makers are required to take into account the requirements of Sharia 
law, which should include extensive consumer protection and public welfare considerations.14 
Also, the UK follows a common law legal system and decides cases based on precedents, 
whereas SA lacks this common law heritage.15 SA would therefore be unable to mirror the 
UK approach in this regard without a much broader and more far-reaching overhaul of its 
legal system. 
Notwithstanding the challenges of regulatory transplantation, the UK approach can 
perhaps provide a positive example, particularly in respect of its flexibility and 
responsiveness to shifting social, political, and economic pressures. UK policy has not rigidly 
adhered to any single approach, but has evolved over time. The permissive approach which 
provided the basis for the UK’s initial response to the emerging challenges presented by m-
payment services, as previously embodied in the PSR 2009, enabled the UK to promote 
development and innovation, most notably in the form of Fintech. However, as the market 
developed, a second generation of legislation was introduced to reflect growing concerns 
 
12 F. Bignami and D. Zaring, Comparative Law and Regulation: Understanding the Global Regulatory Process 
(Edward Elgar 2016) 26. 
13 B. Jones and P. Norton, Politics UK (8th ed, Routledge 2014) 576. 
14 M.M. Keshavjee and R. Abdulla, 'Family Law to Finance'. In A.B. Sajoo (eds.), The Shari’a: History, Ethics 
and Law (IB Tauris & Co Ltd 2018) Chapter 7. 





about its social and economic impact. The PSR 2017 also addressed new services such as PIS 
and AIS which simply had not been contemplated at the time of the PSR 2009. This allowed 
concerns about protecting consumers from fast-paced and unregulated developments to be 
addressed, whilst preserving strong competition within the financial services market and the 
economic growth which this ultimately enables.16 
For example, the UK regulatory regime has constantly revised the definitions of key 
terms, e.g., e-money (which definition was recently updated by the EMR 2011), to ensure 
that the relevance of legislative provisions is maintained as the market and technology 
develops.17 This reflected the need to expand protection to include any value which is stored 
magnetically to undertake payment transactions and is used as tender by legal and natural 
persons, as well as value which is stored on IT servers and on plastic cards.18  
The UK approach illustrates two key principles which could prove highly valuable for 
Saudi Arabian legislators in addressing the regulatory challenges presented by the 
development of the m-payment sector. Firstly, the weight and nature of policy considerations 
are not constant and fluctuate with changes in the market, advancements in technology, and 
broader social developments. Likewise, the regulatory response must not be set in stone but 
must be capable of adapting to changing circumstances, and should be kept under regular 
 
16 P.A. Salz, The Netsize Guide 2009: Mobile Society & Me, when worlds combine (Netsize 2009) 102; S. 
Romero, 'The unstoppable growth of digital banking: 3 billion users by 2021', BBVA, 22 February 2017 
<https://www.bbva.com/en/unstoppable-growth-digital-banking-3-billion-users-2021/> 19 November 2017. 
17 Directive 2009/110/EC on the taking-up, pursuit and prudential regulation of the business of electronic money 
institutions amending Directives 2005/6-/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 2000/46/EC. 
18 HM Treasury, 'Laying of regulations to implement the new E-Money Directive, a consultation document.' 
October 2010, 1-112, 10 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/81328/emoney_directive_consu





review to determine whether updates are necessary. In this context, it is important for the 
Saudi Arabian legislator to continuously take into account regulatory responses from around 
the world. The reason is that there exist not only the three options of placing all of the loss 
from an unauthorised payment either with the consumer (as SA currently does) or with the 
service provider or opting for a hybrid allocation (as the UK has done). In other words, while 
this research has focused on the UK as a model for regulating m-payment systems and has 
examined its regulatory response, other jurisdictions may also offer interesting solutions 
which might better fit the Saudi Arabian context.  
Hence, Saudi Arabia should not confine itself to these three options. It must conduct a 
far-reaching review of the possible legislative and regulatory options to the problem of loss 
allocation. This will help SA to devise a legislative response which best fits its social, 
economic, and political context. Secondly, what is apparent from the UK regulatory regime is 
that it is possible to formulate policies which balance competing policy interests without 
necessarily prioritising only one. Again, this balance can be adapted over time to reflect 
changing needs.  
The next section presents the recommendations and reform proposals. 
 
6.3 Recommendations and Proposals:  Areas for reform in order to provide a more 
robust legal framework for protecting consumers using m-payment services  
In summary, the existing Saudi regulation of m-payment services is deficient in two principal 





who might be less aware of the potential risks of FinTech, particularly against unauthorised 
m-payment transactions and ‘datafication’19, from mercenary corporations. In particular, as 
noted in chapter 3, they fail to ensure that wealth creation confers rights on persons in a way 
that promotes unity within society through high business standards.20 Secondly, existing 
Saudi laws not only neglect to facilitate market innovation, competition, and the growth of 
the Fintech sector, but actively inhibit these processes. Again, this is contrary to the 
fundamental principles of Islam, and is not in the interests of the Saudi nation or individual 
consumers who might otherwise enjoy the benefits of m-payments. The root cause of these 
failings lies primarily in the failure of regulators to adopt a specialised regime to address the 
unique challenges posed by m-payment services. They, instead, attempt to shoehorn 
regulation of the newly emerged Fintech sector into existing banking regulations which were 
manifestly inadequate to manage the risks of a technology which was not even contemplated 
at the time they were drafted. This problem has become compounded over time, as m-
payment services have grown ever further from traditional banking and the challenge faced 
by Saudi regulators in ‘catching up’ with the technology has grown ever more daunting. 
It is apparent that the Saudi regulatory regime is in urgent need of reform. 
Notwithstanding the need for caution in pursuing any proposed regulatory transplant, SA can 
adopt a number of broad principles from the UK’s approach which have been structured 
thematically to reflect the challenges identified in the Introduction chapter.  
 
19 M. Rhoen, 'Beyond consent: improving data protection through consumer protection law' (2016) Internet 
Policy Review 5(1) <https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/beyond-consent-improving-data-protection-
through-consumer-protection-law> accessed 15 April 2019. 





 A complete review of relevant aspects of Saudi law should take place to ensure 
overarching compliance with Sharia principles. The starting point for any such review is to 
identify the ideal position which SA hopes to achieve through regulation of the m-payments 
sector, drawing on the requirements of both Sharia law and the needs of the market if the 
Fintech sector is to thrive in the country. This review should then proceed to characterise the 
defects identified above in greater detail, along with any other areas in which it appears that 
Saudi regulation has fallen short of the preferred position. It will be necessary to consider the 
reasons for these shortcomings, both on an immediate level (i.e., that the primary reason for 
many of the failures is the neglect of updating the law to accommodate advances in mobile 
technology) and on a secondary level (broader features of the Saudi legal system which may 
inhibit the type of review and incremental reform which successful regulation of this sector 
requires). In respect of the latter, Islamic scholars should particularly focus on utilising the 
good faith principle to develop an Islamic fairness jurisprudence which can be applied to 
unfair contract terms and to devise more pro-consumer legislation, including in the field of 
data protection. 
 
6.3.1 Balancing Consumer Protection and Market Innovation 
UK law may be drawn on as an illustration of how consumer protection values can co-exist, 
and even support, strong competition within the market. One way to achieve this is to amend 
the Banking Control Law 1966, so that it clarifies that SAMA is responsible for regulating 
those which offer m-payment services, including TPPs and e-money institutions. This could 





consumer protections might be enforced, or to strengthen the powers of enforcement/mandate 
available to SAMA. For example, an Ombudsman service for resolution of consumer disputes 
has been introduced in the UK to facilitate the resolution of disputes and the enforcement of 
consumer rights. Introduction of comparable measures would make those rights which are 
protected by SAMA more meaningful. Similarly, the e-Banking Rules 2010 might be 
amended to complement the reformed regime in respect of e-money issuers. This could 
include, for example, provision to ensure that the service providers are required to make 
consumers aware of their rights and the straightforward mechanisms by which they can be 
enforced; mere awareness on the part of consumers is likely to have some effect in ensuring 
compliance by providers.  
Alternatively, it might be preferable to create a new regime from first principles to 
cover the authorisation and supervision of payment service institutions, rather than 
implementing reforms within the existing framework of the Banking Control Law 1966. This 
option would take more time and would be more resource intensive, but it has the advantage 
of marking a ‘fresh start’ and allowing a coherent regime to be developed from the outset. In 
order to reap the full benefits of this investment, it would be desirable to replace the e-
Banking Rules 2010 as part of the same process. In this way, policy makers can consider the 
desired balance between consumer protection and market innovation to best meet the 
country’s needs and design legislation specifically intended to implement this, rather than 
seeking to adapt pre-existing measures which did not envisage the desired balance. In order 
to put together a more appropriate regime for regulating this area in a more social welfare-





replacing the BCL 1966 and the E-banking Rules should incorporate, at a minimum, a 
coherent regime of definitions drawn along lines which would be (at least relatively) intuitive 
to consumers. Consumer rights, including in particular protections in the event of 
unauthorised transactions, should be clearly differentiated based on these definitions in ways 
which the consumer can understand in advance of making a decision about which service 
provider they wish to use. The UK approach provides a valuable model in this respect. 
Management of information is another important issue which must be addressed; this 
encompasses both provision of information to the consumer to resolve the challenges of 
information asymmetry, and protection of consumer data which as illustrated by the MLRs 
must be counterbalanced against the need to protect against the increased risk of money 
laundering which technology creates. The GDPR, balanced out by the MLR 2017, again 
provides a valuable model on which Saudi Arabian legislators might begin to build a regime 
providing the necessary balance. These specific recommendations are discussed in greater 
depth below. As discussed in chapter 3, one way to achieve this is to require compliance with 
regulatory technical standards which are firmly embedded with the consumer protection 
interest. TPPs must be licensed, just like certification service providers, since they hold the 
digital identities of customers. New provisions should be introduced to set out clearly the 
situations when liability will be imposed, as otherwise there exists too much uncertainty, 
rendering the service haram. The law should further mandate that customers are entitled to a 
prompt refund whenever fraud or other operational errors occur. A contract ought to be 
entered into between the TPPs and customers which clearly formulates the parties’ respective 
rights and duties in accordance with the Islamic principle of good faith. Other obligations 





appropriate sanctions have to be spelled out when TPPs and their collaborators fail to comply 
with their respective duties. This will incentivise the stakeholders within the m-payment 
ecosystem to adopt robust processes throughout the complicated architecture of this 
enterprise. 
Moreover, the Combating Embezzlement Manual could extend the obligations to 
other stakeholders within the m-payment infrastructure, i.e. these parties should identify 
respective fraud risks and mitigation measures. Alternatively, banks could describe how these 
other partners combat fraud. The burden of this task may be shared between service 
providers, who should have an obligation to self-declare, and state institutions which should 
undertake monitoring (perhaps on a sampling or ‘spot check’ basis to minimise the demands 
on this task).  
 
The AML Law could be further reformed. Whilst it can be applied to the m-payment 
context, m-payment transactions create new opportunities for criminals and terrorists to 
launder money and this also puts consumers at risk. For this reason, it is important to gather 
more information and to transpose FATF Recommendation 16, as previously discussed. 
Naturally this must be matched by improved protection of data and privacy in response to the 





modelled on the FATF recommendations entitled ‘Prepaid Cards, Mobile Payments and 
Internet-Based Payment Services.’21 
 
6.3.2 Institutional Competence 
New authorisations schemes should be required for payment services institutions, as in the 
UK. Steps could be taken to facilitate consumerism by allowing new entrants to make use of 
telecommunications networks in order to make available m-payment services. Once these 
principles have been implemented broadly, the necessary statutory clarifications must be put 
in place to ensure that they are effected in practice. The Saudi government might consider 
adopting the broad categories which have been adopted in the UK (e.g., in respect of the 
boundaries of ‘PS provider’ and ‘PS institution’) following careful consideration.  
 
6.3.3 Adherence to Sharia Values 
Guidance should be provided for the application of Islamic principles in the context of m-
payment contracts, particularly exclusion and limitation clauses. This would resolve the 
imbalance of negotiating power between consumer and service provider. The good faith 
principle should be specifically defined and identified as core principles in any new statutory 
rules so as to preserve the Sharia as the touchstone of fairness and common sense and ensure 
operators comply with the spirit and not merely the letter of the law. It should thus be 
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developed to address the extent to which Sharia law will impose or permit the exclusion of 
liability of m-payment providers to their customers. Provision of further guidance would 
encourage companies to act consistently with the intentions of legislators (particularly 
Islamic companies which are eager to operate consistently with Sharia values, but lack the 
understanding or expertise to do so, that is assuming that compliance with Saudi regulation 
inevitably entails compliance with Sharia principles). This could be done by adopting 
statutory restrictions that are comparable to those for the enforcement of unfair contract terms 
in the CRA 2015 and UCTA 1977 (UK).  
 
6.3.4 Keeping Pace with Technological Change 
This area of law should be kept under review to identify when changes in social or market 
conditions mean that it is no longer as effective as it could be in fulfilling its intended 
purpose. Mechanisms and procedures should be put in place to ensure that the necessary 
changes to the law can be implemented in a timely, efficient, and effective manner. These 
might be formalised as the regulatory regime matures. Promising options may include: 
• A specialised body, such as the UK Payment Systems Regulator, to allow m-payment 
customers to settle disputes easily and quickly (as for example is provided by the UK 
ombudsman service). This might build on the work of the Consumer Protection 
Department which has already been established within SAMA22 and could even make 
 
22 Survey of National Progress in the Implementation of G20/FSB Recommendations, Saudi Arabia, 1-44, 43 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/implementation_monitoring/saudi_arabia_2013.pdf> accessed 20 





use of the 2014 draft bill for the creation of an independent body responsible for 
monitoring unethical practices (which remains unimplemented at the time of 
writing).23 
• An advisory body or committee charged with monitoring developments in the Fintech 
sector and making recommendations as to how the law might respond. 
 
6.4 Significance of these findings 
The fundamental problem with the Saudi legislature regime is that it has failed to identify and 
respond to the specific challenges raised by m-payments, as distinct from traditional banking 
operations. This is epitomised by the failure to reform, or indeed to update in any way, the 
1966 Banking Control Law, which is manifestly inadequate for the Fintech era. SAMA has 
similarly failed to shift its focus away from the traditional banking sector towards emerging 
services, despite indications that m-payment constitutes the fastest growing element of the 
financial sector.24 The result is that the market is severely restricted, with companies 
permitted to offer only a limited range of services and innovation severely stifled. Even those 
enactments which have purported to update the law have often fallen short. In particular, the 
2012 Regulatory Rules for Prepaid Payment Services offer little relief for the Fintech sector, 
instead maintaining the status quo bank-centric approach.  
 
23 Zawya, ‘Consumer protection law under Shoura study’, 12 November 2014 
<https://www.zawya.com/story/Consumer_protection_law_under_Saudi_Shoura_study-
ZAWYA20141112035028/> accessed 18 May 2015. 
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This is detrimental not only to the Saudi economy as a whole, which given its high 
rate of smart phone use25 might have had the potential to become a leader in this emerging 
sector, but also individual consumers who are unable to access the benefits of technological 
advancement which they might otherwise enjoy. This is inconsistent with Sharia values in a 
number of respects.  
First and foremost, Saudi regulation fall short of the standard of consumer protection 
which Sharia demands in its approach to m-payment, the stifling of the market and economic 
growth is also fundamentally inconsistent with Islamic principles. The starting point is that 
reasonable protection against unethical treatment should be established by the law, 
particularly in the context of a newly emerged and high-tech sector where many consumers 
are likely to be uninformed as to the risks. Secondly, as is alluded to earlier in the work, the 
Hanbali School is normally liberal in legislating to address business matters. There thus exist 
fundamental reasons for legislators to abandon this trade-hindering approach. The overall 
conclusion of this assessment of Saudi regulation is therefore that it is in need of significant 
reform. 
Finally, these discussions were drawn together in the closing chapter to consider the 
relative strengths and weakness of UK and Saudi regulation of m-payments and the ways in 
which the latter might learn from the former notwithstanding the different social, cultural, 
and economic contexts of the two jurisdictions. Indeed, on closer inspection of the law and 
policy in each country, it becomes apparent that the values which arise from these two 
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different contexts are not so far apart after all; both the UK and SA are concerned to balance 
the interests of consumer protection and encouragement of market growth of innovation. 
A number of recommendations were made as to how SA might benefit from the 
example of the UK in order to reform its own consumer protection regulatory regime, in 
particular in enhancing its consumer protection provisions and in updating its law to reflect 
advances in technology and the maturing of the Fintech sector, whilst maintaining or 
strengthening compliance with Sharia principles.  
 
6.5 Further Research 
This work has been restricted in its scope to consideration of m-payment services. As alluded 
to above, the regulatory context in SA is significantly different to that in the UK. Perhaps 
most obviously, SA is an Islamic nation in which the financial sector and economic 
regulation is moulded by a significant extent by the requirements of Sharia law. An 
interesting avenue for further research would be to consider how other Islamic countries have 
effected Sharia compliant regulation of m-payments and the successes and failures which 
have accompanied their attempts to do so.  
However, there are many other social differences which distinguish the challenge 
faced by UK legislators from that of their Saudi counterparts in respect of regulating m-





in the world26, and has a reasonably developed m-banking sector.27 It may therefore be 
helpful to draw comparisons between SA and other nations with a comparable degree of 
technological advancement, in particular smart phone use, in order to identify other 
potentially valuable regulatory models. Ideally, a number of alternative models would be 
available to allow regulators to compare the success of each and select the most favourable 
elements as the basis for a new Saudi Arabian regime. 
More generally, the m-payment market is amongst the most significant and fast-paced 
developments in financial services of modern times.28 In light of this, it is desirable in general 
that further research should be completed into the likely future developments of this market, 
the regulatory challenges which may lie ahead, and pre-emptive solutions which might be 
adopted to address these.29
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